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ABSTRACT
Assessing Social Protection Arrangements in Angola and Mozambique
by
André Cavaller Guzzi
Advisor: Susan L. Woodward
I examine the extent to which the involvement of international development
actors in poor and post-conflict countries can override the influence of the domestic
political elites on the outcomes of social protection programs. I compare the outcomes of
social protection arrangements in two post-conflict countries, Angola and Mozambique.
They have different levels and kinds of international involvement, which I define based
on the involvement of post-conflict UN peace operations and their dependency on foreign
aid. While Mozambique had a UN operation and has been dependent on foreign aid,
Angola did not have a UN operation after its civil war and does not depend on foreign aid.
I demonstrate that despite these different levels and kinds of international involvement,
the outcomes of social protection have been similar. I argue that while international
development actors may influence these countries to adopt internationally designed
programs of social protection, they neither alter the attitudes of the domestic government
in relation to redistributive programs nor are they able to expand the outcomes of the
programs implemented. I analyze three arrangements of social protection: reintegration of
former-combatants, fuel subsidies for consumers, and the institutionalization of formal
social protection structures. This dissertation contributes to the current debate on social
protection among international development actors by showing the importance of
considering social protection the result of domestic political dynamics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Overview
In this dissertation, I examine the extent to which the involvement of international
development actors in poor and post-conflict countries can override the influence of the
domestic political elites on the outcomes of social protection programs. I compare social
protection arrangements in two post-conflict countries, Angola and Mozambique. These
two countries have had different levels and kinds of international involvement in the
post-conflict context, which I define based on the involvement of post-conflict UN peace
operations and their dependency on foreign aid. I investigate how and if these different
levels of involvement affect the outcomes of social protection programs. I analyze three
social protection arrangements: the reintegration of former-combatants, fuel subsidies for
consumers, and the institutionalization of formal social protection structures.
Since 2000, social protection has become a central topic of the international
development agenda. 1 Although social protection does not have one single crystallized
definition, and different actors define different programs as such, most international
actors and organizations have referred to social protection as programs and institutions
that integrate development, mitigate poverty, and create social and economic inclusion.
The priority of social protection was accentuated after the 2008 global economic crisis,
when international development actors started to push for sustainable and long-term
responses, such as the development of state institutions, in the context of risks and
vulnerabilities, such as natural disasters and economic crises. Examples of these
programs are schemes of cash transfers (CTs) to the poor, micro- and area-based schemes
In chapter two, I explain that even though there is greater convergence among international actors on the
definition of social protection, the term does not yet have one single definition.
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(such as micro-finance and social funds, and agricultural support), child protection
programs, and public work (Anyang’ Nyong’o 2011). 2 For post-conflict countries,
examples of programs are pensions for former combatants and for individuals who were
physically affected by war (by landmines, for example), and cash transfer programs to
ex-combatants to help them reintegrate into society economically and socially (Carpenter,
Slater and Mallett 2012).
Until 2000, social protection was developed as short-term safety-net programs to
support vulnerable and poor groups. Examples of international development actors
include the United Nations organizations, the World Bank, the International Labour
Organization (ILO), and the traditional bilateral donors of the Development Assistance
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DACOECD). Each of these actors has labeled different programs as social protection. For
instance, in the 1990s, the World Bank referred to its safety net programs to support the
poorest population of low-income countries as social protection. The ILO has focused
mostly on labor rights as social protection and, for this reason, has provided technical
support to the creation of formal structures of social security and social assistance. It was
not until the turn of the millennium that these organizations started to find common
definitions of social protection and began to coordinate actions for the development of
social protection programs.
Although there appears to be a common interest in social protection among
international actors and an evolving commonality of definition and coordination among
them, the international actors and their mechanisms of influence are quite different
CTs will be discussed in chapters two and six. Public work programs are short-term work, such as
employing people to build a road or a school. For a critical analysis of the public work programs, see
McCord (2013).
2

2

between Angola and Mozambique. If international programs and influence matter, then
one would expect different outcomes between the two countries, as defined by the reach
and beneficiaries of such programs. As I detail below, the two countries are similar in
many ways. A significant exception is the role of international actors. To my initial
surprise, however, the outcomes of these social protection programs in Angola and
Mozambique were strikingly similar. I thus decided that the similarity must be due to
similar characteristics of their domestic political systems or politics. The main similarity
between them is the control of the same political elite in each country over the state. I
support empirically that Angola and Mozambique have similar outcomes of social
protection and, in the process, I counter those who emphasize the power of international
actors in post-conflict countries.
Despite this greater involvement of international development actors to push for
redistributive programs since 2000, it is the political elite that determines the existence
and extent of redistributive programs. In each country, the elites seek to maintain and
protect their wealth. Redistributive programs can be provided for the population in order
to respond to domestic pressures that come from opposing political parties, strong civil
society, and competing elites. Even authoritarian states can sometimes promote
redistributive programs to maintain their power unchallenged. However, states where the
elite obtains its wealth through the control of the state while domestic pressures are
restricted or non-existent, the elite in power will not have incentive to promote
redistributive programs because it can have what it needs whether or not the population is
in dire poverty. These kind of countries have exclusionary institutions of social protection,
which means that if social protection programs exist, they target a very small part of the

3

population, the elite itself, and those geographically and politically close to the elite. Both
Angola and Mozambique are examples of these kinds of countries.
I argue that the international involvement for the development of social protection
programs and institutions in post-conflict countries cannot override the political elites’
decision to maintain exclusionary institutions of social protection. I show that, despite the
different levels of international influence in Angola and Mozambique after the end of
their respective conflicts, the political elites managed to reject or counter the influence of
international actors for the development of social protection. I also answer the following
questions in this dissertation: to what degree do the outside international institutions that
push for social protection programs aim, in fact, at reducing economic inequality and
promoting poverty relief, the main goals of social protection programs? To determine
whether these institutions have an interest in equality and poverty relief, I rely on
evidence of international pressure to transform the nature of the state to make it more
redistributive and question the measures that these organizations use to determine the
success of programs and institutions. Second, to the extent that the pressure from these
international actors exists, how easy would it be for the domestic government, with no
incentives to promote redistributive programs, to minimize its effects?
While the international development actors may influence countries to adopt
internationally designed social protection programs and institutions, they alter neither the
attitudes of the political elites in relation to the programs implemented nor the outcomes
of the programs. By outcomes, I mean the reach and the beneficiaries of the programs
and institutions implemented. In fact, in some cases, i.e., the reintegration programs for
former militaries, the adopted programs and institutions of social protection have a
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different result than that expected by the international development actors and end up
supporting those limited groups whom exclusionary institutions of social protection tend
to favor. In all of the arrangements of social protection investigated, the international
development actors have their own agenda and understandings of social protection that
do not effectively alter the nature of the exclusionary political institutions for more
redistributive programs.
In order to identify how the international development actors attempt to push
social protection programs, I compare three arrangements of social protection in Angola
and Mozambique. By arrangement of social protection, I mean the decisions of both the
political elite and the international actors involved on the adopted programs, their
understandings of social protection, and their underlying goals, as well as the strategies
and outcomes of the programs and institutions. On the side of the political elites, I
analyze the strategies of these elites to adopt programs they prefer and to either reject or
minimize the ones that are enforced by the international development actors. On the side
of the international development actors, I present in each arrangement the actors involved,
and their understandings of social protection. The three arrangements of social protection
that I analyze the programs of reintegration of former-combatants, the fuel subsidies for
consumers, and the institutionalization of formal social protection structures.
In both countries, the political elite is the dominant political party, in Angola, the
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and, in Mozambique, the
Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). They have been in power since the
independence of both countries in 1975. Through the control of the state, the members
connected to the MPLA and FRELIMO have been able to obtain and accumulate wealth.
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The MPLA and FRELIMO were created during the colonial period as liberation
movements against the colonial power. After independence, they assumed power in their
respective countries and both tried to implement a Marxist government. Soon after their
independence, they also faced a long-lasting civil war in their countries. In Mozambique,
FRELIMO fought against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) until 1992,
when both parties decided to negotiate the end of the war. After the peace negotiations,
FRELIMO continued in power and has remained in power since then. In Angola, the
main opposition group was The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). The MPLA and UNITA fought the civil war until 2002, when the MPLA was
able to militarily defeat UNITA. The MPLA has also remained in power since then.
Angola and Mozambique have had different levels of international involvement in
their state-building process since the end of their respective civil wars. State-building is
the process of building political and economic institutions in the post-conflict context. 3 I
measure international involvement based on the leverage international actors have to
impose internationally designed programs and institutions. This leverage is the result of
the dependence of the country on foreign aid and the international involvement in the
state-building process of the country. Mozambique has depended heavily on foreign aid
and has experienced strong influence of traditional international actors in its statebuilding process after the end of its war in 1992. Angola, on the other hand, is an oil
exporter, so it has not depended on foreign aid, and it has had limited involvement of
traditional international actors in its state-building process after the end of its civil war in
2002.
This definition is built upon Fukuyama’s general definition of state-building as “the creation of new
governments and the strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama 2004).
3
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The MPLA and Frelimo have been able to control and oppress pressures from the
inside, mainly through the lack of strong political opposition and an extractive economy
that does not rely on the population to obtain wealth. They were able to maintain
themselves in power as a consequence of three main factors: first, the segregated society
during the colonial period that remains in both countries even today; second, they both
have economies that are connected to the global market (although in different ways); and,
third, the way that the civil war reinforced the concentration of state power in the capital
and the main urban areas of the country. The result in both cases is a state with a political
elite that has no incentives to establish redistributive programs for the entire population.
Through a comparison of the same arrangements of social protection in both
countries, I investigate the institutional variation between them and, when both countries
adopted similar programs and institutions, the variation in the outcomes. I find, first, that,
in the programs of military reintegration, the different the different involvement of
international actors at the end of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique did not alter
the political criteria to benefit some groups over others. Second, the fuel subsidies for
consumers, which international actors opposed in both countries but have a central role in
the political dynamics between the government and its constituents in both countries,
were instituted by both countries and a great amount of their state budgets to benefit a
restricted population, the wealthier and more urban population. Third, both countries
have formal structures of social protection, divided into social assistance programs (for
the poor population) and social security (for formal workers). Recently, international
development actors, mainly the World Bank and development agencies of bilateral
donors, have used programs of CTs to create state institutions, but here the difference
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between the two countries in international actors and conditions led to institutional
differences. This difference made Mozambique implement institutions of CTs, while
Angola did not. However, the decision of the Mozambican government to institutionalize
its CT programs can be considered a strategy of the domestic government to guarantee
that foreign aid keeps coming.
Moreover, despite the differences in their international conditions and actors of
influence, I also find that the domestic attitudes and understandings of formal social
protection institutions are very similar: in prioritizing a market-oriented restructuring to
favor macro-development instead of redistributive programs; and in favoring liberal
programs of social security for formal workers, who represent a very restricted number of
the elite and of the urban population, rather than programs for social assistance for
informal workers and for the poorest population in urban and rural areas.
Therefore, through the analysis of these three arrangements of social protection in
Angola and Mozambique, I will show that international development actors have not
greatly affected the nature of the state and the domestic governments’ attitudes on
redistribution and the outcomes of the institutions implemented. In Mozambique, the
programs of CT as part of their formal structures of the social protection were
implemented only to the extent they could please international actors, while keeping the
programs limited with a short-term scope. Angola shows the case of deciding not to adopt
internationally designed programs at all.
What follows in this chapter is the literature review of social protection in subSaharan Africa and international involvement in post-conflict countries. I then explain
my argument, research design, and case selection with more detail. After that, I present
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the methodology and the outline of the dissertation. I conclude this chapter with the
motivations and contributions of my dissertation to the study of social protection
programs and institutions in poor and post-conflict countries.

1.2. Literature Review
Since social protection became a central issue in the international agenda in 2000,
authors have been discussing the actual feasibility and the actual effect of these programs
in poor and post-conflict countries. According to Carpenter, Mallet, and Slate (2012),
authors and practitioners in favor of these programs have pointed out that they can
improve the relation between the state and the population, they can transform the
redistributive role of the state, and they can create more recognition among the
population about the importance of the state. On the other hand, there are authors who are
skeptical about social protection programs either because they believe it is just one more
donor fad or because the domestic states have no incentives to develop them. My
argument shows that although international actors can have an influence in developing
institutions of social protection, the outcomes of programs are determined by domestic
political elites.
I build my argument using three main sets of literature. The first is the literature
that develops a comprehensive approach on social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. As
comprehensive approach, I mean the literature that identifies the main characteristics of
social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. 4 The second is the literature that criticizes the

This is also called cluster literature because it identifies common trends in regions of the world to explain
variation of social protection within and among these regions. Examples of this literature are Haggard and
Kaufman (2008) and Gough and Wood (2004). For case studies of countries and programs of social
protection in developing and poor countries, see Barrientos and Hulme (2008).

4
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practices of international actors, and their understandings, in the state-building process in
post-conflict countries. The third is the literature that analyzes the relations between
international donors and the partners of aid.
In relation to the first set of literature, there are three major examples of works that
develop a comprehensive approach on social protection: Bevan (2004), Hickey (2008),
and Devereux and Cipryk (2009). According to the comprehensive approach,
international involvement is one aspect among others, such as domestic political issues,
neo-patrimonialism, the weak taxation system of the countries, and an extractive
economy, that in combination explain the current state of social protection in the region.
Bevan (2004) explains that Africa has an “insecurity welfare state,” characterized by a
mixed regime that is a combination of several political practices, such as the institutional
legacy from the colonial period, patron-client relationships, and corruption. Additionally,
poor economic conditions led to a system of non-capitalist characteristics (for example,
no industrial working class and no competitive labor market). Finally, international
involvement has a donor-driven, Eurocentric social policy agenda that responds very little
to the real needs of the society (Bevan 2004, 94). Hickey (2008) explains the political
dynamics of social protection and the effects of global and social forces that lead to
national policies and, as a result, to social protection programs. Devereux and Cipryk
(2009) provide a general overview of how the commitments made in national social
protection policies and strategies are being translated into programs and projects by
African governments, with support from the international development actors.
The outcomes of the social protection programs and institutions are, in fact, a
combination of the factors mentioned in this comprehensive literature. However, I will
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propose an explanation of how these different factors relate to each other in specific
African countries. This relation leads to cross-country variation of social protection
institutions and programs. 5
The second set of literature that I build my analysis on is the literature that
criticizes the practices of international actors in the state-building process in post-conflict
countries. Social protection programs have been pushed by international actors mostly
often in poor countries that are also post-conflict countries. This is because the social
conditions of post-conflict countries are even more dire, according to international
development actors (World Development Report 2011, 5). This push coincided with the
state-building process, through which international actors decided to create and reform
political institutions in these countries. They worked under the assumption that the
creation of certain political and economic institutions would help guarantee an
environment for stable development and, in turn, this would guarantee that war would not
reoccur. 6
Within the literature that criticizes the practices of international actors in the statebuilding process in post-conflict countries, there are two sets of scholarship where I focus
There is great variation in the study of social protection in Angola and Mozambique because of the
variation in their social protection policies and in international involvement in the two countries. There is
an extensive literature on social protection in Mozambique. The most prominent research center that
develops studies on social protection is the Institutto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos (IESE), whose
“social protection” research is under the coordination of António Alberto da Silva Francisco. Most of the
research is available on the website: http://www.iese.ac.mz/grupo-de-investigacao-de-pobreza-e-proteccaosocial/. Given that Angola does not have formal institutions of social assistance and more than 70% of the
national budget for social programs goes to fuel subsidies, studies and reports on Angola focus on this issue
instead. For instance, see the “Position of the Political and Social Observatory of Angola (OPSA) and the
Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA) on the State General Budget” Report.
Authors have also focused on social protection programs developed by international actors outside the
scope of the national government, namely the social funds. Finally, there is also a set of works on informal
social protection in both countries. For informal systems in Mozambique, see: Quive (2007). For a general
overview of informal social protection in lusophonic countries, see: Rodrigues, Lopes and Feliciano (2009).
This literature on social protection in Angola and Mozambique provides the central empirical basis for this
dissertation.
6
This assumption is also a consequence of the neo-liberal underpinnings of the peace building process,
where there is the assumption that peace will follow from market reforms (Paris 2004).
5
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attention here. The first literature challenges the understandings and assumption of
international actors on African nations. For instance, Mustapha (2002) argues that in
Africa there are voices struggling for better life conditions, which are oftentimes
neglected, and that the current political practices in the region, such as rent-seeking,
corruption, and patrimonialism, which are harshly condemned by Western policy-makers
and scholars, are not practices common only to that region. Instead, Khan, Giacaman, and
Amundsen (2004) argue that these practices not only did happen in currently rich
countries, but also some of these practices helped their process of development (Khan,
Giacaman and Amundsen 2004). This view supports my understanding on the political
elites because I analyze them through their political motivations and interests, instead of
focusing solely on corruption and practices of embezzlement.
The second literature criticizes the practices of international actors in developing
state-building in post-conflict contexts. Some authors criticize the fact that international
actors transferred institutions that existed in the donors’ countries (most of them being
industrialized Western states) with no attention to the local demands and specificities. In
addition, international actors assumed that those emulated institutions would take the
same function after being implemented in the post-conflict country. 7
Other scholars criticize the Western view of how the state should be organized in
the process of state-building. Some authors argue that there are alternative political orders
to the modern Western form of the state. 8 Other authors argue that, in fact, what
international actors do is not a Weberian state, but what they think (or understand) a

For the literature on institutional transfers, see: Brownlee (2007), Pritchett and Weijer (2010), and
Levitsky and Murillo (2013).
8
See: Menkhaus (2006) and Boege, et al. (2009).
7
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Weberian state is. 9 These authors explain that international actors associate a Weberian
state with the rational-legal type of dominance and neglect the fact that Weber says that
there are other forms of dominance, the traditional and charismatic. In addition,
international actors who promote state-building ignore the fact that state institutions are
the result of a very long process of state formation and, as Woodward explains, “the
product of decisions by local rulers when their power and authority are under threat from
domestic challengers or due to changed economic or security conditions, usually as a
result of exogenous shocks” (Woodward 2011, 88).
In response to the recent literature and the practitioner community that emphasize
the role of public service in the process of state-building, van de Walle and Scott (2011)
explain that the creation and distribution of such services in Western European countries
was highly political. They show that the delivery of public services were not part of the
state-building process European countries, but, instead, helped later the states to gain
legitimacy, defined in terms of the population recognizing the existence and importance
of the state as an institution. 10
In the literature on social protection, there is a Western assumption that social
protection needs to be channeled through a formal state structure and ignores other forms
of social protection that exist in these post-conflict countries. Examples of these informal
forms of social protection are community and family systems of savings and support that
See: Boege, et al. (2009).
A central point of their argument is the difference between state-building and nation-building. They say
that in Europe, there was a temporal difference between the two processes. State-building refers to the
process of the consolidation of modern bureaucracies in the 17th and 18th century. Nation-building refers to
the process of “psychological integration” of the state. In this process, states reached out to the masses, and
public services have been an important instrument of this: the emergence of conscription, obligatory
schooling, improved communication and infrastructural network through roads, railways, and postal
services. These agencies of change contributed to the process of state-building at the same time as the
development of a nation. They claim that the literature of development today uses both terms
interchangeably, hence also erroneously (van de Walle and Scott 2011).
9

10
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have more often provided social protection to the population than the formal state
structures of social protection. 11 The international development community qualifies
these systems as informal social protection to differentiate them from the formal state
structures of social protection. 12
This set of literature contributes to my argument because it shows that
international actors work under their own assumptions about how to resolve the problems
in African countries and how, instead of considering the political specificities of poor and
post-conflict states. In the social protection debate, international development actors also
have a specific understanding of who should receive the assistance, mostly often
emphasizing the poorest of the poor and those living in rural areas.
Finally, the third set of literature that I use to build my analysis is the scholarship
that analyzes the relations between donors and partners of aid. I draw my analysis based
on Whitfield´s work (2009). According to her,
[T]he outcomes of aid negotiations are the product of the encounter between the
recipient and donor preferences, and the ability of each actor to successfully
achieve their preferred outcomes is heavily constrained by the conditions under
which each faces the other and the negotiating strategies they adopt to pursue their
preferences (Whitfield 2009, 12).
Her argument has two central points that are central in my analysis: first, it
challenges previous works that have a very passive view of the recipients of aid and that
focused more on the side of the donors (Whitfield 2009, 12). 13 Second, her argument

See: De Conink, John and Emily Drani (2009).
While in several countries the state incorporates informal social protection as complementary
mechanisms of formal social protection, they most often work as substitutes of formal structures of social
protection. For a general understanding of the relations between formal and informal institutions
(complementarity and substitution), see Helmke and Levitsky (2004).
13
Clapham (1996) also explains different mechanisms that domestic states use to circumvent international
involvement: resistance, acceptance, and acceptance with subversion.
11
12
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integrates three aspects of aid that I also integrate in my analysis of social protection: the
negotiations of programs, their implementation, and the outcomes. 14
Therefore, these three groups of literature (comprehensive social protection in
Africa, critical analysis of the international state-building in post-conflict countries, and
the relations between donors and partners of aid) help understand some of the
assumptions and practices of international development actors in poor and post-conflict
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. My analysis builds on these sets of literature to
understand the main motivations and actions of international development actors to push
for social protection programs and institutions and to understand if they alter the effects
of internal domestic politics on the outcomes of social protection.

1.3. Argument, research design, and case-selection
Statement of the argument
I argue despite international pressures, the international development actors
cannot override the control of the power elites in Angola and Mozambique over the
outcomes of social protection. While international development actors may influence
countries to adopt internationally designed social protection programs and institutions,
they neither alter the attitudes of the domestic government in relation to redistributive
programs nor are they able to expand the outcomes of such programs. By outcomes, I
refer to the reach and beneficiaries of the programs and institutions implemented.
My argument uses two stages of the international influence to implement social
I differ from how the countries are selected for her work. While she has a chapter dedicated to
Mozambique, she excludes Angola because, according to her, it is an authoritarian country, and it thus has
greater leverage to reject international demands. As I will show later, part of my argument is that the
negotiations with Angola and Mozambique are based on ideas that the international actors have about the
country and that there were cases where the international actors decided not to negotiate with Angola, not
the other way around.

14
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protection institutions and programs: first, during the international state-building process,
international development actors create programs and institutions of social protection in
poor and post-conflict countries. This period is when international actors reform or build
institutions in post-conflict countries. The international actors will pressure the domestic
government to adopt them and the domestic governments will either accept or reject them
depending on the nature of international involvement in the state-building process. The
second stage is the post-state-building period, when institutions and programs are run by
the state and the international development actors just promote financial and technical
support for them. In this second period, domestic political actors most often choose
and/or design the social protection programs they prefer to adopt and, for the ones that
are internationally imposed, domestic actors control and limit the outcomes, defined as
the beneficiaries of such programs.
With my analysis of three arrangements in Angola and Mozambique during these
two stages of international influence, I refute the arguments made by international social
policy reports and advocates of social protection programs that international involvement
in post-conflict countries. They state that, in fact, international involvement can alter the
political dynamics of poor and post-conflict states through their pressures to implement
internationally designed programs and institutions of social protection. However, as I
show with my case studies, the internationally designed programs and institutions that
international actors push for not only have little effect on the outcomes of social
protection programs, but also, in some cases, they end up reinforcing the restricted
outcomes of the programs determined by the exclusionary political institutions of social
protection of the countries.
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Finally, my argument proposes that, in poor and post-conflict countries, social
protection has a similar logic in comparison to other richer and more developed countries.
In every state with structures of social protection, the decisions over who benefits from
such programs and institutions happen through political criteria. This is because those
who benefit from the programs, such as workers, rural vs. urban population, and the
poorest population, and the benefits they get are part of a trade-off, i.e., electoral relations,
or to guarantee popular support, between the government and the population. In poor and
post-conflict countries, this dynamic is not different and those who are power will not
promote redistributive programs if there are no domestic demands or pressures, such as
strong civil society, strong opposing political parties, and competing elites. This is
specifically the case when the political elite controls the state and this control is the
source of their wealth. As a result, I show here that the beneficiaries of programs of social
protection in these countries end up being the very limited group of the political leaders’
constituencies and supports.

Research design
I demonstrate this argument through analyzing three social protection
arrangements in Angola and Mozambique: military reintegration programs, fuel subsidies
for consumers, and the institutionalization of formal social protection structures. I use the
definition of arrangements of social protection because each of these programs has a
different set of actors, ideas, strategies, and outcomes. Using the arrangements, I can also
have a clear understanding of the contexts surrounding the creation of a particular
program or institution and the reasons behind each actor’s decisions.
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I analyze the three arrangements of social protection in Angola and Mozambique.
Between 2001 and 2010, both countries were among the five sub-Saharan African
countries in the top ten list of the world’s fastest growing economies. 15 They were also
considered in a period of normal politics, where elections happen periodically, although
with questionable transparency, and the recurrence of conflict is unlikely. 16 However, at
the same time that their macro-economic indicators are growing very fast, they are still
among the poorest countries in the world. 17 The fact that both countries have an
increasing macro-economic development accompanied by low social indicators,
international development actors have stressed, since 2000s, the importance of, and have
tried to influence, the adoption of redistributive programs, i.e., social protection programs,
in these countries.
Domestically, both countries have a “dominant political power,” which means
that although there is some space for political contestation by opposing groups, there is a
15
The other three countries were Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Rwanda. “Africa’s Impressive Growth,” The
Economist, January 2011. This economic success is related to the export of natural resources, such as oil,
natural gas, coal, minerals, and agricultural commodities. Therefore, this growth is vulnerable to the price
of these commodities in the external market.
16
There is variation between these countries. In both countries, the opposition usually claims fraud in the
elections. In addition, the opposition party in Mozambique usually states that it will restart the conflict.
However, in the time frame of the dissertation, the conflict had not reoccurred.
17 In Angola, for example, 36.6% of the population lives below the poverty line (18.7% of the urban
population, and 58.3% of the rural population, according to the Millennium Development Report of 2010).
Angola also has a high Gini coefficient of 42.5 in 2013, which indicates the high inequality in terms of
economic redistribution. In Mozambique, social development also remains slow. According to the most
recent Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Report on Mozambique (2010), in a total population of 21.2
million in 2007/08, 54.7% were living below the poverty line, 49.7% of adults (15 years and above) were
illiterate, and 11.5% of adults between 15 and 49 years old had HIV/AIDS. MDG Report on Mozambique
(2010). According to the Report, there were no statistically significant changes in the level of poverty from
2002/2003, 54.1%, to 2007/2008, 54.7%. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS raised from 9.3% in 2002/2003 to
11.5% in 2007/2008. Adult illiteracy rate raised from 46.4% in 2002/2003 to 49.7% in 2007/2008.
Available
at
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country %20Reports/Mozambique
/mozambique_september2010.pdf. Visited on 17 Sep 2014. In 2012, Mozambique was ranked at second to
the last position in the Human Development Index (HDI). Congo and Niger were tied in the last position.
See
Table
1:
Human
Development
Index
and
its
components.
Available
at:
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013%
20Report%20English.pdf. Visited on 17 Sep 2014.
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dominant group that controls the political system, creating a blurry line between the state
and the party (Carothers 2002). 18 The dominant political power in both countries, the
MPLA and FRELIMO have been in power since their independence from Portugal in
1975. 19 In addition, these parties control and concentrate the wealth of their countries. In
Angola, the MPLA controls the export of oil. In Mozambique, since FRELIMO was in
control of the privatization process that took place in the country in the 1980s and 1990s,
it could guarantee to its members access to those companies. Therefore, these two parties
similarly have an interest in keeping control of the state, through which they obtain their
economic assets, as they do. They also have an interest in keeping exclusionary control of
state institutions to guarantee that it benefits only those associated with political power.
As a consequence, I argue, redistributive programs and institutions, i.e., programs of
social protection, were very limited in scope (or almost nonexistent). When these
programs are created and/or institutionalized, these dominant parties use them to serve
their interests. 20
Despite these similarities in the political elites, Angola and Mozambique have had
different influence from international actors after the end of their conflicts. To analyze
international involvement, I use two mechanisms of influence. One is their dependence
on and relations with traditional donors and international financial institutions (IFIs), the
World Bank and the IMF, for foreign aid. The other is the international involvement in

As Carothers (2002) says, there can be variation from one dominant system to another based on the level
of freedom and openness to the market.
19
Variation between this process in Angola and Mozambique will be explained in chapter three. One
central difference in these two countries is that in Mozambique, FRELIMO remains in power, but the
president has changed. In Angola, the president, Eduardo dos Santos, from the MPLA has been in power
since 1979.
20
Note that this is broader than having social protection working under political criteria, by which I mean to
provide programs and services to specific groups in a society (i.e., ethnic group). To serve the interests of
the elite includes also the creation of programs of social protection for members of the elite.
18
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the state-building process in each country. Since the 1980s, Mozambique has been one of
the greatest recipients of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa and its state-building has been
greatly influenced by international actors since the end of its war in 1992. Angola,
because of its wealth from export of oil, has not been dependent on international aid and
its state-building process did not have the involvement of international actors. Therefore,
the international influence in these countries are very different.
While

the

variation

of

international

involvement

can

explain

the

institutionalization process of social protection, this variation does not explain the
outcomes of the arrangements of social protection in both countries. As outcome, I mean
the reach and the beneficiaries from such arrangements. Instead, I argue here, the political
elites of these countries control the outcomes of such programs. The persistence of the
same elites in power in both countries are explained by how the domestic economy of
these countries is inserted in the global market, the socially segregated society and the
dynamics of their civil wars. Angola and Mozambique have a political and economic elite
that have connections, although in different ways, to the global market and through these
connections, they obtain their wealth. In summary, Table 1.1. shows the differences and
similarities between Angola and Mozambique.

Table 1.1: Differences and Similarities between Angola and Mozambique
Angola
Mozambique
Inserted in the Global
Capital Market?

Yes

Yes

Dependent on foreign
aid?

No

Yes

20

International
involvement in
institution-building

No

Yes

Institutionalization of
CT programs?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Power elites control
the outcomes of
institutions and
programs?
Source: Created by the author

With these similarities and differences in mind between the relations of Angola
and Mozambique with international actors, I compare the arrangements of social
protection in both countries. In each arrangement, the political elites pursue different
strategies to interact with international actors. In the case of Mozambique, the strategy
has been to accept, reject, or circumvent international actors’ demands. The existence of
numerous donors in the country helps attenuate some of the international pressures
because the government can have different sources of aid and because one donor can
pressure the other to alleviate their demands. In the case of Angola, given that the country
does not receive assistance from traditional donors, the strategy has been to negotiate
with international actors for financial support for social programs. International actors
demand social programs as conditions for international loans. Angola’s economy relies
on the export of oil, so its economy is vulnerable due to international demand and price
volatility of the commodity. Therefore, whenever there is a slump in the price of oil, the
government of Angola becomes more receptive to donor pressures for reform, such as the
increase of expenditure on public services, i.e., education, health, and cuts of fuel
subsidies (Boyce 2004).
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Case selection
In the recent push for social protection in Africa, Angola and Mozambique
represent unique cases. Mozambique is usually considered by the international
development community a case of successful social protection structure in sub-Saharan
Africa. This is because it has the oldest institution of CT in sub-Saharan Africa, the Food
Subsidy Program (PSA), which in 2012 changed its name to Program of Basic Social
Subsidy (PSSB). Mozambique has also been considered the “case of success” on many
fronts of international involvement in Africa, such as in its peace operations and the
development of a stable democratic structure. Angola, on the other hand, is one of the
few countries in Africa that has not yet adopted a program of cash transfers and is
considered by international development actors as having underdeveloped structures of
social protection in general.
Despite the singularity of Angola and Mozambique in comparison to other
countries in Africa – same colonial power, late independence, civil war, and Marxist
experiment, I analyze two aspects that can be generalizable to other countries in poor and
post-conflict countries. First is the existence of an elite in almost every capitalist system
that is connected to the global market and that influences the outcomes of social
protection mechanisms. Second, since I am analyzing the international involvement in
these countries and how it varies based on African countries’ insertion into the global
market, it is possible to draw similar analysis to other poor and post-conflict countries in
sub-Saharan Africa.
The case studies are divided into the programs of social protection, it is important
to explain why I chose to study the selected social protection programs. I chose programs
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that are referred to as social protection by both sides of the actors. I also chose programs
that are channeled through the state, even if they are financed by and receive technical
support from international donors. I chose programs that exist in both countries, or that at
least are in the process of negotiation between international and domestic actors. 21
Programs of social protection are different from other social programs that can be
implemented just by international implementing NGOs with no involvement of the
domestic government, such as education and health. This is the same reason why I did
not select community-based programs of social protection, such as social funds,
Community-Based Development (CBDs), and, more recently, the Community-Driven
Development (CDDs) projects. Finally, I selected programs from different moments after
the end of the conflict to check for variation of international actors’ motives to introduce
them.
Finally, there are three reasons why I chose to analyze institutions of social
protection instead of internationally imposed institutions during the state-building process
in general. First, social protection, as an institution, seemed to be recognized as a
different (or unexpected) route of the state-building process in African post-conflict
countries, which was mostly conducted through a neo-liberal ideology (Ferguson 2015).
Second, social protection institutions were being pushed at a later stage of state-building,
in comparison to other institutions, such as elections, political parties, and armed forces.
Third, different from other social programs, such as education and health, the benefits of
social protection to social development are contested among the international
development community. Some domestic and international actors, influenced by a liberal
That is, I excluded flood assistance in Mozambique. The country is the second most vulnerable to
flooding in the whole world, behind only Bangladesh. So, there are social protection programs for this issue.
21
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understanding of social protection, believe that the provision of direct financial support to
the population can be detrimental to the development of human capital and individuals
can become too dependent on such assistance. In other words, along with the difficulties
on the ground to execute social programs in general, the proponents of social protection
have also to prove that the programs have positive effects on social inclusion and
reduction of poverty.

1.4. Methodology
Methods and definitions
In order to understand how the domestic political elites have control over the
social protection outcomes and the international development actors cannot alter this
control, I use a combination of three methods in this dissertation. First, I use a “critical
social policy method,” which means, according to Bevan (2004, 117), an “in-depth
understanding of political economy and social-cultural contexts, and how [and if] policy
actually works in practice in different contexts.” Second, for each program analyzed, I
make a comparison between the relations between Mozambique and international actors
and the relations between Angola and international actors. Third, I use a process-tracing
method to understand the power structure in Angola and Mozambique and how these
power structures affect the creation and adoption of programs and institutions of social
protection.
I call Angola and Mozambique “poor” as a reference to their low human
development index and the fact that they have a sizable amount of their population below
the poverty line. At the same time, their societies have the lowest levels of social
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conditions in the world. However, I do recognize in my analysis that the great difference
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between the two countries is, in fact, one of the main
reasons why international donors and institutions, especially those influenced by the
international financial institutions, treat them differently. As defined by the World Bank,
Angola is a middle-income country and Mozambique, a low-income country, but their
social conditions remain among the lowest in the world. 22 This different category makes
Mozambique eligible for international aid programs that Angola does not qualify for.
I call them post-conflict countries despite the fact that the international actors
have shifted their strategy from post-conflict recovery to development in both countries
for three reasons. First, I study social protection programs since the end of their wars,
namely the support for ex-combatants’ reintegration. Second, there is no actual definition
of a post-conflict country, and there is usually an overlap between the international
development and post-conflict agendas, making it hard to draw a line between these two
periods. Finally, legacies of the conflict remain and as I will argue, some of these legacies
determine who receive the limited programs of social protection that exist in the country.
Finally, the timeframe of the analysis of this dissertation starts in the 1980s, when
both countries officially moved from a Marxist-oriented government to an open market
one, and ends in September 2014. 23

1.5.Outline

22
According to the World Bank data, low-income countries have a gross national income (GNI) per capita
of $1,045 or less and middle-income economies have GNI per capita more than $1,045 but less than
$12,736. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures life expectancy, education,
and income per capita, Angola and Mozambique have low human development (HDR 2013).
23
I emphasize “officially” because the idea that Angola ever actually adopted a Marxist government is
frequently challenged due to its connection with the global market through the export of oil.
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Chapter two defines and contextualizes social protection in the international
development agenda. It explains the definitions of social protection. It will then explain
the arrangements of social protection, highlighting the international actors involved in
each of them, their understandings of social protection, their motivations for pushing or
implementing them, and the responses of the domestic governments where social
protection is being implemented. This chapter also explains the similarities and
differences from one arrangement to another, both institutionally, meaning the
international actors and donors involved, and ideologically, the assumptions that guide
the international actors.
Chapter three focuses on the explanatory variable, the political elite of Angola
and Mozambique.
Chapters four, five, and six discuss the arrangements of social protection: the
programs for reintegration of ex-combatants, fuel subsidies for consumers, and the
institutionalization of social protection structures.
The concluding chapter restates the main findings of the dissertation, presents an
overview of what has happened with social protection in Angola and Mozambique from
July 2014 to May 2016, and proposes questions for future research.

1.6. Motivations and contributions
My main motivation to write this dissertation was to study social programs in
post-conflict countries. My original idea was that the long-term sustainability of peace in
post-conflict countries is said to depend on the outcomes for the population, especially
socio-economic improvement, and this requires some efforts at equalization, i.e.,
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redistribution. I then chose to focus on social protection not only because it became a
primary focus later of international actors, but also because it was the first set of
programs that aimed directly at this issue.
For instance, in September 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a Resolution that mentioned social protection as one of the main pillars of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 24 This means that social protection will serve
as a global framework for social policy programs until 2030, and their consequences will
be addressed in the years that will follow.
The main contribution of this dissertation is to show that social protection is part
of the domestic political processes and decisions of those in power based on the
incentives and pressures that will lead them to promote redistributive programs. As
Ferguson (2015, 13) states, “most of the discussion about [social protection] programs
has been in the public policy field -- asking questions about whether or how well such
programs ‘work,’ how they can be improved, and so on.” My dissertation shows that
domestic political dynamics is not just one more issue that hinders or advances the
adoption and execution of social protection, as it is often portrayed by international
reports on social protection. Rather, social protection is the consequence of the politics of
poor and post-conflict countries in the domestic (between the government and the
beneficiaries of the programs) and international (government and international donors)
realms.

24
Goal 1.3 of the SDGs calls for the implementation of “nationally appropriate social protection systems
and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable.”
A/RES/70/1 - Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Adopted on
September, 25, 2015. Available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
Visited on 15 Jun 2016.
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I also contribute to the study of the social protection institution in Mozambique, in
particular. As mentioned above, the CT program in the country is the oldest CT program
in sub-Saharan Africa and is considered a case of successful social protection in the
region. I analyze whether this success that Mozambique is oftentimes said to represent in
regard to the current push for social protection institutions in poor countries is based on
the circular reasoning of the policy-making literature, which measures success based
solely on the creation of programs and on what it accomplishes (Pitcher 2014, 10),
instead of measuring the result of the programs based on the dimensions of what it still
should do and accomplish. 25 In other words, I defend that Mozambique is considered a
successful case of social protection just because of the fact that the institutions of social
protection exist and not because of their effectiveness.
In summary, this dissertation broadens the analysis of social protection in poor
and post-conflict countries. It problematizes the role of international development actors
in the development of social protection programs and institutions because they disregard
the domestic political dynamics of the countries where such programs and institutions are
adopted. This dissertation suggests that while this disregard remains, internationally
designed social protection will continue being incremental and not transformative.

Chapter 2: Contextualizing the Arrangements of Social Protection
2.1. Introduction
This chapter explains the contexts, definitions, and concepts of social protection
arrangements. The inclusion of social protection in the development agenda is relatively
This argument is based on the commitment of actors to implement policies. In other words, if actors are
willing to institute the program, then it is a success; if they are not, then it is a failure.
25
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new, dating from 2000 (Cook and Kabeer 2009; Rocha Menocal 2010). For this reason,
even in countries that finished their conflict in the early 1990s and have had international
involvement since then, the institutions of social protection are still incipient and
international development actors are still in the process of evaluating the feasibility and
opportunities for their creation. Before this push for social protection institutions,
programs of social protection in poor and post-conflict countries were mainly led by
international actors in a limited, sometimes not much beyond rhetoric, and patchy way. In
the current push for institutions of social protection, international development actors are
engaged in the so-called process of state-building. As such, development donors provide
technical and financial assistance for their partners to develop their own institutions of
social protection. Therefore, in order to understand the institutionalization of social
protection in post-conflict countries, it is necessary to analyze the programs and
institutions of social protection in the broader context of the international agenda for
post-conflict countries.
This is what this chapter does. It first defines and conceptualizes social protection
in the international development agenda. Then, it introduces the idea of arrangements of
social protection, and goes on to explain the three arrangements of social protection:
military reintegration, fuel subsidies, and the current institutionalization of formal social
protection structures. It will also explain the arrangements of social protection in the two
case studies of this dissertation: Angola and Mozambique.

2.2. Social protection in post-conflict countries
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According to Cook and Kabeer (2009), international development actors use the
term social protection in three main ways. First, some use it as an umbrella term to refer
to all socio-economic programs, ‟including social security, social insurance, health care,
child protection” (NASI 2008, cited in Cook and Kabeer 2009, 3). Second, others have a
narrower view of the term and exclude social services (e.g., education and health
programs). Finally, others place the emphasis on social transfer programs that target
groups falling outside the coverage of formal labor-market based social security
programs (Cook and Kabeer 2009). 26
A better way to understand the common ground of a definition of social
protection is through understanding its function. 27 Cook and Kabeer (2009) explain that
social protection programs consider poverty not as static, but as a dynamic concept and
identify mechanisms to prevent the negative effects of the vulnerabilities and risks of
individuals’ and households’ socio-economic conditions. That is why these programs
require more long-term attention from their providers than other kinds of social programs.
As described by Barrientos and Hulme (2008),
[S]ocial protection must perform three main functions: (i) to help protect basic
levels of consumption among those in poverty or in danger of falling into poverty;
(ii) to facilitate investment in human and other productive assets that alone can
provide escape routes from persistent and intergenerational poverty; and (iii) to
strengthen the agency of those in poverty so that they can overcome their
predicament (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, 4).
This definition by Cook and Kabeer is related to a theoretical idea of social
protection. In practice, some programs that are labeled social protection do not have the
26
This dissertation focuses on the second approach because two of my case studies – reintegration support
for ex-combatants and the cash transfer to the poor – are examples of social transfer programs.
27
The choice to define social protection through its function is because this is the common ground among
the different definitions. The kinds of programs, or the reasons of why the state should provide social
protection, or the justifications for why individuals should receive social protection vary among the
definitions of social protection by the different actors.
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characteristics that they refer. Some programs of social protection have had a short-term
scope.
Since 2000, social protection has increasingly become a central topic in the
development agenda in post-conflict countries. In 2000, the international development
agenda became more committed to programs of poverty reduction because of the creation
of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They used social protection as one
program for that goal. The recent push for social protection has also coincided with
another central goal of the development agenda, state-building. According to Woodward
(unpub. ms. 2016), by 2002 state-building became “the common term for different
perspectives on a commonly perceived problem.” These differently perceived problems
included the global security threat, massive human rights violations, underdevelopment,
and debt arrears to the World Bank (Woodward unpub. ms. 2016, 76). The commonly
perceived problem was related to the “fragility” or “weakness” of the state to control or
prevent these problems. State-building also became the central focus of the international
development community, and since the turn of the millennium, “almost every major
donor has identified state-building as one of its key objectives, particularly in fragile
states” (Rocha Menocal 2010, 3).
In practice, as mentioned in chapter one, state-building refers to the involvement
of international actors in creating new government institutions and strengthening existing
ones in poor and post-conflict countries. Examples of these institutions are the
constitution, political systems (e.g., power sharing), the electoral process, the security and
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justice sector institutions, and, recently, institutions for social protection. 28 Along with
political reforms, state-building has also an economic component in which international
financial institutions (IFIs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank,
determine the macroeconomic policies of the state and its relation with the global market.
In other words, state-building refers to an international enterprise, composed by several
international actors, to reform the political and economic structures of the country, with
not much, if any, involvement of domestic actors.
The attention to social protection in the post-conflict development agenda,
however, has not always been the same. In fact, social protection was mostly ignored in
countries that ended their civil wars in the 1990s and some that finished in the 2000s.
Three main reasons can explain this neglect, despite a rhetoric of the use of social
protection in official discourses and official documents. First, the international actors
involved in post-conflict countries were more focused on ending the conflict than finding
and proposing economic and sustainable solutions for war-affected communities. In other
words, peace operations worked under the premise of a peace dividend, meaning that
while they provide peace, individuals will then automatically have a better chance to
prosper economically.
Second, all of these countries went through a period of structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) in the 1980s through which they had to reform their economies as a
condition to receive foreign loans. Those reforms set a strict policy for cuts in public
expenditures for sectoral development, including social protection. Examples of other
conditions were: “to reduce the government public sector workforce and lower remaining
These different areas do not receive the same attention from the international actors. In fact, social
protection is one of the lowest priorities of the international actors. For an in-depth analysis of the variation
of analysis in different state-building processes, see Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes (2007).
28
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salaries, remove subsidies and price controls, devalue local currency, sell state-owned
enterprises, weaken state environmental and labor regulations, and deregulate movement
of capital” (Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010). In addition to cuts in state subsidies of
consumer goods, social services were privatized and they were implemented in the
following ways: (1) through user fees, meaning that individuals needed to pay to receive
services, 29 (2) private insurance, (3) decentralization of government services, and (4)
implementation by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Pfeiffer and
Chapman 2010).
Third, development actors were still providing assistance under the principles of
humanitarian assistance, the ones that dictated their assistance during the conflict. They
provided emergency and short-term assistance to the individuals who were seen to need
relief the most, primarily implemented by INGOs, and without long-term mechanisms of
social assistance (Havey, et al. 2007). Moreover, the post-conflict agenda of international
actors pushed for the development of a liberal state, with a minimum role in the economy
(Paris 2004), and with very limited, if at all, institutions of social protection.
In relation to social protection, the most famous programs implemented in poor
and post-conflict countries were the safety net programs, developed by the World Bank. 30
The goal of these programs, referred to as the social dimensions of structural adjustment,
were to alleviate the negative impacts of the SAPs. Those programs targeted specific
vulnerable populations, such as the urban poor affected by the cuts of government
User fee policies in the health sector have been considered overall a failure because they are regressive
and discriminate against the poor (Hall 2007, 156).
30
Safety nets vary considerably from the definition of social protection. While social protection supports
households in reducing, preventing, and overcoming hazards that adversely affect well-being, consumption,
and investments, safety nets were advocated as responses to financial crises and adjustment policies.
However, a well-designed safety net can be an important part of a social protection approach, if their
existence is well known before the crisis hits (Shepherd, Marcus and Barrientos 2004).
29
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subsidies of basic consumption goods. These safety net programs, however, were harshly
criticized for having a very limited scope in the face of the generalized negative effects of
the SAPs. 31 As Hanlon puts it, these social programs were like a drop of water in the
ocean. 32 In addition to the World Bank, UN agencies and international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs), such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Health Organization
(WHO), have also implemented some programs of social protection in poor and postconflict countries (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, 11).
The World Bank also influenced the political institutions of these countries.
Following the 1989 report on Africa, the World Bank started to focus on the idea of good
governance. With this inclusion, the World Bank started to make clear statements of what
it considered appropriate political practices and made strong criticisms of what they
believed were corruption, neo-patrimonialism, and rent-seeking as preventing the
development of proper state functions and resulting economic growth. 33 In other words,

The IFIs did not take into consideration the fact that conflict-affected countries have different issues (or
more issues) to deal with than other developing countries and thus they did not create specific adjustment
programs for them. Woodward (2011) explains that the process in which World Bank provides assistance
to post-conflict recovery is also conditioned by economic growth. “Because the World Bank assistance
requires a prior agreement with the IMF, and an IMF agreement requires a prior settlement of a country’s
debt arrears, economic policies for peace are not formulated in terms of policies necessary for aid
(shouldn’t this be for peace?)” (Woodward 2011, 90). De Castillo gives examples of issues particular to
post-conflict countries, such as the reintegration of former combatants into productive activities, the return
of displaced people to their original homes, the destroyed infrastructures of the countries, especially in the
rural areas, and the difficulty to access some regions in the country where most likely the most vulnerable
population is located (del Castillo 2008).
32
In addition to the generalized poverty of those countries, this recognition was brought to the attention of
the international actors after the rise of a large number of riots (known as IMF riots) that happened in the
urban areas of countries subjected to the SAPs. The anger of the protesters was directed at the withdrawal
of what was seen as political entitlement and as against austerity itself (de Waal 1997). The international
actors started to speak up against the SAPS. In 1987, UNICEF published the Report Adjustment with a
Human Face denouncing the harm of the SAPs and arguing for better protection for the poor (Pfeiffer and
Chapman 2010).
33
According to Williams (1993): “The objectives of the reforms for good governance were to embed
liberalism within the logic of the state machinery and to displace the corruption, patrimonial logic and the
31
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according to Woodward (unpub. ms. 2016, 81), through the label good governance, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), separately at the time and
driven by theory, not practice, were “continuing to promote a model of the state through
their lending programs and particularly economic conditionality.”
Although international actors in post-conflict countries neglected social protection,
post-conflict countries did have different programs of social protection with different
designs and different paths towards their institutionalization. Some programs were
implemented by INGOs in communities and provinces while the state had little, if any,
involvement in the creation of such programs. Other programs were nationally based and
their invocation and design were chosen by domestic actors because of the interplay
between domestic and international actors. In this internationally led state-building
context, the central question that the recent push for social protection raises is the actual
feasibility of poor and post-conflict countries to adopt, fund, and execute the programs.

2.3. Arrangements of social protection
My definition of an arrangement of social protection draws on the explanation of
“institutions and implementation arrangements” by Monchuk (2014). According to her,
[I]nstitutional and implementation arrangements for safety nets in Africa are
characterized by a mix of government and donor programs with large
involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOS) for implementation at
the local level. Programs range from being fully government owned and operated
to being managed by the government with the support of donors, managed by
donors together with the government, and run by donors or NGOs alone (these
programs tend to be smaller) (Monchuk 2014, 43).

communalist sentiment that donors assumed dominated these realms and made them dysfunctional, both in
terms of Weberian public administration principles and in terms of blocking market-oriented reforms.
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Therefore, Monchuk uses the term arrangement to explain the implementation of
social protection programs after the negotiations and decisions about which programs
were going to be adopted were already made. In my use of the term, I add the context in
which the programs and institutions of social protection were decided upon and the
understandings of each actor involved about social protection. This way, I use this
broader view on arrangement to analyze the international actors involved in each program
defined as social protection, their understandings of social protection and their
motivations, and the domestic actors’ strategies to accept the programs they prefer and to
reject others. Through analyzing each arrangement separately, I am able to understand
what changes from one arrangement to another and what explains cross-country variation.
I analyze three arrangements of social protection in post-conflict countries:
reintegration of former-combatants, fuel subsidies, and the institutionalization of formal
structures of social protection, mainly social assistance programs. For each arrangement,
I focus on the following aspects: the context in which international actors introduce them;
the goals of the international actors; and the concept of social protection by domestic and
international actors. The table below summarizes the three arrangements.

Table 2.1: Arrangement of Social Protection

Reintegrati
on of excombatants

Context of
international
involvement

Functions of actors
involved

Concept of social protection
by international actors

Immediately after
the end of the wars

International actors
promoted the program.
Domestic actors
established institutions.

This is a sub-type of social
protection. It had the language
of social protection, but
evidence shows that
international actors were more
concerned about security than
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an actual institutionalization
of social protection.
Fuel
subsidies

Response to such
subsidies in
countries that
produce or do not
produce oil

Not an institution, in the
sense of having a state
institution responsible for
this program.

International actors go against
fuel subsidy. They recognize
its social protection
component, but prefer that
countries use the money for
subsidies to other pro-poor
programs.

Formal
structures
of social
assistance

Since 2000 (mainly
after 2008)

International actors are
involved to promote the
state institution.

Consensus that it is a social
protection, but variation
between Angola and
Mozambique.

Source: Created by the author

Before moving to an explanation of each arrangement, it is necessary to explain
what overlaps among the three arrangements. First, they have similar actors involved, but
how they coordinate their actions and how they understand social protection differ from
one arrangement to another. Also, these three arrangements are part of the post-conflict
process and in all of them, there is an interplay between international and domestic actors
that affects their outcomes.
Second, some programs of one arrangement can serve as lessons to another
arrangement. For instance, CT programs were instituted in the arrangement of support for
military reintegration and some of their methods of execution could be used for the CT
program for the poor that is currently being pushed by international actors.
Third, some arrangements are in direct opposition to each other. There is a debate
among donors against fuel subsidies because they are regressive and not pro-poor
programs. For this reason, international actors prefer that these countries channel state
resources used to subsidize fuel to other activities, including the repayment of their
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international loans. Finally, the first two arrangements (military reintegration and fuel
subsidies) are part of a broad agenda of the international actors and not of the
development of social protection per se. For instance, military reintegration was part of
the security and development strategies of the international actors in the immediate postconflict context. The debate over fuel subsidies was related to the international financial
institutions’ involvement on domestic expenditure. The third arrangement, institutions of
CT, arguably represents the first social protection arrangement that is exclusively
dedicated to the issue of social protection. However, because this arrangement is part of
an internationally led state-building process, the creation of these programs and
institutions can also be related to the interests of the international actors who are
promoting state-building.
What we will see with the arrangements that will follow is whether there is a
change in practice from the first arrangement to the last. With the two country cases, I
will also show how the outcomes of these arrangements change from one country to
another due to different levels and kinds of international involvement.

Reintegration of ex-combatants
Programs of reintegration for former-combatants are a sub-type of social
protection. The fact that these programs had specific targets and sought to promote social
inclusion and a route out of ex-soldiers’ predicament makes reintegration a kind of social
protection. However, they target just one kind of group, the ex-combatants and their
dependents, and the reason behind the program is not because they are the poorest groups
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in the society but because, in the understanding of the international actors involved in the
peace operations, they need to be re-inserted so that they do not resume fighting.
The scope and beneficiaries of the programs are usually set up in connection to
other security strategies, disarmament and demobilization, which are set up in peace
agreements. The three strategies together form the Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) programs. Therefore, reintegration programs can have different
shape from one country to another. These three programs altogether are security
strategies embedded in peace operations. Disarmament and Demobilization are strategies
to ensure that former combatants would give up their weapons and that insurgent groups
would disband. Reintegration programs are meant to ensure that former combatants
would be able to return to their communities and that they would be provided with
economic opportunities.
What most critics have argued from this strategy is that, first, reintegration is the
least prioritized strategy among the three DDR components, suggesting a focus on peace
stabilization instead of its sustainability. Second, they have done little to actually provide
jobs, despite the “undisputable importance of the role of active employment in redirecting
behavior and commitments toward peace” (Woodward 2002, cited in Cocozzelli 2009,
24). Instead, programs of reintegration include education and vocational training,
technical assistance, and cash and in-kind transfer programs. The table below shows
examples of programs providing support to the reintegration of ex-combatants into the
society. 34

Other programs considered social protection in post-conflict countries are cash transfers to disabled
soldiers and to families of service personnel who have died, such as in Rwanda and Sri Lanka (Carpenter,
Slater and Mallett 2012, 23).
34
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Table 2.2: Social Protection Programs targeted at ex-combatants in fragile and
conflict- affected countries in Africa
Countries
Year
Assistance
Skills level
Average
Duration of
targeted
assistance
US$ per
beneficiary
Angola

2002

Low

Cash and inkind

300-900

6 months

Chad

1996-1997

Low

Cash

860-1,480

1 year

Djibouti

1995

Low

Cash

1,000-2,000

6 months to
1 year

Eritrea

1993

All levels

Cash

800-1,600

6 months

Namibia

1990

Low

Cash and inkind

1,263

9 months to
1 year

Source: Adapted from World Bank 2006, in: Carpenter, Slater, and Mallett 2012, 23.

The international actors involved in the negotiation of these programs are those
who participate in the peace operations of a particular country. If the peace process is
being led by the United Nations (UN), the operation is mostly organized by a UN mission.
Bilateral donors also influence the decisions to create and fund such programs. In terms
of execution, the actors involved are the UNDP, other implementing INGOs, and
humanitarian aid agencies.
In terms of institutionalization, the arrangement of military reintegration did not
push for the creation of ministries and departments for war veterans and reinsertion;
rather, institutionalization was promoted by the national governments after the
international actors left.
Both Angola and Mozambique had CT programs to help the reintegration process
of their former combatants. In Mozambique, the DDR programs were coordinated by the
United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The Reintegration and Support
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Scheme (RSS) was the only redistributive program to the population during the period of
its transition to peace (McMullin 2013). It was a two-year cash compensation program
financed by the donors through a US$35 million UN trust fund. The goal of the program
was to ensure a source of income to the former combatants of both sides of the conflict.
In Angola, the peace operation was homegrown given that there was not the
involvement of UN operations in the end of the war, in 2002. The international actors
involved were the financial institutions that provided financial support to the creation of
the programs. The Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) was
created in 2002, with the end of the conflict, with an initial budget of US$246.3 million
from the World Bank International Development Association (IDA), the Multi-donor
Trust Fund, and the Angolan government. Like Mozambique’s RSS, its goal was to
facilitate the process of reintegration of the former combatants from both sides of the
conflict. In both countries, the process of institutionalization was developed by the
domestic actors. As soon as international actors left, the calculations of the domestic
actors changed. Up until today, the opposition in both countries complains about the
privileges and benefits that the members of the Liberation Front of Mozambique
(FRELIMO) in Mozambique and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) in Angola receive in comparison to the former combatants of the insurgent
groups, RENAMO and UNITA.

Fuel Subsidies for consumers
The debate over price subsidies in general, and fuel subsidies in particular, has
arisen since the involvement of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in the
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domestic expenditures of poor and post conflict-countries, starting with the SAPs in the
1980s. Subsidies, whether of food or fuel, have been largely criticized by the donor
policy agenda, especially the IMF. The main international actors in this arrangement are
the IFIs but most of the bilateral donors and development agencies concur with the
position of the IFIs. 35
Fuel subsidies were first promoted by countries that export oil and later also by
countries that do not. Most governments claimed that this is an essential subsidy because,
in the case of oil exporters, oil should be a commodity affordable for the entire
population. Fuel subsidies supposedly have a social protection component because they
reduce transportation fares, enable individuals to go farther to workplaces, and make
energy more accessible for individuals, given that individuals do not have electricity.
However, international actors have argued that price subsidies in general are regressive
and ineffective because they do not target the poorest individuals in the country and, in
fact, fuel is consumed only by a small and elite group of the population. This is because
the poorest individuals do not consume the products and services that are subsidized.
To the present day, some countries in Africa still subsidize fuel, and they are still
negotiating with the IFIs to phase them out. One of the arguments of international actors
favoring the reduction of general price subsidies is that then, the state would have more
resources to finance its social protection structures and promote cash transfer programs.
Below is a list of countries in sub-Saharan Africa that subsidize fuel.

35
They have different positions in relation to ending subsidies in other countries and in their own countries.
According to Nal (2013), who was writing in response to the Nigerian elimination of subsidies in 2012 that
caused great riots, leading the government to return with the subsidies, said the following: “In 2009, the
G20 asked its members to rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. While the
commitments of some members after more than two years are still at the level of proposal, others have
simply put forth various arguments to exclude their policies from reform” (Nal 2013, 152).
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Table 2.3: Size of fuel price subsidy (% GDP) in 2011
Countries
% of GDP spent on
Oil producer
fuel subsidies
Angola
5
Yes
Nigeria
4
Yes
Cameroon
3
Yes
Democratic Republic
2.5
Yes
of Congo
Sierra Leone
2
No
Chad
2
Yes
Togo
2
No
Guinea
1.5
No
Equatorial Guinea
1.5
Yes
Central
African
1.3
No
Republic
Niger
1.2
No
Côte d’Ivoire
1.2
No
Burkina Faso
1.2
No
Tanzania
1
No
Mozambique
1
No
Gabon
1
Yes

Source: Adapted from Africa’s Pulse, World Bank, 2012.

Fuel subsidies have accounted for a substantial portion of government spending in
Angola and Mozambique (Monchuk 2014, 74). The hike in prices in public transportation
was a trigger factor to a chain of protests and riots in the urban areas of Mozambique
between 2008 and 2012. In addition to this, as will be shown in the case of Angola, the
phasing out strategy can have two negative aspects. First, if the program is not developed
in parallel with other political reforms to enforce redistributive programs, there is no
chance that the resources that are saved will go to other social programs. Second, every
time that the price of oil increases because of the phasing-out process, fuel subsidies
become even less pro-poor.
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Institutionalization of formal social protection structures
Formal social protection structure is the overarching term for programs of social
security, social assistance, and other social programs. Using the definition of Barrientos
and Hulme (2008, 3), social insurance refers to programs to mitigate the effects of life
contingences related to work, injury, and old age. In most high and middle-income
countries, social security programs are financed by contributions of employers and
employees. Social assistance programs are programs targeted to the poor and are usually
financed by taxation.
The push for such social protection in in poor and post-conflict countries since the
2000 coincides with the state-building process led by international actors. For instance,
the 2001 World Bank Development Report announced a political agenda to make state
institutions more accountable to the population. The innovations of this social protection
arrangement are, first, that there is greater convergence of the idea of social protection
among the international actors, both in terms of conceptual understanding of the term and
the increasing number of international development actors including social protection in
their agenda. The second innovation is the institutionalization of social protection
programs in post-conflict countries. Different from the previous arrangements,
international development actors seem to be more committed to creating institutions of
social protection instead of simply programs of social protection.
A confluence of factors has led to the greater focus on social protection by
international development actors. First, the adoption of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) by the UN in 2000 encouraged states to develop policies and mechanisms
of poverty reduction. This led to a diffusion of programs and policies to combat poverty,
some of which were for social protection. Second, the success of social protection
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programs in some developing countries stimulated a process of emulation in the global
south. 36
A third increase of coordinated actions among international actors came after the
2008 global economic crisis. In 2009, following several institutional advances on social
protection by major international organizations and the international financial institutions,
the IMF African Outlook recommended social protection in the region to mitigate the
consequences of the international economic crisis. The UN supported the International
Labor Organization (ILO)’s Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I). The World Bank
established the Rapid Social Response Fund (RSR) “to be distributed in the form of
localized social protection instruments” (Nino-Zarazua, et al. 2012) and began a five-year
impact evaluation (until 2013) of safety net programs in sub-Saharan African countries
(Monchuk 2014). In 2010, the ILO and the IMF established the High Level Social
Protection Floor Advisory Group to increase cooperation in supporting countries to create
and enhance fiscal space for the creation of social policies on a sustainable basis. In fact,
the World Bank and the ILO have probably been the lead organizations in this field of
social protection. 37
Barrientos and Hulme (2008, 13-14) present a detailed list of cases of social protection programs: “The
Child Support Grant in South Africa, implemented in stages since 2003 now reaches 7.2 million children;
The Minimum Living Standards in China rose from 2.6 million beneficiaries in 1999 to 20.6 million in
2002, and 22.4 million in 2006. Mexico’s Oportunidades, which replaced Progresa in 2002, now reaches 5
million households. Bolsa Familia, which replaced Bolsa Escola in 2004, now reaches 11 million
households in Brazil; Indonesia’s safety net cash transfers introduced in 2005 reached more than 15 million
households. The Employment Guarantee Scheme, aiming to provide 100 days’ guaranteed income for the
rural poor in India, is currently being implemented and is expected to reach around 26 million households
when fully operational.”
37
For an analysis of the role of the World Bank in general, see Weaver (2008). For the World Bank’s role
in social policies, including social protection, see Hall (2007). Both authors argue that the difficulty of the
World Bank concerning social policy is related to internal (or organizational) problems due to the World
Bank’s strategy of being involved in a broad number of issues (Weaver 2008) and having a very broad
definition of social policy (Hall 2007). According to the Bank’s own evaluation, the organization’s social
development work is often characterized by what it does, rather than what it is, but it remains a fuzzy
concept (Hall 2007, 163).
36
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Social protection has also been included in the agenda of bilateral donors. Among
the traditional donors of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) is the most prominent in
the area of social protection. Other relevant donors for this area are the German Society
for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Dutch government. 38
Regional organizations issued declarations that also included the idea of social
protection. In sub-Saharan Africa, the most prominent declaration was the Livingstone
Call for Action, at a meeting of 12 African countries in Zambia in 2006. 39 They decided
to promote greater cooperation between African and non-African countries in the sharing
and exchange of information, as well as experiences and action on social protection and
CTs. They agreed that vulnerable children, older persons, and people with disabilities and
households should be the main targets of social protection programs.
Therefore, with all of these advances in the international arena around social
protection, it would be possible to say that this arrangement is, in fact, an emerging
international regime. 40
In this internationally led state-building context, the central question that the
recent push for social protection raises is the actual feasibility of poor and post-conflict
38
For a report on how principles of engagement from the OECD could be reached through social protection
mechanisms, see Harvey, et al. (2007).
39
At the Meeting, the representative of the following countries were present: Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. In addition, there was a representative of the Brazilian government, development partners, UN
agencies, and NGOs. Available at: http://www.ipc-undp.org/doc_africa_brazil/Livingstone-call-foraction.pdf
40
As regime, I refer to the classic definition by Stephen Krasner (1982):“Implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations.” However, if it is a new regime, it is still at a very initial stage, because the area
of social protection faces, according to Deacon (2005, 25-26), “a war of positions within which
intellectuals in and around the international organizations are engaged in a context of paradigms and
ideologies sometimes informed by empirical research” Deacon (2005).
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countries to adopt, fund, and execute the programs. Social policy and comparative
politics analysts have become engaged in answering this question. Some social policy
studies analyze the main factors that would allow the creation of social protection
programs, such as growth of the macro-economy and fiscal space, the best options of
programs to be adopted, and the emulation of successful experiences from one
community or country to another. Other social policy studies and the comparative politics
literature address the main problems related to the creation of social protection. Some of
them focus on the domestic aspects that hinder the possibility of social protection, such as
political regime, colonial legacy, and economic factors. Others focus on the assumptions
and practices of the international involvement in the push for social protection.
The international push of social protection have two stages of influence. The first
stage is the state-building process and international actors push for the creation and
establishment of programs and institutions of social protection. The second stage is poststate-building, when international actors provide technical and financial assistance to
programs and institutions that are already implemented.
In relation to the first stage of influence, numerous social assistance and social
security programs and labor rights have been pushed by international actors. Programs of
CT have become one of the most popular programs of social assistance. 41 According to
the definition by Garcia and Moore (2012), “cash transfer programs are programs that

Harvey, et al. (2007) explain that there are two reasons for the delay of cash transfer in the development
agenda. First, food had dominated emergency responses and this was tied to domestic surpluses in donors’
countries. Second, “there were concerns about the feasibility of cash; it would be more prone to corruption,
inflationary in weak markets, disadvantageous to women, and impossible to be transferred in conflict
contexts. However, experience suggested that this is not the case. In fact, experience has suggested that it
has not been inflationary and women have been able to have a say in how money is spent. Corruption is
still a concern, but there is no evidence that it happened less with in-kind transfers” (Harvey, et al. 2007,
21).
41
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provide noncontributory cash grants to selected beneficiaries to satisfy minimum
consumption needs” (Garcia and Moore 2012, 18). They can be conditional CTs, when
requirements or conditions may be placed on beneficiaries to be eligible to receive the
cash. An example of these conditions is the enrollment of the children in the household in
school. They can also be unconditional, when no requirements or conditions apply for the
beneficiaries to receive the cash.
CT programs respond to two broad functions. The first is to provide relief to the
population in face of major crisis such as flood and other natural disasters. The second is
to promote development, in which case the program needs to be provided in the longer
term and requires a consistent system for the provision of such a program. In SubSaharan Africa, the CT programs have been implemented with these two functions in
mind.
Most of them focus on vulnerable populations based on levels of poverty, but
there are also programs of CT directed to people with HIV/AIDS. All of these programs
are financed, designed, and adopted with international actors’ support, mainly the World
Bank.
Table 2.4: Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with and without CTs as of 2012
Programs
Countries
Only conditional CT programs
Only unconditional CT programs

Eritrea, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and São
Tomé and Príncipe (5 countries)
Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia,
Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland,
Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (21
countries)
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Countries with both conditional and
unconditional CT programs

Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi,
Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania,
and Zambia (9 countries)

Countries with no known CT programs

Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Chad,
Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Madagascar, and Mauritania (12
countries)

Source: Adapted from Garcia and Moore 2012, 45.

There is a cross-country variation in sub-Saharan Africa in relation to the
adoption and institutionalization of CT programs. In 2012, out of 47 sub-Saharan African
countries, 21 had some kind of unconditional CT programs, five had conditional CT
programs, and nine had both kinds of programs. Only 12 countries did not have
implemented any CT programs. From these 12 countries, four – Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Madagascar, and Mauritania -- have already started dialogues surrounding social
CT programs. Therefore, CT programs have become central in the debate on social
development in sub-Saharan Africa.
The main issue around the introduction of these programs remains the same: most
of these countries spend little money on social protection. The spending on social
protection has typically been about 0.1 percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, as opposed,
for example, to 5.7 percent for North Africa and the Middle East (Garcia and Moore
2012). International organizations are seeking different ways to make these countries find
alternatives to pay for them. 42 The reduction of fuel subsidies, the previous arrangement,
According to the recent ILO Report, “World Social Protection Report 2014/15,” some of the options
presented to increase states’ revenues for the implementation of social protection in poor countries are:
reallocating public expenditures, increasing tax revenues, extending social security contributions,
borrowing or restructuring existing debt, curtailing illicit financial flows, and drawing on increased aid and
transfers.
Available
at:
http://www.social-
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has been one of the main targets of the international actors. They argue that if states did
not spend so much on fuel subsidies (as shown in Table 2), they would have more money
to use for programs of social protection, such as the CTs.
In the second stage of influence, the post-state-building, international actors
provide financial and technical assistance to programs and institutions that already
exist. 43 This assistance c have different ways, such as the provision of funding to the
state budget and also directly to programs and projects in specific sectors, including
programs of social protection. This push was the result of the international donors’
decision to treat the recipients of aid as partners and provide them with budget support.
The idea of partnership started to be used in the late 1990s by the UN agencies and
donors’ circles but was then requested by the recipient countries themselves at the Accra
forum on aid effectiveness in 2008 (Woodward unpub. mns. 2016, 186).
Both Angola and Mozambique were influenced by this social protection
arrangement, although in different levels. They both receive assistance from the ILO to
develop social security programs, such as labor rights and “decent work.” They are both
part of the Strategies and Tools against Social Exclusion and Poverty (STEP), a
Portuguese financed program at the ILO to provide assistance for the development of
formal and informal structures of social protection in the Portuguese Speaking Countries
in Africa (PALOP). 44

protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.action?th.themeId=3985&lang=EN
43
This is the case of Mozambique, where DFID and the Dutch government decided to provide direct
financial assistance to the programs of cash transfer. A closer evaluation of these kinds of international
involvement will be done in chapter six, but, in general, these programs have been criticized for being too
expensive, for helping just a few people, and for ignoring the realities of the countries when they are
designed.
44
The countries that form the PALOP are Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome e Principe, and
Cape Verde.
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In relation to social assistance programs, Angola and Mozambique had
institutional variation, especially with regards to CT programs. As previously explained,
Mozambique has the oldest program of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa, the Food
Subsidy Program (PSA), which was created in 1990. PSA, which changed its name in
2010 to Social Program of Basic Subsidy (PSSB), is a CT program to the elderly, ill, and
malnourished pregnant women. When it was created, the program was aimed at the urban
poor and covered only individuals from Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, and other
urban areas. Since 2000, the program was expanded to also reach rural areas. In 2008,
bilateral donors, particularly DFID and the Netherlands, began to provide direct financial
support to the program, and, in 2010, the ILO and UNICEF approved direct technical
support for the delivery and management of the PSA/PSSB (Pellerano and Hodgers 2010,
26; Waterhouse 2009, 17). As of 2014, it covered all 11 provinces in the country and
benefitted more than 300,000 households in Mozambique, representing one of the largest
programs in scale in sub-Saharan Africa. All of this success, however, has not been fully
translated into a recognition and acceptance of programs of CT by the Mozambican
government. In fact, the government has made explicit critiques against the existence of
these kinds of program (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009).
Angola has no institution for CTs to the population similar to the PSA in
Mozambique. It was not until the last two presidential elections, in 2008 and 2012, that
President José Eduardo dos Santos (in power since 1978) spoke about institutionalizing
programs with the purpose of wealth redistribution, including the provision of services
and social protection. In the 2008 elections, his presidential campaign focused on the
provision of services and goods for basic needs, such as water and housing, and for the
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2012 election, his campaign was organized around promises to develop programs related
to social protection. The abono familiar program, a kind of bolsa família from Brazil,
was announced by the former President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who went to
Angola during the electoral campaign. However, as of June 2016, there was no actual
implementation of the program.
These arrangements help understand the variation of institutionalization of
programs of social protection in Angola and Mozambique. The following chapters will
show empirically that despite the variation of international mechanisms of influence in
Angola and Mozambique, the outcomes of these programs and institutions were
determined by the elites in power. I move now to an analysis of how these elites have
been able to maintain themselves in power in Angola and Mozambique and their effects
on exclusionary institutions of social protection.
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Chapter 3: The political elite in Angola and Mozambique
3.1. Introduction
This chapter explains how the political elites in Angola and Mozambique have
remained in power since the independence of both countries from Portugal. As political
elite, I refer to the dominant political party that has had control over the state, and this
control is what allows them to obtain and accumulate wealth. In Mozambique, this elite is
the People’s Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and in Angola, it is the People’s Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Both groups were created as liberation movements
during the colonial period with a leadership that was from urban areas and from
privileged social positions. After independence, these liberation movements became
political parties and assumed the power of their respective countries. Despite several
changes that these countries had gone through since independence – the process of
independence, from a Marxist to an open economy, and from civil war to peace – the
MPLA and FRELIMO, although with degrees of authoritarian rule, have remained in
power until the present day.
This chapter explains that the MPLA and FRELIMO have not had incentives to
provide assistance, or expand the very restricted support they provide, to the population
because they are able to maintain themselves in power, their source of wealth, without
having to do so. I propose that this was possible because of three factors: the segregated
society that existed in the colonial period and remained in the country since the colonial
period, the dynamics of the civil wars, and the relation of these elites in power with the
global market. As a result, they have been able to keep their institutions of social
protection exclusionary. As exclusionary institutions of social protection, I mean
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institutions that keep the provision of social programs to a very restricted part of the
population, and mostly for individuals associated with the elite.
In relation to the first factor, segregated society in the colonial period, I show that
colonial rule was a strict social protection network for the elite. In the post-colonial
context, while some inclusion happened, the elites in power sought to maintain their
privileges through keeping those institutions exclusionary.
The second is the dynamics of the civil wars in these countries. The civil wars in
each country contributed to the maintenance of the exclusionary institutions in these
countries. During the period of war after independence, the exclusion of those institutions
was reinforced because the state had to guarantee the physical and economic protection
of the incumbency. Therefore, the effect of civil wars on institutions is not, as one would
think, a change of the political dynamics and structures. Rather, civil wars affect state
institutions in two ways; while the war undermines the power of the state throughout the
territory, the state forms institutions that concentrate its economy for the purpose of
fighting the war and protecting the elite in power. Therefore, the civil wars allowed the
government to concentrate its wealth both to fight the war and protect those who lived in
the urban and wealthier areas. In other words, in both cases, the war helped reinforce a
geographic divide in the country between the urban and the rural areas.
The third factor is the relation of the domestic political elites and the global
market. In both countries, the political elites have access to their wealth through the state.
In Angola, the MPLA has been able to maintain its wealth through the control of the
production and export of oil, which is coordinated by the state oil company, Sonangol. In
Mozambique, since its insertion in the global market, members of FRELIMO have been
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able to maintain themselves in control over the private companies of the country. 45
Therefore, in both countries the political elites obtain and concentrate their wealth
through their control of the state.
The consequence of these structures to the study of social protection is that the
political actors have no incentive to promote redistributive programs to the entire
population. In addition, the very limited programs of social protection will benefit just the
very elite and those close – politically and geographically – to the elite. The urban
population, at least in comparison to the rural population, can benefit more from social
protection programs and institutions because of their geographic proximity with the elite,
who also live in the urban areas, and because they are politically and geographically
closer to the political elite.
In order to explain the exclusionary institutions, I will first present the colonial
period. Then, I will analyze, separately, the period after independence in Angola and
Mozambique and discuss how the civil reinforced the exclusionary institutions of these
countries. Finally, I explain the close connection of both governments with the global
markets.

3.2. The pre-independence context in Angola and Mozambique
Angola and Mozambique were colonies of Portugal for over 400 years. A long
liberation war preceded their independence in 1975. They gained independence because
of the willingness of the liberation movements to continue fighting and also the domestic
challenges that the Portuguese New State regime, led by Antonio Salazar, faced as it tried
See, for example, the idea of “transformative preservation” by Pitcher (2002). According to her, the
liberalization of the market in Mozambique was controlled by FRELIMO and, it could have the benefits of
the process of privatization that started in the 1980s in the country.
45
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to keep the colonies. The fall of the New State regime led to the independence of the
colonies. 46 During the colonial period, the population was highly stratified and only the
small group of white people, assimilados, and mestiços were able to benefit from social
policies and social protection. Most of the population, composed of native black people,
had no access to social services, having most of the limited services they received came
from their own local communities and, to an even larger degree, from the religious
missionaries (Waterhouse and Lauriciano, 2009).
Three aspects of the colonial period are important for explaining the social
stratification of these countries after their independence: their extractive economy, the
social structures during the colonial period, and the emergence of the liberation groups
that fought against Portuguese dominance. These latter groups become the political elite
of their respective countries after independence, and they remain in power to this day.
Portugal sought to extract wealth from all its colonies. Angola was the “jewel in
the crown of the Portuguese African Empire” (Chabal 2007, 8). In addition to its vast
territory, 14 times larger than that of Portugal, the African colony gave more profit to the
European country than any other: from the slave trade, through the production of cotton
and coffee, and in the development of manufacturing. 47 By the end of the colonial period,
in the 1960s and early 1970s, Angola experienced one of the most rapid manufacturing
booms in sub-Saharan Africa (Cramer 2008, 150). For this reason, Portugal had a strong
interest in controlling the colony through the deployment of large contingents of military
Portugal was one of the poorest countries in the Western Europe, with a primarily agricultural-based
economy. Antonio Salazar and his successor as the prime minister of Portugal under the New State until its
collapse in 1974, Marcelo Caetano, felt strongly that the exploration of the natural resources of the African
colonies, especially Angola, could boost the national economy. The interest in keeping the colonies was
also related to prestige and pride because the colonies represented a symbol of the period when Portugal
was the main power in Europe due to its early navigation period and colonization process (Henriksen 1973).
47
According to Cramer, by the early 1970s, Angola was the third or fourth largest exporter of coffee in the
world (2007, 152).
46
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troops and through the establishment of a highly centralized and repressive administrative
structure. 48
Mozambique, on the other hand, did not have exportable natural resources, nor
did Portugal create extensive agriculture in the country. Portugal had to create different
strategies to |make Mozambique more profitable (Newitt 1995). The main strategies
included concessions of extended territories to private foreign companies, and
exploitation of labor market, for example, a labor agreement with South Africa to send
labor to work in mines in the neighboring country. 49
Although Portugal did not have a legal discriminatory system, such as apartheid
in South Africa, this did not mean that everybody had the same legal status in the
colonies (SIPRI 1976). The population in the colonies was divided into two groups: the
civilized and the uncivilized. The “civilized group” was composed of the white ruling
class, which consisted of Portuguese and other Europeans who went to work in the
colonies, as well as mestiços, who were the children of black Africans and white
Europeans, and assimilados, 50 native Africans who could speak Portuguese and who took
jobs in commerce or industry (Collelo 1990: 23). The New State assured some privileges
to this group, such as the right to land ownership, the right to vote, and higher wages than
48
Note here the economic difference of Angola and Mozambique to Portugal. Angola provided direct
economic returns to Portugal. Mozambique promoted indirect returns since the two main sources of profit
were, first, through the concessions to foreign private companies and through integrating the territory of
Mozambique to the Southern African regional market. Second, it was through providing access for other
colonies in the hinterland to Mozambique´s ports.
49
Examples of these companies were the Mozambique Company in the center of the country, Nyassa
Company in the north, and the British Sena Sugar Company. For a thorough analysis of the Mozambique
Company, see Allina (2012).
50
In theory, any black person could become an assimilado. However, in order to get this status, they would
need to prove through a literacy examination in the Portuguese language whether they are inserted enough
within the white society. The vast majority of Africans, who never claimed this status, remained classified
as indigenas (native people), and qualified Africans never grew large enough in number to influence the
structure of the colonial regimes (SIPRI, 1976: 38).
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members of the “uncivilized group” earned for equivalent work (SIPRI 1976: 34-9). The
“uncivilized group” was made up of native black people, a socially marginalized group
who represented the vast majority of the population of the colonies. Thus, although in
theory social ascension was possible, in practice, it was very unlikely to occur.
In addition, the Labor Law created by Portugal in 1889 reinforced social
disparities in the country (Newitt 1995, 360). This law stated that all natives of
Portuguese overseas territories bore a moral and legal obligation to seek to acquire,
through work, all the means they lacked for subsistence and to improve their own social
condition and that, if they did not comply in some possible way with those obligations,
they could be forced to work. In other words, although in theory it was different from the
traditional idea of slavery, the new Labor Law essentially codified forced labor. Even
though this practice was reduced after the concession companies left the country, forced
labor existed until the independence of the country in 1975 (Weinstein 2012).
The database developed by Maria Eugenia Mata (2006) to explain the social
divides she observed within the Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia in the 1940s and
1950s is a thorough illustration of social disparity in the Portuguese colonies. Her data
were collected from the official documents developed annually by the New State regime.
Although she compares the five African colonies, in her study she noted that it was
necessary to bear in mind that social dynamics varied from colony to colony due to
varying population density and territorial size.
Angola, the largest territory, was fourteen times the area of mainland Portugal […]
with around 4.1 million people living there in 1950. Mozambique was about
seven times the area of mainland Portugal […] with a population of around 5.7
million in 1950. Guinea-Bissau was about half the area of mainland Portugal […]
with 500,000 people in 1950; while the other colonies were small spaces and with
a population that did not reach more than 100,000 in 1950 (Mata 2006).
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The social composition of the Mozambican population in 1950 was 0.8% white,
0.1% mestiço, and 98.5% black; only 2% of the population were considered to be part of
the “civilized group” (Mata 2006). 51 In Angola in 1950, 2% of the population was white,
0.7% mestiço, and 97.4% black; only 3% was defined as part of the “civilized group”
(Mata 2006). In Angola and Mozambique, there were also disparities within the
territories. In both colonies, the “civilized groups” were concentrated within the capital
and a few other urban areas.

Liberation movements
The liberation movements that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s in Angola
and Mozambique were created and organized by individuals who were either from urban
areas or from outside the colonies. In other words, most of these groups were led by
mestiços or assimilados, rather than by individuals from the marginalized groups.
In Angola, according to David Birmingham (1992), during the colonial period,
two elites emerged in the country, which he calls the “old creoles” and “new creoles”
(cited in Hodges 2001, 37). The “old creoles” were formed in the nineteenth century in
Luanda by assimilados and mestiços who developed their wealth through working with
commerce and in the civil service. However, the racist policies implemented by Portugal
in the colonies, from 1910 through the New State regime, gave preference to colonial
immigrants, to the detriment of the “old creoles.” The resentment among these old
assimilado families was later to emerge in a political form, through the formation of the

According to Mata (2006), in 1950, 0.2% of the population in Mozambique had origin on the Indiansubcontinent. The Indians represented 14% of the civilized group in the country, while Native Africans
represented 5% of the same civilized group (Mata 2006, 7).
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nationalist group, the MPLA, in the late 1950s (Hodges 2001: 38). In that process, they
fused with political activists from a more recent Portuguese-speaking urban group, the
“new creoles,” made up of mestiços and assimilados who had been educated in Europe
and were competing for jobs with settlers, often less educated than themselves. Despite
the Marxist-Leninist orientation of many of the “new creole” leaders of the MPLA,
including its leader, Agostinho Neto, the “old creole” families identified with the
movement due to its urban-based structure.
In addition to the MPLA, two other nationalist movements were created in the
rural areas of Angola. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was a
nationalist movement created in 1957 by an Angolan, Holden Roberto, who lived in Zaire
and had a close relationship with its President, Mobutu Sese Seko. However, the FNLA
claimed to be a black-African nationalist movement, resentful of the assimilados and
mestiços who dominated the MPLA (SIPRI 1976). The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA), another Angolan nationalist movement, was created
in 1966, when Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA due to divergent goals and strategies within
the organization. Savimbi, who was educated in Angola and studied medicine in Portugal,
proclaimed himself the representative of the black peasants in Angola against the
dominance of the whites, mestiços, and assimilados; in this sense, UNITA’s profile was
similar to that of FNLA. During all of the 1960s, these nationalist movements fought
against Portugal for the independence of Angola. These groups did not ally to fight the
war, and in fact on several occasions had to fight against each other. In 1974, the collapse
of the New State in Portugal represented the end of the colonial era.
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In Mozambique, FRELIMO was created in 1962 as the only nationalist movement
against Portugal after Eduardo Mondlane organized three nationalist movements, which
were subsequently exiled in Tanzania.
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Mondlane had an advantage over his

counterparts in Angola, as he did not need to compete against other leaders for popular
support and, therefore, did not need to debate whether or not he was a legitimate
representative of the marginalized people of Mozambique (Shore 1992). Mondlane was
educated in Europe and the United States and worked as a United Nations official prior to
forming FRELIMO. Thus, a commonality across nationalist movements in both countries
was that they were not initiated by marginalized individuals, though their stated goals of
ending social disparities were crucial in gaining popular support. In fact, the majority of
combatants and supporters of these movements were from poor rural backgrounds (SIPRI
1976).
Another similarity among the nationalist movements is their foundation in
ethnicity. Regarding ethnicity, all rebel groups in Angola (MPLA, FLNA, and UNITA)
claimed that, although they had some connection to a particular ethnic group, their
ultimate goal was to be a nationalist movement with a trans-ethnic ideology (Wadlow
2007; Collelo 1991; SIPRI 1976). 53 Although ethnicity was an important variable
impacting nationalist movements’ ability to gain popular support, it was not in itself a

These movements were: the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), National Democratic Union
of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI)
(Simpson 1993).
53
The MPLA, which began in Luanda, was popular among the Mbundu ethnic group because it was the
predominant group in and around Luanda (Collelo 1991) FNLA was favored by the Bakongo people, an
ethnic group disseminated throughout the northern region of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zaire), and Congo (formerly Brazzaville). Both Roberto and Mobuto were originally from the
Bakongo people, further garnering support from this group in the north (SIPRI 1976). UNITA was popular
within the Ovimbundo people, the most populous ethnic group in Angola. Savimbi, originally from that
ethnic group, left FNLA to establish a base within the Angolan territory, rather than Zaire, in order to work
with peasants in the central highland plateau of the colony.
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very powerful determinant of the conflict in Angola, as it was not an evenly distributed
source of mobilization (Cramer, 2007). Apart from the Bakongo, there was no strong
ethnic tradition in Angola in 1974. In addition to this, throughout the war for
independence, there were massive population movements such as urbanization and
collective shifts in cultural and ethnic identities. In the burgeoning cities, there seemed to
be evidence that ethnicity mattered less and less (Cramer 2007).
In Mozambique, the groups that Mondlane put together to create FRELIMO were
from different areas of the colony, and, for this reason, FRELIMO received support from
different ethnic groups. Similar to the case of Angola, the conflict in Mozambique did not
occur because of ethnic discrepancies. However, there was a strong divide between the
ethnic groups in the north and south of the country. There was an understanding that the
tribes in the south, geographically closer to the capital and other urban areas, were more
privileged than the ones in the north. Therefore, rather than an ethnic conflict between the
tribes from the south and the north, the divergences between them may be interpreted as a
consequence of major social disparities (Henriksen 1976). 54
A final similarity among these groups is that they received assistance from several
external, international actors. According to Schmidt (2013, 82-83), they received
different kinds of support from four major groups of countries and organizations. First,
they received humanitarian support from Nordic countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark,

In Mozambique, internal divergences occurred within FRELIMO regarding its goals. For one group, the
main goal of FRELIMO was to combat Portuguese dominance, without taking into consideration the
necessity of changing the social and economic structure of the colony after independence. Another group,
led by Mondlane, felt that FRELIMO’s goal should have been to change the colonial system and the
exploitation of peasants. For the latter group, the struggle against Portugal represented a means of
implementing a socialist government in Mozambique. After Mondlane’s assassination in 1968, the victory
of Samora Machel, a member of the latter group, proved that the ideas of social transformation were
predominant within FRELIMO. The members of the former group left FRELIMO and created opposing
forces, such as the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).
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and Finland. 55 Second, they also received humanitarian support from the World Council
of Churches. Third, they received military, economic, and diplomatic support from the
Organization of African Union (OAU). Finally, they received military support from
Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China.
After ten years of war, the era of colonial rule by Portugal finally ended in 1974.
Portugal signed the Lusaka Agreement in September 1974, transferring control of the
government to FRELIMO. In January 1975, Portugal signed the Alvor Agreement with
FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA, which led to the creation of a transitional coalition to govern
Angola until the elections scheduled for later that same year (Pazzanita 1991).

3.3. The political elite in Mozambique
Post-independence and civil war
The period that followed the independence of Mozambique was marked by the
combination of the government’s implementation of a Marxist government, announced at
the Third Party Congress in 1977, and the civil war that started also in 1977. The war
was between FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a group
formed by FRELIMO dissidents who were supported by neighboring Rhodesia and, later,
South Africa, both countries that wanted to destabilize FRELIMO’s rule because of its
Marxist agenda. 56 As a result, the war in Mozambique was one of the proxy conflicts of
the Cold War because the government was being financed by the communist bloc while
Schmidt (2013) observes that Norway and Denmark were members of NATO, which supported Portugal
in the liberation wars.
56
Rhodesia was a colony ruled by a minority of white elites who saw the presence of the Communist and
popular government in Mozambique as a regional threat, as it offered safe haven to the Rhodesia Liberation
Movement (ZANU). In 1979, Rhodesia became independent, and South Africa, which shared Rhodesia’s
perception of FRELIMO and was especially concerned with FRELIMO’s support to the African National
Congress (ANC), became RENAMO’s main sponsor.
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the insurgent group was being financed by the capitalist bloc. Therefore, in order to
understand how the exclusionary political institutions were able to persist despite these
changes, two aspects needs to be addressed. The first is the extent to which the social
agenda of the Marxist government was, in fact, implemented. The second was the
endogeneity of the civil war.
In relation to the social agenda, the government announced at the Third Party
Congress a plan to develop a policy of work for all in state companies and rural lands,
while the state would provide universal social services, such as education, health care,
and housing (Quive 2007, 6). Given the difficulty the government had in developing the
industrial sector in the country, the government’s main attention was on the socialist
project of collectivization of the rural population. 57 Under this project, all rural dwellers
had to leave their lands to live in communal villages where, in theory, the population
would receive social services. 58
Evidence suggests that little was, in fact, implemented. As Hanlon and Renzio
argue, during the socialist experiment, Mozambique had a mixed economy; while social
services and companies were nationalized, there were still private sugar plantations

According to Saith (1985), due to the precarious levels of the industrial sector of the poor countries
during the socialist transitions (Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and China), governments sought to
invest in the agricultural sector though which they could get the resources necessary to develop their
industrial sector. Therefore, “the rural sector becomes the subject of the socialist development” (p.1).
58
For an overview of other projects of communal villages, such as in Tanzania and in the USSR, see James
Scott (1999); for an analysis of the communal villages in Mozambique, see Lubkemann (2005).
Lubkemann (2005) conducted anthropological studies in Machaze, in the south of Manica province, and
found evidence that villages were very unpopular in some areas of the country, because “the government
instituted price control, a state monopoly on the sale of local agricultural surplus, and nationalized the rural
shop network” (Lubekmann 2005, 496). The government also broke some “long-established patterns” of
local economy and order (Lubekmann 2005, 496). One of the examples of unpopular actions taken by
FRELIMO was the restriction of seasonal migration to Rhodesia, a longstanding boost to the economy
wherein young men went to work on the plantations on the other side of the border (Lubekmann 2005, 496).
The anti-FRELIMO sentiment that resulted helped RENAMO gain support from the population in some
regions in the central and northern parts of the country, despite carrying out extreme violence in
Mozambican territory (Lubekmann 2005).
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during that time (Hanlon and Renzio, 2007, 5). Besides that, while the initial goal of the
radical government, driven by the ideas of the liberation movement, was to pursue a
completely different set of strategies from the colonial power, the method and the
outcome of some of these policies, for example rural collectivization, were very similar
to measures taken during the colonial period in the rural area for security purposes.
Moreover, the stated intentions of FRELIMO for universal social services did not
develop much beyond the discourse.
The president of Mozambique from 1975 to 1986, Samora Machel, gave inflated
rhetorical discourses about public policies, but they hardly existed in practice. Because of
these contradictions, coupled with problems in the economy and the context of war, some
members of FRELIMO began to oppose the government. However, the opposition faced
severe repression, several of those who opposed the government were killed, and others
were sent to education and rehabilitation camps.
The second aspect of this period that will guarantee the state the possibility to
accumulate its wealth is the endogeneity of civil wars, a theory developed by Kalyvas
(2008) on the dynamics of civil war. According to him, civil war is an endogenous
process, meaning that “behavior, beliefs and preferences, and even identities can be
altered as a result of the conflict and its violence” (Kalyvas 2008). In terms of economic
development, Kalyvas argues that there is a “negative correlation between violence and
allocations of economic development by the government” (Kalyvas 2008, 403). In other
words, poverty is endogenous to the civil war either because the state has difficulty in
reaching the entire territory or because it purposefully fails to support areas that can be
usurped by the insurgency. The government, then, concentrates state allocations of

65

economic development in the areas that are the most protected in the country, which tend
to be the capital cities and other urban areas.
This dynamic happened in the civil war in Mozambique. The urban population
had access to food and other services that the government subsidized. Rural areas
received very limited support, especially after RENAMO started to block and restrict
access from the government to areas in the center and north of the country. Most of the
support that the population from those areas received came from humanitarian assistance
(Barnes and Ball 2000, 164-167). Therefore, these two aspects (dynamics of civil war and
the limited effects of the Marxist government on redistribution) help show how the war
and the failed socialist experiment helped the political elite of Mozambique maintain its
social protection institutions exclusionary. At the same time, it shows that just a small
part of the population, those in urban areas, received some, although still limited, support
from the government.

Market liberalization
The insertion of the political elite of Mozambique in the global economy was
another central factor that led to the maintenance of exclusionary political institutions. It
started to happen in the mid-1980s, at the Fourth Party Congress, in April 1983, Samora
Machel acknowledged the economic failures of the government and spoke of the
importance of implementing reforms, signaling the shift from a Marxist to an open
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market economy (Alden 2001, 8-9). 59 In 1984, Mozambique joins the World Bank and
the IMF. 60
Internationally, this period was characterized by the transition of several countries
from the socialist bloc to the open market. Through structural adjustment programs
(SAPs), the World Bank and the IMF supported countries in their efforts to “restructure
their economies to control inflation, repay international debt, and stimulate economic
growth” (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010). The main prescription of these institutions was a
very small state with no intervention in the economy. The first economic reform
implemented by Machel was the Economic Action Plan (PAE). This three-year plan
included several programs with the aim to “increase the trade of agriculture, provide
supply of inputs and basic consumer goods to smallholder farmers, and to improve
Mozambique’s financial situation” (Ball and Barnes 2000, 162).
In 1987, PAE was replaced by the first structural adjustment plan (SAP) in the
country, the Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE). Following the neo-liberal agenda
of the SAPs, PRE promoted actions that focused on market liberalization, such as
deregulation, currency devaluation, and privatization. While the SAPs brought
advantages for a small elite of the country that could take advantage of the process of
privatization, their social consequences were extremely negative, especially for the urban
areas, as will be explained in later chapters. Cognizant of the social factors affecting
In 1981, the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation rejected Mozambique’s application for
membership.
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In this same period, Samora Machel also recognized the importance of attempting peace negotiations
with RENAMO’s sponsor, South Africa. In March 1984, the governments of both countries signed the
Nkomati Accord, in which South Africa agreed to stop sponsoring RENAMO if the Mozambican
government would expel some exiled members of the African National Congress (ANC) residing there
(Metz 1986). However, South Africa did not follow through on the decisions agreed in the accord, and the
war continued. The relationship between the two countries became even more unstable after Samora
Machel’s death in a plane accident over South African territory in 1986. Therefore, although the conflict
continued until 1992, the economic reforms started to happen in 1986.
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poverty, the World Bank replaced PRE with the Social and Economic Rehabilitation
Program (PRES) in 1990. This change meant that the economic reforms would be
accompanied by social programs to alleviate poverty. However, as I will discuss in the
following chapters, authors have highlighted that those programs were too small to
actually resolve the great dimension of the social crisis in the countries caused by the
SAPs.
In 1992, FRELIMO and RENAMO finally signed a peace agreement in Rome. As
part of the agreement, the UN would send a peacekeeping operation, ONUMOZ, which
would remain in the country for two years, until elections could be held. It was agreed
that ONUMOZ was going to have a multi-dimensional scope. The beginning of the 1990s
thus witnessed a huge involvement of the international community in all political sectors
of the country: to monitor the ceasefire, programs of demobilization and disarmament,
and the elections, to provide technical support for those elections, and to coordinate
humanitarian assistance. 61
During the peace process, and concurrent economic reforms, there was little
priority given to changing the redistributive role of the state. In fact, the goal of these
reforms was to keep the state small, with little intervention in the economy and almost no
provision of social services to the population. Several authors have pointed out this view
of the international donors in the process of reconstruction in post-conflict countries.
Paris (2004) explains that, in the early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF worked under
the assumption that the liberalization of the market and the development of democratic
political institutions would bring the economic prosperity necessary for economic growth
The peace operation in Mozambique will be analyzed in chapter four because this is when the social
protection arrangement of military reintegration occurs.
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and that this would also translate, in post-conflict contexts, into sustaining peace (Paris
2004). 62 Ball and Barnes (2000), looking specifically to the case of Mozambique, argue
that, despite some attention to the conflict, “the World Bank strategies focused on
‘traditional issues of development,’ such as the reestablishment of the security and the
reactivation and expansion of production” (2000, p.163-164). It is no surprise, then, that
by the end of this period of peacebuilding, in 1994, the formal structures of social
protection in the country were extremely limited.
Three main consequences emerged from the implementation of these new liberal
policies. The first was an increased dependence on international development donors. By
the end of the war, Mozambique was one of the poorest countries of the world. For
instance, the ratio of aid to GNP was over 50 per cent between 1987 and 1993. This ratio,
according to Lancaster, was the second highest in the world, just behind Somalia
(Lancaster 1999, p.41). Since then, international aid flows have remained high, around 25%
of the national income. 63
The second consequence was related to who benefited from the privatization
process pushed by the structural adjustment reforms. Most of those who benefited were
connected to FRELIMO. As explained by Venugopal (2012), citing the famous works of
Pitcher, Cramer, and Castel-Branco:
Between 1990 and 2000, the government authorized the sale of nearly 1,000 stateowned enterprises, the large majority of which were small to medium sized
companies located in Maputo province. Until 1996, 90% of the buyers were
domestic Mozambicans who were given very generous and extended payment
terms (Castel-Branco 2001). Many of these new companies were entrepreneurs
linked to the FRELIMO-controlled state and included former and current officials,

See also: Del Castillo (2008) Rebuilding war-torn states, and Woodward (2011) State-building for
peacebuilding: what theory and whose role?
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Data since 1980: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. Visited 07/12/2015
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ruling party members, military personnel, and the state enterprise managers
(Venugopal 2012, p.14).
The third consequence was the fact that a small elite was able to become
extremely wealthy as a consequence of the privatization and other economic reforms
developed during the structural adjustment process. The adoption of structural adjustment
policies was the cause of division within FRELIMO. One group advocated a more
interventionist role for the state in development, and the other group favored the
indiscriminate adoption of the free-market state as prescribed by the Bank and the Fund.
As Hanlon and Renzio explain, the second group became dominant because of the
stimulus and support received from the IFIs (Hanlon and Renzio 2007).
In the process of rapid accumulation, given the thinness of Mozambique’s
incipient capitalist middle class, the elite was allowed to buy off the privatized
companies, sometimes with donor-funded loans that were never repaid. In this
process, donors promoted an image of capitalism in which businessmen could
take advantage of the market transition at great personal gain simply because they
subscribed to a capitalist rather than a socialist world-view. Market driven
accumulation and trickle-down economics underpinned the model, claiming it was
good for people to get rich because this would help reduce poverty. Through the
1990s, those in government and the elite who supported the new model found
themselves in receipt of top-up salaries and highly paid consultancies, while
anyone who opposed the neo-liberal model was increasingly marginalized. For
key Mozambicans, some accepted the rhetoric that life was improving for
everyone, while others closed their eyes to the obvious fact that it was not. This
combination, of opportunities for enrichment and ideological closure, created a
donor-dominated hegemony that did not leave much space for alternatives
(Hanlon and Renzio 2007, 7).
In terms of supporting the poor population, little action was actually taken by the
government. It was just expected that the wealth that the government would obtain
through advancing its macroeconomic reforms would trickle down to the population.
However, that was not the case, not only because of the culture of wealth accumulation
that was implemented, but also because the population was in a particular moment of
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extreme emergency. In an attempt to solve the social problems caused by the war –
refugees, IDPs, destruction of infra-structure and of social service facilities, such as
hospitals and schools – Chissano asked for donors’ help through relief aid (Alden 2001,
11).
Another dynamic that was pushed by the structural adjustment policies was the
foreign investment in NGOs as a strategy to alleviate some of the social problems that
were not being solved, or that were being caused, by the structural adjustment. In
Mozambique, there was an explosion of implementing international NGOs, in a number
of different sectors (health, education, sanitation, humanitarian assistance). Most of these
NGOs were focused on working with local communities promoting direct support to the
population. In other words, the state was basically excluded from the process of social
policy provision during the structural adjustment period that took place throughout the
1990s.
Since then until the present day, FRELIMO has been consistently winning
elections and providing almost no power to RENAMO, even in the provinces where
RENAMO won the majority of votes. RENAMO had argued that its “supporters in rural
areas are harassed and sometimes beaten up.” 64 Finally, in 2007 it was publicized in the
news that much of the money given to local authorities for economic development was
said to end up in the pocket of FRELIMO’s members. 65 Therefore, Mozambique is said
to be in a period of normal politics because of the non-reoccurrence of the war. However,
profound antagonism between RENAMO and FRELIMO has characterized the first
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“Not quite as stellar as it looks” The Economist, 2007.
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fifteen years of the 2000s, with RENAMO continually announcing that it is going to go
back to the bush.
In relation to its macro-economy, it is true that the country has had a steady GDP
growth, from 2000 to 2010. However, as explained by Castel Branco (2007), “that
growth has been driven by foreign aid and capital-intensive foreign investments, which
create few jobs and contribute little to the public purse. Mozambique still relies on
foreign aid, while the domestic economy has failed to develop or diversify.” 66

3.4. The political elite in Angola
The transitional coalition among the three liberation movements in Angola –
FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA – was very short-lived. Strong divergences existed among
their leaders, causing an immediate collapse of the government and leading the country
into civil war. With its military advantage due to Soviet and Cuban support, the MPLA
was able to remain in government, while FNLA and UNITA had to reestablish their bases
in the northern and central countryside of Angola, respectively. While UNITA initially
espoused a less aggressive policy, declaring interest in finding a peaceful solution to the
conflict, FNLA decided to promote direct combat against the MPLA, though it collapsed
in 1976 because it could not recover from its defeats (Pazzanita 1991). UNITA, on the
other hand, organized its forces in order to initiate combat against the MPLA, relying on
financial and military support from South Africa and the United States. Therefore, after
the independence of Angola, the civil war became a struggle between the MPLA,
representing the incumbent, and UNITA, the insurgent.
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In 1977, the first MPLA Congress decided to adopt a Marxist-Leninist system of
government. It was declared that the government was going to centralize political power
and develop a planned economy. This structure was challenged by the war against
UNITA. In this context, four aspects led to the persistence of exclusionary institutions in
the country. Similar to Mozambique, the two first aspects refer to the extent that the
government implemented a Marxist-Leninist government and the dynamics of the
conflict. To support the exclusionary political institution, the control of the government
over the production and export of oil made the government even more neglectful of the
needs of the population. The third aspect, different from Mozambique, was the length of
the war, which lasted until 2002.
Once in power, the MPLA had to deal with three main issues: the civil war
against UNITA, conflicts among factions within the MPLA, and pressures from the urban
population for more representation. The party decided to subordinate the state to the party
in order to address all of these issues (Kaure 1999). This decision was boosted by an
attempted coup orchestrated by an urban movement, with the leadership of Nito Alves. 67
Kaure explains that, after this coup, the government started a “systematic party purge to
get rid of those suspected of a ‘petit-bourgeois’ mentality. Those targeted were mainly
mestiços and assimilados who before independence had acquired wealth and a higher
social status than was available for the ‘indigenas’” (Kaure 1999, 28). As a result, since
then, party membership remained largely restricted to traditional leaders and loyalists of
Futungo, the president’s office.
Sogge (2009) points out that the post-independence government inherited weak
and, I add, exclusionary, political institutions from the colonial period. For this reason,
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even if they did not face a civil war or internal factionalism within the party, it would still
have been difficult to implement the socialist project. According to Sogge (2009, 2),
Angola’s system of administration developed according to Portuguese law,
custom and organizational capacities. Those systems were weak. Under more than
forty years of dictatorship [since independence] and a bizarre creed that the
colonial order was legitimate and sustainable, government became more rigid,
centralized and corrupted. In rural areas the state was present only in rudimentary
ways, if it was present at all. Alongside formal institutions were many informal
norms of the Portuguese police state, claims of privilege by petty officials and
grand corruption by senior officials including the military. Apart from churches,
sports clubs and a few charities, there was no formal associational life. Political
activism in civil society was outlawed.
In addition to this restricted government in the hands of a single party, the
government relied on the export of oil as its source of wealth, which was completely
detached from its society (Cramer 2008, 250). The increase in oil output and revenue in
the hands of the state occurred while the other sources of economy (manufacturing and
agriculture) were destroyed by the war. After Portugal left, the MPLA invited officials
from Algeria to transfer their knowledge on institutional structure for oil exploitation to
reconfigure the Angolan state-owned company, Sonangol (Soares de Oliveira 2015).
Angola gave concessions to Western companies to exploit oil in the country and
guaranteed that the Marxist-Leninist regime was not going to interfere in their oil
business. 68 In addition, the government made sure to protect the oil refineries against any
attacks during the conflict. Therefore, while the government was fighting a war against
the Western countries, the government was able to maintain its economic relations with
those countries intact (Soares de Oliveira 2015, cited in Harding 2016). The fact that the

The Western companies in Angola: Chevron, BP, Exxon/Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and ENI
(Sogge 2009, 4).
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government did not break its relations with the global market led some authors to argue
that the party did not implement a Marxist-Leninist program.
As a result of this centralized government and its increasing wealth from the oil
sector, the MPLA government completely disregarded the needs of the society. It is
important to mention here that, contrary to the idea of the “natural resource curse,” this
access to a natural resource did not cause the creation of exclusionary institutions in
Angola. Actually, it reinforced a power structure that was already fragmented and
exclusionary. Another central aspect of social protection is the actual capacity of
countries to fund such programs. In Africa, the main debate over the economy has
focused on three main aspects: the “natural resource curse” analysis, the system of
taxation, and the involvement of international actors in the economic reforms. The core
argument of the “natural resource curse” approach is that since the government has the
possibility to enrich itself through the extraction and export of natural resources, it does
not rely on internal revenue and, for this reason, the administrative capacity of the state is
underdeveloped. 69
In summary, despite the initial claims in 1975 for the development of a socialist
government, not much was actually put into practice. The connections it established with
foreign capital through the exploitation of oil helped the government develop its economy
with full disregard to the population. In social terms, as Messiant explains, “the bulk of
the population was simply discarded: first in the rural areas, which were afflicted by war
Although it is correct that natural resources can allow the state to have exclusionary control of the
country’s revenues, the existence of natural resources is not the cause of state fragility (Kurtz 2009). For
instance, as Cramer (2007) points out, Angola already had unequal and fragmented institutions well before
oil was discovered, extracted, and exported. Once oil became the center of the country’s economy, political
and economic leaders used those fragmented structures to control the wealth from its extraction (Cramer
2007). In addition, Kurtz (2009) mentions that natural resources are not a variable that impedes social
protection in the developed world. In fact, some of the developed countries with the most advanced welfare
system rely in their economy on the export of natural resources, such as Australia, Canada, and Norway.
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and had become irrelevant ever since the oil rent made it possible to buy food abroad,
then in the cities, where poverty grew over time and political support dwindled”
(Messiant 2007, 96).
Another aspect that boosted the exclusionary political institutions was the
dynamic of the civil war. When UNITA returned to the Angolan countryside, in 1976,
one of its strategies to destabilize the MPLA was to weaken the economy of the country.
The targets of the attacks were railways that transported agricultural products and
minerals from the countryside to the coast, through roads and villages controlled by the
government. According to a former UNITA combatant interviewed by Minter (1989,
194), UNITA attacked villages where residents refused to leave government-controlled
areas to join UNITA in the bush.
Messiant (2007) explains that the nature and dynamics of the conflict between the
MPLA and UNITA was one of the reasons why there seemed to be no revolt from the
population against MPLA’s neglectful and repressive policies. During the conflict, each
side dominated particular regions of the country, and the strategy of UNITA was to
hinder the ability of the MPLA to access different areas of Angola (Minter 1994).
Therefore, while the government was already not promoting efforts to the population in
the rural areas, the dynamics of the civil war made the government even more neglectful
with the population outside urban centers. According to Messiant (2007, 96),
[T]he consequence of this polarization of the country, conspired to mitigate the
effects of MPLA’s repressive policies since people had to choose their side based
on where they were living in order to receive protection against the other side.
Depending on where they lived, they could not overtly oppose the policies from
the government or the opposition.
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The last aspect that motivated the exclusionary political institutions in Angola was
the length of the conflict. Unlike in Mozambique, where the resources to fight the war
dried up with the end of the Cold War, natural resources in Angola continued funding
both sides of the conflict. The MPLA continued having access to oil and UNITA was
able to have access to sources to finance its war through controlling the exploitation of
diamonds in the northeast of the country and, since the mid-1990s, through the support of
Zaire (Minter 1994, 217).
The peace settlement in Angola was far more complex than in Mozambique.
Although the peace processes began at the same time, Mozambique reached peace
accords far earlier. Synge (2005, 31) has identified several reasons for the failure of the
peace process in Angola. First, the victory of the MPLA in the 1992 elections was not
recognized by UNITA. Second, both the MPLA and UNITA found themselves in a
stalemate, as they did not trust each other to demobilize their armies as agreed upon in
the accords. A UNITA official suggested that the problem in Angola was that “there were
two forces fighting for power and each one believed that if it laid down its arms, the other
would subjugate it” (Synge 2005, 31).

Market liberalization and the end of the conflict
In 1989, Angola became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. In 1987, the
country developed its structural adjustment plan, the Program of Economic and Financial
Reconstruction (SEF). The main goals of the SEF were the stabilization of the financial
situation, which was marked by great indebtedness and budget deficits, and the reform of
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the economy to increase productivity. However, in 1990 the government announced that
it was not able to achieve the goals of the SEF (Kaure 1999).
At its third Congress in December 1990, the MPLA officially abandoned its
Marxist-Leninist ideology even though, as discussed, the government had had
connections with capitalist markets throughout all the years of the so-called Marxist
regime. One of the party’s reasons for announcing its market liberalization was the
interest among the MPLA elites in getting closer to the western economies after the end
of financial support from the Soviet bloc with the end of the Cold War (Hodges 2001, 50).
However, the main problem that the country needed to solve, in order to receive
assistance, was that of bringing the conflict with UNITA to an end.
In May 1991, MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accord, agreeing to promote
the transition to a multi-party system and to promote political elections, with the
supervision and monitoring of the United Nations Mission in Angola, UNAVEM.
However, immediately after the results of the 1992 elections were announced, conflict
was reignited in the capital and, once again, UNITA returned to the bush in order to
organize itself against the government. 70 In 1994, MPLA and UNITA attempted to sign
another peace agreement, the Lusaka Accords, which also failed. The conflict only came

Uyangoda (2007), through an analysis of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, explained that the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used the peace process to reach an agreement with the government to rearm
and regroup. In other words, the LTTE used the peace process as a strategy to revitalize and reorganize the
organization in order to continue fighting against the government. A similar analysis could be drawn by the
UNITA in Angola, as after the peace agreements in 1991 and 1994, the group was able to reorganize its
strategies in order to continue fighting the MPLA (Synge 2005, 31). According to Potgieter (2000, 263),
“following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol of 1994, UNITA used the respite provided by the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III peacekeeping operation to recover from the losses
suffered in the period of intense fighting immediately after Savimbi’s rejection of the Angolan election
results of 1992. By the middle of 1998, despite the scrutiny of the United Nations, UNITA had again
succeeded in regenerating its war machine.”
70

78

to an end in 2002, when Savimbi was killed in a military campaign supported by the
government, as will be further discussed in the following chapter.
In 2002, the government of Angola tried to approach the international community
for foreign aid in order to reconstruct the state. The IMF and other organizations were
reluctant to provide such aid, arguing that the government was not transparent with its oil
revenues. Two sides of this relationship should be mentioned. On one hand, the year of
2002 was a moment that the international community was not focusing on Africa because
of its engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, after the attacks of September 11. On the
other, the government of Angola did not seem to be willing to accept the conditionalities
imposed to receive international aid. According to Pacheco (2006, cited by Sogge 2009,
11), the country rejected the notion that, “before it can be properly aided, the country had
to be integrated on terms set by donors. Rather, Angolans wish to be respected, not
berated to accept the ‘bible’ of ‘good governance, transparency, and accountability,’
when the preconditions of such things are not present.”
Regardless of who did not accept the terms of traditional aid, it is important to
highlight that Angola did not depend on such assistance, in comparison to its neighbors.
After the end of the war, the annual GDP growth of Angola was the highest in the world,
achieving the highest annual growth of 22.6% in 2007. 71 Moreover, in a special edition
on Angola in Foreign Policy, Paulo (2010) stated that,
[A]ccording to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Angola received no less than US$15.5 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI)
in 2008—about half of all the FDI going to less developed countries. Most came
71
Variation of the GDP growth since the end of the war: 2002: 13.8%, 2003: 5.2%, 2004: 10.9%, 2005:
18.3%, 2006: 20.7%, 2007: 22.6%, 2008: 13.8%, 2009: 2.4%, 2010: 3.4%, 2011: 3.9%, 2012: 5.2%, 2013:
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from the United States, France and the Netherlands and went primarily to
expanding the petroleum sector (Paulo 2010).
Therefore, in the period after independence the government of Angola remained
with little support from international donors. The only times that the government
approached the IMF to negotiate assistance was when the price of oil decreased in the
foreign market and affected its domestic revenues. In political terms, despite frequent
political elections and the opposition contesting their results, not only the MPLA but also
the same president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has remained in power since 1979.

3.5. Conclusion
This chapter explained the political elites of Angola and Mozambique, through
revisiting some of the extensive literature of this issue in both countries. The chapter has
shown the political and social structures of both countries and how those structures
reverberated after their independence. Although it is a reasonable assumption that the
maintenance of power and wealth is an inherent interest of the elites anywhere, the
colonial structures of African countries intensified the structures of segmentation and
fragmentation of their political institutions. Colonial rule was a strict social protection
network for the elite. Despite claims of establishing a Marxist government in Angola and
Mozambique, and in fact a Marxist rule existed in Mozambique in the first years after
independence, the leadership of the parties in Angola and Mozambique later opted to
promote a structure of exclusivity and wealth accumulation.
The civil wars in each country helped this structure to remain exclusionary. They
allowed the government not to transfer its wealth to all of the corners of the country and
to concentrate its wealth both to fight the war and protect those who lived in the urban
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and wealthier areas. In other words, the war helped reinforce a geographic divide in each
country. This idea goes in the same direction of Kalyvas (2008, 403), when he states that
“poverty is not necessarily endogenous to the conflict insofar as the state is likely to
expand a greater effort to prevent rebel activity in richer areas, or alternatively, the
opportunity costs of violent repression are lower in poorer areas.” In other words, at the
same time that the government is fighting a war of counterinsurgency, it has social
policies to continue and craft.
In addition to the war, another reason why the government was able to keep its
institutions exclusionary was because of their relations with the global market. As Kaure
(1999, 9) says about Angola, and African countries in general,
Before independence the typical colony was already integrated into that of the
“parent country” and by implication the broader capitalist system, thus making it
difficult for the incoming independence governments to disengage from this
network of ties overnight, as it were. On the other hand, African regimes also
often took the decision to avoid breaking the colonial economic links on strategic
grounds, preferring to get the political kingdom in order first to assert their claim
in economic independence (to paraphrase Kwame Nkurumah).
Mozambique became a participant in the global market through its relations with
the international financial institutions, after its period of implementing structural
adjustment programs. The government was able to guarantee that members of its own
party would have access to the companies after they were privatized. In Angola, the
access to the foreign market came through the concessions it made to foreign companies
to exploit oil. The fact that both political parties, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the
MPLA in Angola, remain in power until today indicates that the power structure in both
countries remains the same.
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The consequence of this political structure, along with the international demands
of programs of social protection, will be the subject of the following three chapters. In
each of them, we will focus on a particular social protection arrangement implemented in
Angola and Mozambique. In the three following chapters, I show that despite the
different levels and kinds of international development actors in Angola and
Mozambique, they do not override the control of the political elites over the social
protection outcomes.
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Chapter 4: Programs to support the reintegration of former-combatants
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the reintegration of former-combatants in Angola and
Mozambique. Reintegration programs were the first programs of social protection
implemented in Angola and Mozambique after the end of their respective civil wars. The
end of each war happened in different moments, in Mozambique in 1992 and in Angola
in 2002, and with different levels of international involvement. These differences raise
the question of what was similar and different in the strategies and outcomes of military
reintegration.
Because of these differences, I expected great variation in the institutional
outcomes of these countries. I expected to see greater levels of inclusion in the programs
in Mozambique, the country with greater international involvement, than in Angola, the
country with less international involvement. However, when the programs of
reintegration started to be run by the domestic governments – upon the end of the
international involvement in each country, similar outcomes were achieved. Both
countries ended up supporting just one group of former militaries. In other words, the
programs became highly politicized given that beneficiaries of the programs were
selected on political criteria. In Mozambique, the former-combatants that continued
receiving support after the international actors left were those who fought on the side of
the Mozambique Liberation front (FRELIMO) during the liberation war. In Angola, it
was the fighters who fought on the side of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA). As explained in previous chapters, FRELIMO and the MPLA were the
incumbents of Mozambique and Angola, respectively, during and after the civil war.
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This chapter provides two reasons for these similar outcomes. First, after
international involvement ended and the state government was in charge of continue
providing support for ex-combatants to reintegrate, international actors did not pressure
the governments to implement inclusive programs of social protection for all the former
combatants. In Mozambique, international involvement was the UN peace mission in the
county, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In Angola,
international involvement was just the World Bank’s funding for the country’s program
of reintegration. Second, while the programs were being implemented, international
actors were working under a liberal agenda of state-building, so they did not build state
institutions for this purpose. In other words, while reintegration programs did have a
social protection component, they did not contribute to developing features of
redistribution.
This chapter will be divided into four parts. First, it presents an overview of
programs that are created to support former-combatants’ reintegration. Then, it analyzes
separately the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique to show the difference of
levels of international actors for both the peace negotiations and for the state-building
process that followed. Then, for both countries, I compare the cash transfer program for
ex-combatants. In Mozambique, this program was the Reintegration Support Scheme
(RSS), and in Angola, the program was the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration
Program (ADRP). Then, I analyze some aspects of the programs, such as their reach,
targeting, benefits, and beneficiaries. Finally, I conclude the chapter showing how the
variation of international involvement did not affect the outcomes of the reintegration
programs for former-combatants.
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4.2. The programs to support former-combatants’ reintegration
By the end of their conflicts, Angola and Mozambique were in a dire political,
social, and economic situation and their political institutions were too weak to respond to
such a situation. There was a generalized poverty, and most of the population did not
have access to basic social programs, such as health, housing, and education. In 1992,
when ONUMOZ was deployed, Mozambique had three million internally displaced
persons (IDPs), 1.7 million returnees from neighboring countries, and 92,881
demobilized former-combatants from both sides (UNSC 1994). 72 With the end of the
conflict in Angola in 2002, 218,023 of more than 450,000 refugees returned from
neighboring countries, there were more than four million IDPs, and around 80,000 of
UNITA’s demobilized soldiers were in need of support for reintegration. 73
Although the number of refugees and IDPs was much higher than the number of
former-combatants, great attention was given to the latter in the peace operations. This
happened because former-combatants were considered by domestic and international
actors a group with a greater chance and incentive to go back to war if they were not
integrated into society. In other words, reintegration was part of a strategy for peace
stabilization. This also indicates the priority of international actors is the stabilization of
the country, whereas programs of reintegration and inclusion are not.

The number of returnees from each neighboring country was: 58,000 from Tanzania, 1,285,000 from
Malawi, 22,000 from Zambia, 247,000 from Zimbabwe, 71,000 from South Africa, and 17,000 from
Swaziland (Information based on UNHCR Maps on the UNHCR website: http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e485806&submit=GO Visited on: 04/11/2016).
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Returnees came from DRC (76,700), Zambia (43,500), Namibia (9,400), and Republic of Congo (3,400)
(Information based on UNHCR Global Report on Angola 2003. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=40c6d73a0&query=angola returnees Visited on:
04/11/2016).
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Decisions to implement programs exclusive to ex-combatants is a source of
debate among practitioners and academics. A study developed by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) in 2009 presented the main pros and cons of programs of
reintegration exclusive to former combatants. The pros are that former-combatants need
special programs because of their role as combatants during the war and the fact that they
can return to war if reintegration does not occur effectively; thus, the peace agreements
have programs of demobilization and they need to propose alternatives of reintegration to
follow that, and the program can be better designed if it targets specific beneficiaries
(ILO 2009).
The cons of having programs exclusive for former-combatants are: granting excombatants special treatment may arouse hostility within the larger community, which
often sees this group as having been most responsible for the conflict, a more inclusive
approach can stimulate reconciliation, public opinion does not often accept the
prioritization of former combatants, the success of reintegrating former combatants into
an economically unhealthy society is doubtful, ex-combatants may be difficult to identify
as such because they may be reluctant to reveal their past, and from a quantitative point
of view, these groups are a minority and should not be prioritized over the majority of
those who need to be reintegrated (ILO 2009).
In both countries, the decision of the international actors to create (in
Mozambique) and finance (in Angola) programs to provide cash to ex-combatants – RSS
in Mozambique and ADRP in Angola -- was made while demobilization was already in
place, and it was made after a long and strict process of negotiation between the domestic
and international actors. In fact, the delays in the negotiation process were a problem to
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the demobilization and reintegration process also affecting the outcome of such programs.
Most of the negotiations were related to funding, institutional structure to distribute the
benefits, and who should be beneficiaries. The cash transfer programs for ex-combatants
in Angola and Mozambique were implemented as part of their respective DDR strategies.
Former combatants from both sides of the conflict went through a specific process of
reintegration, within the DDR strategies, whose parameters were set in the peace
document of each country. In general, DDR broadly seeks to take the weapons from excombatants, disband insurgent groups, and reintegrate former combatants into civilian life.
In procedural terms, ex-combatants were sent to assembly or quartering areas, where they
returned their weapons and the demobilization process happened, and from there, they
would be resettled and reintegrated into society. Once they are resettled, they are offered
programs of reintegration, which means, according to the World Bank, “targeted
programs of cash compensations, training, or income generation to increase the potential
for economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families, or other
displaced persons” (Alden 2002).

4.3. Peace Process in Mozambique and Reintegration
As the famous Mozambican journalist Carlos Cardoso said in 1994: “our war [in
Mozambique] was organized by foreigners and now our peace is being organized by
foreigners.” Cardoso was making reference to both, the signature of the GPA and the
peace process that followed. The GPA was signed by the then President Joaquim
Chissano, from FRELIMO, and the leader of the insurgent group RENAMO, Afonso
Dhlakama, in Rome in October 1992. The GPA had the participation of African countries,
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Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and western countries, France,
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The GPA was mediated by the
Italian government and the Community of Sant’Egidio, from the Vatican. It also had the
participation of the UN and the Organization of the African Union (OAU). 74
The reintegration process of former-combatants, as part of the Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategy, was established in the GPA. In
addition to the reintegration process, it agreed on the demobilization of troops, the
formation of a new Armed Forces (FADM), the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, and
the process of elections. It was also agreed that the peace transition would be led by
ONUMOZ.
ONUMOZ was deployed in December, 1992, under the leadership of the interim
Special Representative for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, who later became the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Mozambique. The mission was
divided into a main commission, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC),
which overlooked the implementation of the agreement, and subsidiary commissions: the
Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the
Mozambican Defense Forces (CCFADM), and the Commission for the Reintegration of
Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE). 75 All the commissions were run by UN civilian
and military staff with the attempt to coordinate the government of Mozambique with
Before the signature of the agreement, both sides had indicated their interest in establishing peace since
1990, and the GPA was the first time that both sides agreed to negotiate the transition to peace. The
government showed interest in peace when the Ministry of Finance announced its interest to put forward a
demobilization process in 1990, reducing the military expenditures (Ball and Barnes 2000, 167). RENAMO
also showed its interest in a peace agreement when it had no more resources to continue fighting the war.
75
Between 1992 and 1994, ONUMOZ had the following strength: 6,625 troops and military support
personnel, 354 military observers, and 1,144 civilian police; there were also some 355 international staff
and 506 local staff; during the polling, ONUMOZ deployed approximately 900 additional electoral
observers.
In
Mozambique,
ONUMOZ:
facts
and
figures:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm.
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international donors in the implementation of peace. Alongside ONUMOZ, civilian
employees of several international agencies – including the European Union, the World
Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the
Swiss Development Cooperation Agency (SDC) – worked as observers of the cease-fire
and the demobilization process (Paris 2004, 142).
During the peace process, Mozambique received financial assistance from a great
amount of donors. In fact, Mozambique was already a great recipient of aid during the
conflict. These donors organized forums in order to coordinate assistance. Two major
fora were the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
(UNOCHA) and the World Bank Consultative Group (Ball and Barnes 2000, 163).
Bilateral donors also tried to coordinate their assistance through the formation of groups.
The like-mined group was composed of the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland, and there was a group that consisted of six countries
designated as members of the high-level politico-military commissions mandated by the
peace process accord: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the UK, and the US (Ball and
Barnes 2000). There were also development agencies, like the UNDP, with their own
trust fund forums to raise money for their activities.
In relation to the reintegration process, CORE was responsible for planning,
organizing, supervising, and monitoring the economic and social reintegration of military
personnel (Ball and Barnes 2000, 176). While CORE was relevant to the funding
coordination of donor assistance for peace implementation, in practice all demobilization
and reintegration programs were planned and organized by the donors and implemented
by NGOs.
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While debates about the provision of programs exclusive for ex-combatants had
happened even before the end of the conflict, the decision to create the RSS happened
while disarmament and demobilization were already happening. According to the process
of disarmament and demobilization, former-combatants were transferred to Assembly
Areas (AAs). 76 The proposal was that AAs would be created throughout the country for
each side of the war. 77 In AAs, ex-combatants would return their weapons to be destroyed,
and, from there, they would be allocated either to different regions of the country to reenter civilian life or to the new military force, upon their choice (Berman 1996, 60).
However, the precarious conditions of the AAs and the delays in the process of
demobilization and resettlement led ex-combatants to rebel against the conditions they
faced. 78 The rebellions involved kidnapping UN staff at the AAs, road blockages, rioting,
and stealing vehicles and other equipment of the UN.
It was in this context that the Netherlands, a country of the like-minded group,
proposed the creation of a reintegration program for the ex-combatants, the RSS. The
like-minded group believed that the initial proposal of the government to pay a six-month
salary for ex-combatants would still not be enough to deter ex-combatants from returning
to war. It was in this context that the Dutch government proposed an extension of that
salary for a total of two years. The proposal gained momentum with the support of the

RENAMO was hesitant to send its troops to the AAs because this [to what does this refer?] was the only
protection it had against the government forces. To compensate for the many nonmilitary advantages of
incumbency that the government had, Aldo Ajello managed to convince donors to create a UN Trust Fund
and raised $18 million to finance RENAMO.
77
There were 29 AAs for FAM and 20 for RENAMO (Berman 1996, 60). In addition to the AAs, there
were centers outside the agreed AAs, which were called the Centro de Tropas Nao Acantonaveis (CTNAs).
Later, they were also included in the ONUMOZ DDR strategies.
78
Riots and violence occurred in AAs on both sides of the conflict. According to Mullin (2013, 123), in
FAM AAs there were six violent incidents reported in January 1994, 13 in March and 36 in May; in
RENAMO AAs, there were in the same months, respectively, 12, 21, and 31.
76
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SRSG Aldo Ajello and the international donors’ community, who agreed to fund the
program (McMullin, 2013, 127). The total of the trust fund was $35 million.
Therefore, the creation of a program of social protection exclusively for formercombatants in Mozambique was the result of an international community’s strategy to
make sure the conflict would not reoccur in the country. Because the goal of the program
was to provide financial support to guarantee that ex-combatants would not restart
violence, RSS became known as a “buy peace” strategy.

RSS in Mozambique
Mozambique’s program to support reintegration of ex-combatants, the
Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), was developed during ONUMOZ, between 1992
and 1994. The peace process between the incumbency led by the Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO) and the insurgent group, the Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) that succeeded the General Agreement (GPA) in 1992. The scale and
duration of the RSS had no precedent in UN peace operation missions in a country
(McMullin 2013). Through the RSS, all the demobilized former-combatants from the
government Armed Forces (FAM) of FRELIMO and from RENAMO, who chose not to
join the new Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), received a two-year cash
transfer (Berman 1996, 87, McMullin 2013). The first six months of salary was paid by
the government and the following 18 months was paid by a multi-donors’ trust fund and
distributed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
According to Protocol IV of Mozambique’s GPA, the target of the economic and
social reintegration program was all the demobilized combatants. Demobilized
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combatants were the former combatants who were members of either side of the conflict
– FAM and RENAMO – up until E-Day (date when the GPA and the ceasefire were
ratified by the government of Mozambique). They gave away their weapons, ammunition,
equipment, and uniforms, were registered and received an ID card, and received a
demobilization certificate.
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In other words, to be a demobilized soldier, and

consequently receive benefits of reintegration programs, it was necessary to go through
these procedural requirements.
As Berman explains, in the process of registration in the AAs, ex-combatants had
to respond to a questionnaire and the question: “do you want to join the FADM?”
Depending on their response, they would be sent to destinations where they would
establish their lives as civilians, or to be trained to be part of the FADM (Berman 1996,
70).
All of the demobilized soldiers who decided not to join the military forces would
receive the RSS, which was 18 months of salary, in addition to the six months of salary
provided by the state to those soldiers who chose to demobilize. The UNDP office in
Maputo was given responsibility for implementing the RSS operations and for
contracting the financial arrangements to the People’s Bank for Development (BPD) for
the direct payments to the demobilized soldiers (Berman 1996, 70). At that moment, BDP
had branches in the ten provinces of the country and the demobilized soldiers could
withdraw the money either in these branches or in post offices. The demobilized soldiers
would receive their monthly disbursements in bi-monthly checks at district-level banks.
The program became very popular among the soldiers, who began to demobilize in order
GPA available at:
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mozambique_Peace_Agreement.pdf.
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to obtain the benefits. The RSS also restrained combatants to opt to join the new armed
forces.
Besides the RSS, three other programs were created especially to help
demobilized soldiers: the Occupational Skills Development Program (OSDP), the
Information and Referral Service (IRS), and the Provincial Fund (PF). When the
ONUMOZ mandate was over in 1994, the PF was created to provide funding for microprojects. This was implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in
the Northern provinces and by the German development agency, GTZ, in the central
provinces. The approach adopted by GTZ – quick impact model – sought to identify
beneficiaries and provide them with a small grant, ranging from MT 1000 to 5000, to
support entrepreneurial activities (Alden 2002, 347). The Ministry of Labor asked to have
control over the Provincial Fund but donors resisted, declaring that such a step would
only serve party-political interests. These programs existed until 1997, when the
resources that funded them dried up.

4.4. Peace Process in Angola and Reintegration
Different from Mozambique, Angola did not have a UN peace operation. The end
of the war in Angola, in February 2002, was the result of a military incursion that led to
the killing of the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi. Following the military defeat, the
MPLA and UNITA signed the MoU and, after that, a peace transition was initiated in the
country with a very limited involvement of international actors.
Although Angola did not have a UN peace operation in 2002, there were two
attempts at a peace agreement between the MPLA and UNITA, with limited involvement
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of the UN. 80 The implementation of the Bicesse Agreement was followed by the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, from 1991 to 1992. 81 The goal of
UNAVEM II was only to verify and observe the provisions of the Bicesse Accord: the
demobilization process, the creation of a joint armed forces, the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAA), the transformation of UNITA into a political party, and the promotion of the first
multiparty elections in the country.
International actors were not involved in the process, except for the troika – the
United States, Russia, and Portugal – that played the role of observers in the creation of a
joint commission for political and military issues. 82 The government tried to initiate a
program of DDR, but that failed for a number of reasons: both sides of the conflict kept
secret armies violating the Bicesse Accord. The quartering process was never actually
completed and it was not known exactly what UNITA’s fighting strength was because,
although it claimed having around 75,000, this number may have been inflated for
strategic reasons. The slow rate of disarmament observed during the Bicesse process
may be an indication of both a lack of seriousness by, or of confidence between, the
parties as well as a reluctance to hand over weapons which could be sold for profit in a

It has been extensively pointed out that the failure of UNAVEM II was a cautionary tale for the UN
peace operations in other countries, including Mozambique (Dzinesa 2012, McMullin 2013). It was
because of the failure in Angola that the UN decided to strengthen and lengthen the duration of ONUMOZ.
For instance, the UN deployed 7,500 UN troops to monitor demobilization in Mozambique, compared with
only 350 unarmed UN military observers and 90 unarmed police observers in UNAVEM II. Additionally
the decision of SRSG Aldo Ajello to postpone the general elections in Mozambique was accepted by the
UN upon the recognition that the failure of UNAVEM II in Angola was in part due to rushing elections.
81
UNAVEM I was a UN operation in the country between 1989 and 1991 to observe the withdrawal of
50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. This mission was established as part in the agreement of the UN with
South Africa, against the involvement of Cuba in the region, for the independence of Namibia.
82
The troika participated in the three peace processes, but with different levels of involvement. In the
Bicesse Accord, the troika and the sides of the conflict agreed on the triple-zero clause, which meant that
the government and UNITA would not acquire new military equipment and the United States and Russia
agreed stop supplying the parties – Russia was the main supplier for the government, and the United States
for UNITA – and would encourage other countries to do the same (Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto 2013,
43-43).
80
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situation characterized by a lack of employment opportunities (Alden, Parsons and
Gomes Porto 2013, 42). Demobilization of troops did not, in the end, begin until almost a
year after the signature of the Bicesse Accord, in March 1992.
According to the SRSG Margaret Anstee (Paulo2004),
[T]he countries most closely concerned with Angola genuinely wanted peace to
be restored, but they wanted a quick fix, particularly the two superpowers from
the Cold War… The result was an agreement flawed from the start, and a
marginal role of the UN that was doomed to be ineffectual (Paulo 2004, 29).
Besides that, both parties were not trustful that each side of the conflict was
willing to give up fighting. For this reason, right after the victory of the MPLA in the
presidential and parliamentary elections on 29 and 30 September, 1992, UNITA resumed
the conflict with the claim that the electoral process was rigged. 83
In the two years that followed, while the war was happening with high intensity,
attempts to promote a peace negotiation were still in place (Paulo 2004, 30). 84 A new
peace agreement was finally reached in November 1994, the Lusaka Protocol. Different
from the Bicesse Accord, the Lusaka Protocol was negotiated and facilitated by the UN,
the troika, and some African leaders. Under the Lusaka Protocol, both sides were to
conclude the 1992 elections under UN supervision, with the SRSG Alioune Blondin Beye
chairing a Joint Commission to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire, quartering of
UNITA soldiers, and disarmament. The Protocol was followed by UNAVEM III with a
two-year mandate, from February 1995 to 1997. Even though UNAVEM III was
composed by a much larger amount of military personnel than UNAVEM II (it had 7,000

In the presidential elections, dos Santos won with 49% and Savimbi with 33% of the total votes. In the
parliamentary elections, the MPLA won with 55% and UNITA 35% (Peace Agreements: The case of
Angola, 2000).
84
There were rounds of talk in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and
in Abidjan in April-May 1993 (Paulo 2004, 30).
83
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UN peace keeping troops, 350 military observers, and 260 police observers, around ten
times bigger than UNAVEM II), most Angolans considered the mission still too weak to
outweigh and control the willingness of the parties, UNITA and the MPLA, to continue
fighting (Paulo 2004, 30).
UNAVEM III also expanded its role in the DDR process. It created the Institute
for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel (IRSEM), under the
Ministry for Reinsertion and Social Assistance (MINARS). In regards to quartering and
registration, the Lusaka Protocol established a minimum number of soldiers to be
quartered by UNITA, some 62,500. They were to be gathered in 15 Assembly Areas
(Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto 2013, 44). Nevertheless, DDR proceeded slowly, with
UNITA suspending its participation in the process on several occasions. In addition, the
resettlement and reintegration was a complex procedure, involving an array of
government, UNITA, UN agencies, and INGOs. This helped to address concerns about
the government’s capacity to implement such a complex program, but the difficulties of
coordination frequently led to delays and confusion (Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto
2013).
After two years in the country, UNAVEM III started to withdraw its troops and
the SC replaced it by a much smaller operation (with a total of 1,500 troops), the UN
Mission of Observers in Angola (MONUA), to prevent open conflict. However, in 1998,
UNITA started to launch some local attacks and both the government and UNITA
demanded UN withdrawal because of its inefficacy to prevent further conflict (Paulo
2004, 30). MONUA withdrew from the country when a plane accident, arguably led by
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UNITA, killed SRSG Beye. After the 1994-1997 period of relative peace, the war
resumed and lasted until 2002.
In October 1999, the UN Office in Angola (UNOA) was established to explore
effective ways to restore peace and to coordinate humanitarian assistance. Therefore, by
the time that the war came to an end, the UN did not have a peace operation deployed in
the country. In 2002, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the General of
the government’s Armed Forces, Armando da Cruz Neto, and the General of UNITA’s
Armed Forces (FMU), Geraldo Abreu Muengo Ucuatchitembo “Kamorteiro.” The MoU
was witnessed by the UN Undersecretary-General and Special Advisor for Africa,
Ibrahim Gambari, and the troika. The process was run by the incumbent government,
which made the peace led by the winner of the conflict. In order to observe the peace
process, the SC established the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) to “chair the
reinstated Joint Military Commission, to provide 30 military observers to monitor the
quartering areas as guarantors of the agreement, and to coordinate the humanitarian
efforts of all other UN agencies.”
In terms of donors, the immediate period after the end of the war, between 2002
and 2004, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the country was divided by
Portugal (34%), the United States (18%), the European Community (11%), the Nordic
countries (7%), and Japan (4%) (Sogge 2007). Besides these countries, China was also a
contributor of concessional loans (Sogge 2007). Therefore, most of the assistance to
Angola came from bilateral donors and especially from countries that had some economic
and political interests in Angola, such as Portugal and the US, whereas traditional donors
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(like the Nordic countries and the European Community) had a much smaller share of the
ODA.
Other sources of international aid, such as relief and humanitarian programs
channeled by the UN agencies and aid from the World Bank, declined after the end of the
conflict (Sogge 2007). The reason for this decline was that there was an international
mistrust of the government of Angola due to its recognized levels of corruption involving
its exports of diamond and oil.
In relation to reintegration, most of the international assistance came from the
World Bank, through the International Development Agency (IDA) and the MDRP.
Launched in 2002, the MDRP aimed to support DDR activities in seven countries
affected by conflict in Central Africa: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The
requirements for the country to be eligible to receive assistance from MDRP included the
preparation of a national demobilization and reintegration program as a result of the
conflict, a suitable institutional structure to implement DDR, and participation in the
regional peace process. Angola became eligible to receive assistance because it had these
institutions from previous peace agreements, and it participated in the Lusaka Cease-Fire
Accord of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002. 85
The program financed by the World Bank was the ADRP. Of the $180 million for
the program, the World Bank pledged and began to disburse $33 million (through IDA)
and $53 million (through the MDRP’s multi donor trust fund), the government pledged
$217 million, and the European Commission an additional $17 million (Alden, Parsons
and Gomes Porto 2013, 40). Although the negotiations between the government and the
85

This is not to be confused with the Lusaka Protocol for the civil war in Angola in 1994.

98

World Bank started in March 2002, the ADPR started to be implemented only in March
2004.
The support from the World Bank was framed as a poverty reduction strategy
paper for Angola. This means that the demobilization and reintegration process in Angola
needed to be framed within a strategy of economic recovery and development. While this
strategy was not achieved in practice, as we will see in this chapter, it affected the shape
and design of the program.

ADRP in Angola
The ADRP was the cash-transfer program for ex-combatants in Angola. Soon
after the MoU was signed, the government started to negotiate with the World Bank and
its MDRP over the designing and funding of the program. The end of the war happened
in February 2002 with the death of the leader of the insurgent group, the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Jonas Savimbi. Two months after his
death, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government, led by the
People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and UNITA was signed
establishing the provisions of the reintegration process. 86 Both the MoU and the peace
process that followed were led by the national government with little international
involvement, except for the involvement of some countries as observers of the process.
The reintegration of ex-combatants was also mainly led by the government. However, the
design and implementation of the program was influenced by international aid, mainly
86
The full name of the MoU is “Memorandum of Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities and the
Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol.” It was signed in Luena, Angola,
on April 4, 2002, so the agreement is also called the Luena Protocol or Luena MoU. The MoU was not a
new agreement; rather, it was an amendment of the Lusaka Protocol, as will be explained further in this
chapter, with changes in the annexes 3 and 4, related to the DDR of UNITA and the integration of the
Armed Forces (Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto 2013, 34).
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from the World Bank and its subsidiary agency, the Multi-country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program (MDRP), because of the demands the World Bank had in order to
provide aid. Therefore, while the peace process in Angola was homegrown, its programs
of reintegration were conditioned on international demands. One of these demands was
the development of state institutions to run such programs, given that the World Bank
only provides funds to programs when there are domestic institutions to run them. The
program was launched in 2004, and it was designed to assist more than 100,000 exUNITA combatants and 33,000 FAA personnel. The final decision of the program was to
provide for ex-combatants a monthly salary during five months, in a total equivalent to
$100, and a reinsertion kit of tools and household items (McMullin 2011, 251). However,
the program was barely implemented, and there was evidence of politicization throughout
the entire process.
In relation to DDR, the first steps of demilitarization of UNITA’s military forces
began during April 2002 with the setting of 27 quartering areas scattered through the
country. The government of Angola retained total control over the process as well as its
responsibility for financing, with no provision for third-party monitoring (Alden, Parsons
and Gomes Porto 2013, 37).

However, there was a much larger number being

demobilized than the expected. In August 2002, 85,585 ex-FMU were quartered and the
government, to accommodate all of the ex-combatants expanded the number of
quartering areas from 27 to 35 (Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto 2013, 37). Most of the
former combatants were joining the camps with their family, increasing even more the
expected number of demobilized individuals. This increasing number of demobilized
soldiers casts doubt upon the announcement of the Armed Forces in August 2002 that the
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demobilization and disarmament components had been completed. In addition, at that
moment, the process of reintegration had still barely started (Alden, Parsons and Gomes
Porto 2013, 37).
In fact, in May 2002, one month after the MoU and the beginning of quartering
former-UNITA combatants, President Dos Santos launched an urgent appeal for
international aid in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster in the rebel camps caused by
an increasing number of demobilized soldiers. Humanitarian and religious organizations
working in the camps confirmed the situation. Ecclesia Catholic radio reported the death
of 25 people in the Cambulo-Capaya camp, in the Lunda-Norte province, and MSF said
famine was developing in the Gualangue camp, in the southwestern Huila province,
where thousands of people were affected by famine (Agence France-Presse 2002). 87 In
addition, due to the shortage of quartering sites for the demobilized soldiers, the
government started a movement to pressure civilian IDPs to evacuate the camps that
existed for them or transit centers so that demobilized soldiers could be relocated there
(Human Rights Watch 2003).
Despite this situation, the World Bank just started to provide assistance to Angola
in 2004. Upon the World Bank request, the government created a national commission to
be in charge of the program, the National Commission of Social and Productive
Reintegration of Demobilized and Displaced (CNRSPDD). IRSEM, which existed since
after the Lusaka Protocol, continued being the implementing organization. Both organs,
spread out in the 18 provinces of Angola, were in charge of preparing inventories of the
87
In October that year, The Angolan government denied allegations that it was deliberately starving exUNITA soldiers in quartering camps, saying poor infrastructure has hampered the delivery of emergency
food aid. "There are not any shortages of food or medicines. We face transport difficulties because of the
poor state of the roads. We can only deliver aid by air," Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told
the Portuguese news agency.
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different reintegration programs, channeling the funds to the programs, and establishing
partnerships with implementing NGOs and UN agencies.

4.5. Evaluating the Programs
The RSS and the ADPR were developed as an emergency response to failures of
the demobilization process in both countries. However, the different involvement of
international actors affected the creation and implementation of each program. RSS was a
suggestion from the outside to help avoid the conflict to reoccur. In Angola, on the other
hand, the government needed to ask for foreign aid to fund the reintegration program, and,
for this reason, it needed to follow specific demands from the outside as well.
Upon the end of these programs, they were considered a success in terms of
achieving the end of demobilization and (even if only partial) reintegration of formercombatants. In fact, RSS has been considered one of the most successful programs of
DDR run by the UN until the present day. As Alden stated, in 1997 the implementing
agents conducted their final impact assessments, and they “found unanimously that
former combatants had been fully reintegrated into society, citing as evidence perceptions
on the part of both demobilized soldiers and society in general that reintegration had been
successful, as well as the absence of significant and sustained violence during the postelection period” (Alden 2002, 345).
Angola’s program, as part of the MDRP, also received a positive evaluation from
the World Bank. The MDRP was the largest program of its kind ever attempted in the
world. Angola was considered a successful case in the region because of its political
stability in comparison to the other countries in the Great Lakes region, such as the
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and Central African Republic (MDRP
2009).
Two issues in relation to the comparison done here deserve some considerations.
The first one is related to who evaluates the programs. The outcomes were evaluated by
those who implemented them. In Mozambique, the success of the demobilized is
oftentimes attributed by the program in itself. But the actual evaluation should be done in
a broader perspective, in terms of the real reintegration of ex-combatants in the economy
and society. In Angola, the program was also seen as a success by MDRP. As the MDRP
manager, Maria Correira, states about the MDRP program in general: “It would be easy
to dwell on what didn’t work well or what remains to be done. But if we ask ourselves
‘what would have happened if the MDRP didn’t exist?’ the Program’s immense
achievements become evident.” 88
Despite the success of these programs, the DDR strategy experienced similar
flaws in both countries. A vast literature has pointed to problems in the design and
execution of DDR programs in general, and in Angola and Mozambique in particular.
The first problem in both programs was the fact that they neglected special attention to
vulnerable groups, mainly women, children, and the disabled. One of the main problems
identified in the literature in relation to the neglect of women was the process of
disarmament and demobilization. Since most women had roles that did not involve the
possession of arms, they were not eligible for the demobilization and, as a result, of
reintegration programs. In addition, in Mozambique, the women who were demobilized
were offered training only in traditional women’s activities, such as sewing and
MDRP. 2009. “MDRP partners gather for the last time at the World Bank.” 16 de March de 2009.
http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/N&N_03_09.pdf. Visited on 16 April 2016.
88
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secretarial work, demonstrating the existence of prejudices in the process of designing
programs of DDR. In relation to children, one of the problems identified is that neither
country wanted to admit that children participated in the war, which is a violation of
international human rights conventions. Finally, the neglect of the disabled affected a
great number of people in both countries because many people were injured by the land
mines in both countries.
The lack of jobs to economically reintegrate ex-combatants was another problem
in both countries. This issue reveals two other problems in the reintegration process. One
is the fact that both countries had very weak economies and that there were no job
opportunities for all demobilized people. Two, as explained by Alden, was the
international community’s assumption that, given that most of the ex-combatants came
from rural areas, they were willing to work in agriculture after the conflict. The result of
this assumption was a great number of programs, including the ADRP, providing to excombatants seeds and tool kits to work as farmers after the conflict (Alden 2002). This
assumption was made in both Angola and Mozambique. In Mozambique, “a steady
stream of demobilized soldiers in search of employment moved from rural communities,
where they were resettled, to urban areas” (Berdal 1996, 40). In Angola, given that it was
the interest of the government to relate demobilization to the recovery and development
of the rural sector of the country, it was decided to resettle ex-combatants in rural areas as
well.
The third flaw was the lack of attention to social and cultural reintegration of
former-combatants. In some communities in Mozambique, traditional rituals for
reinsertion and the reintegration of former combatants existed, but they were not
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considered part of, or stimulated by, the formal programs of reintegration. According to
the president of the Mozambican Association of War Veterans (AMODEG), Joaquim
Neimure,
Not enough attention was given to the social and cultural dimensions of
reintegration in Mozambique. Under the GPA, which was carried out in
coordination with the UN Mission, there was CORE but the social and cultural
dimensions were basically ignored. As to economic reintegration, CORE
promised special programs, aid, training, and jobs, but they still remain only
promises (Nemuire 1996, 61).
The fact that the same problems were identified in both countries even though
they had different kinds and levels of international involvement raises the question about
the role of international actors in the outcome of such programs. The international actors
involved considered them successful, but they had problems in relation to the
implementation process and to the contexts surrounding such policies. The fact that
reintegration programs were not accompanied by the creation of jobs made reintegration
to be only partially completed.

Targeting
After ONUMOZ withdrew, FRELIMO made the Ministry of Labor responsible
for continuing reintegration efforts. But, according to McMullin (2013), the government
has focused on veterans of the independence war of 1975, and decided that no more
support was necessary to the ex-combatants of the civil war. The government also
established, in 1999, a Ministry for Veteran’s Affairs, but limited the mandate of the
ministry to assist only independence war veterans (McMullin 2013, 130). For instance,
ex-combatants who fought in the liberation struggle qualified for pensions, medical care,
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and schooling for themselves and their children, whereas the ex-combatants of the civil
war were not eligible.
Angola experienced a similar institutional outcome. However, the politicization
was noticed not only after the end of the peace process, but throughout. In June 2005, in
the meeting of the UNITA’s Political Commission, leaders of the party argued that the
MPLA did not do what it promised in relation to reintegration programs. In that same
year, ex-combatants from UNITA distributed a document in Luanda asking the
government to inform what was being done in relation to the reintegration process in the
country (Lusa 2005).
The initial plan of the government of Mozambique was to demobilize only
members of FRELIMO. Before the end of the conflict, the government of Mozambique
proposed to the international donors a program to demobilize 45,000 FAM combatants
and asked financial support for the CG in 1991. International donors were against the
proposal arguing that the program was too costly and also because they had preference
for short-term program of stability (Ball and Barnes 2000). Additionally, donors were not
willing to finance special programs for the demobilized soldiers, preferring them to be
included within overall reintegration programs because they were concerned about
creating programs specific for them and they would not integrate in the society. It was
only after the demobilized started to express their anger in the assembly areas, as
explained above, that the donors agreed to the investment in cash payments and other
entitlements. In other words, the decision to implement the program of reintegration for
ex-combatants in Mozambique was the result of a concern from the international donors
that the widespread violence in the AAs could lead rebels to restart the conflict.
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In Angola, the initial proposal from the government was to demobilize only
members of UNITA. In order to avoid the mistakes of previous peace agreements, the
decision of the government was to prioritize the combatants of UNITA (Ruigrok 2007). It
was only after the negotiations with the World Bank for financial assistance over the
demobilization process that the government of Angola included members of the
government’s armed forces and the old caseloads in the programs of demobilization. It
also had to deal with the incomplete reintegration process of another 160,000 former
soldiers from the incomplete reintegration processes from the other two peace accords
(Alden, Parsons and Gomes Porto 2013, 41). 89
The decision of the World Bank was to change the way in which the program was
going to be implemented by the government. Prior to the negotiation, the government
was committed to creating a program only for the UNITA combatants not attached to the
process of demobilization and reintegration. The World Bank proposed a change in the
government’s plans to create an integrated program of demobilization and reintegration
that would be in charge of reintegrating 33,000 members of the FAA and the old caseload.
The involvement of international actors, be it political or technical, was able to
alter the target of the programs initially planned by both countries. This change, however,
did not bring a substantial effect on the institutionalization of the programs. In Angola,
most of the process was done and monitored by state institutions, so the process was
controlled by the state. Up until 2007, the last MDRP Report, Angola had barely started
the demobilization process of former FAA combatants.
In Mozambique, the process was led by the international actors, and when it
ended, the state had no incentive to continue supporting the same individuals from the
89

Data diverge among readings. Ruigrok (2007) talks about 191,400 combatants of the old caseload.
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program. This was a consequence of two aspects of the international actors’ involvement.
The first was that the program of reintegration was established as a process that would
happen in the short-run and the state institutions were not going to be committed to
continuing providing assistance to the same individuals who were the target of the
internationally funded programs. Second was the fact that the international actors
evaluated the programs as successful, which implied that, in fact, there was no need to
continue providing assistance to the ex-combatants of the civil war because the
reintegration process was already complete.

Reaching beneficiaries
In general, there are two instances where money and in-kind transfers, such as
food and materials for agriculture, can be provided to the demobilized combatants. The
first one is while they are waiting for resettlement. In this moment, they often receive
salaries that are compatible to the salaries they received as combatants and also programs
of training in order to have some qualification when they are finally resettled. These
programs are called reinsertion programs. The second one is after they are already
resettled and it works for two purposes: to be a safety net for ex-combatants to guarantee
that they will not return to conflict, and to guarantee that they would improve the local
economy through enhancing their capacity for purchasing local products. These programs
are the reintegration programs.
This difference affects the capacity of reaching ex-combatants. If the goal of the
programs is, indeed, reintegration, the government and the international actors need to
think of strategies to reach ex-combatants. While they are in the assembly or quartering
areas, it is easier to find them to provide them with the benefits, in comparison to when
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they are reintegrated and dispersed throughout the territory. Therefore, the decision of
where former-combatants should be allocated matters for the outcomes of the programs.
In Mozambique, the CORE included reinsertion programs (material benefits) and
reintegration (OSD and PF). In relation to the reintegration programs, the initial debate
was related to whether the ex-combatants would get a lump sum or installments of the
cash payment. The final decision was that the latter would be more efficient because it
would provide a safety net that would ensure a guaranteed income over a considerable
period of time, since donors feared ex-combatants would spend all the money at once.
However, with CORE’s decision, there was also the necessity to plan how the money
would be sent out to the former combatants. As explained before, donors decided, then,
that the 18 months of donor trust fund was to be paid every two months at the BPD or by
post office (Hanlon 2004, 377). Initially this was a good strategy because the BPD had
branches all over the country. However, at the same time that this process was happening,
the country was going through economic reforms, through which the BPD was privatized,
and it needed to close several branches because they were not profitable (Hanlon 2004).
This was a problem for the ex-combatants to access their paychecks. In addition, the
other programs, the OSDP and the IRS, became centers that ex-combatants used to ask
questions about collecting their paychecks instead of doing their proposed activities.
In Angola, there were also programs of reinsertion and reintegration. The
reintegration program, the ADRP, was the reverse of the programs in Mozambique. In
theory, the ADRP consisted of local programs in the regions where the demobilized
soldiers wanted to return. These programs could be agriculture or training for small
business work. However, in practice, this was not always the case, and in rural areas, it
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had a restricted scale and the existence of several organizations promoting reintegration
programs represented a source of confusion among demobilized workers:
In the rural areas, there often was a dazzling variety of reintegration schemes, set
up for the time being by local church groups or NGOs. The projects could only
cater to a handful of demobilized soldiers, and offered limited assistance and few
benefits. When the much larger national program was finally formalized, in many
cases all the demobilized soldiers came to register. Yet, the ADRP not only
disqualifies the old-caseloads. Also, soldiers that had recently been demobilized,
but had already benefited from any other project offered under the ADRP even if
they did not feel reintegrated yet. This resulted in a substantial degree of
confusion and misunderstanding (Ruigrok 2007, 91).
These facts also show how these programs had little effect on the outcomes for
the state institutions. In Mozambique, most of the process of implementation was being
done and controlled by international actors, and the central government had little
involvement in the implementation of RSS. In Angola, while the World Bank insisted on
the involvement of the central government in the process, most of the reintegration was
also happening at the local level, through the sub-projects financed by the Bank and the
MDRP.

4.6. Conclusion
The empirical evidence of this chapter contributes to my argument in three
ways. First, it shows that after the international actors left Mozambique in 1994 and
stopped financing the reintegration program in Angola in 2008, the reintegration
programs in each country had similar results. In both cases, the programs were politicized
because the government prioritized the combatants who fought on their side during the
conflict. In the case of Mozambique, the priority was toward the combatants of the
liberation war, instead of the civil war. The government argued that the process of
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reintegration for the ex-combatants of the civil war was already over. In Angola, the fact
that the government led the program of reintegration throughout, the programs of
reintegration were highly politicized, and remained politicized after the end of ADPR.
The motivations of this politicization rested in different reasons in each case, but both
happened while the international actors were still present in the countries: in
Mozambique, the decreasing interest of the international actors to proceed with the
program reduced the chances of a more effective and actual social and economic
reintegration program. In other words, RSS “reflected a minimalist goal of providing
financial support to combatants over a fixed period of time, enough to pay and scatter
them and remove them from being potential threats to security” (McMullin 2013, 127).
In Angola, the ADRP was part of the intent of the World Bank to make the country meet
international expectations to receive international funding.
Second, it shows that regardless of the level of international involvement in the
post-conflict countries, the programs of reintegration were short-term. Given that the
peace process worked under liberal underpinnings, social protection programs existed
only for the purpose of buying peace, in the case of Mozambique, or in order to fulfill the
requirements for the poverty reduction strategy paper, in the case of Angola.
Finally, what is left to answer is the question about whether the domestic political
elites needed to find strategies to circumvent pressures of the international actors or if
there were no pressures from the international actors that the domestic political elites
needed to address. After the mandates of the international actors ended, there was an
absence of pressure from the international actors to guarantee that the reintegration
programs would continue. This is the reason why, despite the great difference in the level
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of international involvement in Angola and Mozambique during the peace process, the
outcomes of both programs of military reintegration were similar.
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Chapter 5: Fuel Subsidies for Consumers
5.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses fuel subsidies as an arrangement of social protection in
Angola and Mozambique. 90 Different from the arrangement discussed in the previous
chapter, this social protection is promoted by domestic actors while international donors,
especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are against it. These international
actors argue that fuel subsidies are regressive and do not benefit the poorest population.
As explained in earlier chapters, both countries have different levels and kinds of
international involvement and my general assumption is that the level and kind of
international involvement affects outcomes.
Fuel subsidies for consumers are considered to have a social protection
component because they reduce the cost of transportation and are an important source of
energy for areas where there is no electricity. Given that Mozambique is more dependent
on the IFIs than Angola, it would be expected that Angola, an oil producer, would have
fuel subsidies while Mozambique would not. However, both countries have these
subsidies. During the 2000s, Angola has spent around 4 to 5% of its annual Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) on fuel subsidies, while Mozambique has spent around 1%.
Both countries opted to subsidize the consumption of fuels, such as kerosene, gasoline,
and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).
This chapter shows that international actors have little effect on both countries
and that domestic political elites have greater influence on their decisions to subsidize
fuels. These dynamics are different in Angola and in Mozambique, mainly because
There are two kinds of fuel subsidies: those for production and those for consumption. In this chapter, I
focus on subsidies for consumption.
90
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Mozambique needs to import oil while Angola produces it. However, in both countries,
the beneficiaries of this social protection program are the same. Those who benefit from
the program are the political and economic elites, their political constituencies, and, in
most part, those who live in urban areas.
This chapter, therefore, sets out to understand how Mozambique, given its
dependency on international actors and aid, is able to circumvent international
preferences, and what, if anything, contains Angola’s fuel subsidies. In addition, it shows
who benefits from this social protection in each country. In order to do so, this chapter
will first explain what fuel subsidies are. Then, it will explain the relations of each
country with the IFIs and the pressures each country faced to phase out fuel subsidies.
After that, it will explain the domestic politics of each country to respond to international
pressures.

5.2. Fuel Subsidies
In sub-Saharan Africa, fuel subsidies have been used by countries that produce
and countries that do not produce oil, spending an approximate total of 1.5% of the GDP
of the region annually. 91 Countries that export oil argue that they need to maintain the
price of fuel accessible to the population to avoid complaints of resource exploitation that
can generate strikes and rioting.
While this social protection component is an important aspect of fuel subsidies,
“governments generally use subsidies as part of wider economic policies to support
specific businesses, markets, sectors or regions, and subsidies are among the more
common public policy instruments in current use, with political interests often
91

Countries above the average tend to be oil producers.
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determining who receives subsidies and at what scale” (Whitley and van der Burg 2015,
6).
International actors have a different view of fuel subsidies. They believe that they
are regressive and ineffective because in countries that have massive poverty, those
individuals who live in urban areas and use means of transportation are not the poorest
individuals. On top of that, they argue, individuals who have cars are the ones who
benefit the most from the fuel subsidies, and they are among the richest sectors of the
population in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, according to a book sponsored by the IMF,
[T]he most effective way to protect the poor is to allocate some of the budgetary
savings from the elimination of fuel subsidies to a well-targeted social safety net
that has high coverage of poor households and little leakage to non-poor
households. To the extent that existing social safety net programs do not exist or
are badly targeted, the gradual removal of fuel subsidies can help protect the real
incomes of the poor, while the targeting of existing programs is improved or new
programs are developed. For example, kerosene subsidies may be maintained
while other subsidies are removed. However, there may be substantial efficiency,
as well as revenue, costs associated with such a strategy. Therefore, it is important
that alternative mechanisms are developed as rapidly as possible and fuel
subsidies phased out accordingly (Kpodar, El-Said and Coady 2006).
This note summarizes the view of the international financial institutions (IFIs),
mainly the IMF and the World Bank, in relation to fuel subsidies. They prefer programs
that have a very specific targeting system. They assume that the government institutions
will channel the exceeding money they will have in case they stop their fuel subsidies to
social programs. Finally, they recognize the importance of subsidizing some kinds of fuel,
such as kerosene.
In relation to the requirement by international actors to eliminate fuel subsidies,
three points must be raised: (1) international actors have traditionally rejected all kinds of
subsidies, (2) international actors suggest a phase-out strategy, which can have negative
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consequences, and (3) the population of the country may be in favor of the subsidies,
despite the rejection of international actors.
First, international financial institutions (IFIs) have been traditionally against all
different types of subsidies, especially food. During the structural adjustment programs,
the IFIs demanded countries cut all the subsidies that they had. At that time, the strategy
was to remove the state from the market and provide incentives for a process of resource
allocation driven by economics rather than politics (Hyden 2012). The consequences of
the structural adjustment programs were massive levels of poverty in urban areas because
people could not afford the consumption goods and services after the elimination of the
subsidies.
Mozambique greatly suffered these effects with its first structural adjustment plan
(SAP) in the country, the Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE), as explained in
chapter three. In order to correct the prices with actual market demand, the prices of basic
products and services in the country, such as water, food, electricity, and rent, rose
substantially. By 1988, the prices of rice, maize, and sugar increased between 300 and
500% (Marshall 1990). At the same time, government cut public expenditure by
decreasing the minimum wage of workers, from a monthly wage of U$52 to U$23
(Hanlon 1996, 69). According to a report developed by Reginald Green, in 1988, half of
the urban population and two thirds of the rural population were absolutely poor in
Mozambique. 92 The report also mentioned that poverty in urban areas was mostly caused

In the report, absolute poverty was defined as “the level of household income where either growth
faltering in children was very common or where basic food providing two-thirds of calorie requirements
costs more than half of the income” (Hanlon 1996, 93).
92
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by the negative consequences of the PRE, whereas poverty in the rural areas was mostly
affected by the war. 93
The second point is that strategies to phase out fuel subsidies, as suggested by
international actors, can be problematic if they do not have a complete political reform
along with it. Political reforms mean here the actual execution of other social programs,
so the population will notice that while they will lose because of the increase in the price
of subsidies, that they will win through free or cheaper access to other social services.
Therefore, political reform means the development of a more accountable government,
which reallocates resources to other programs and their execution. With no political
reforms prior or during the phase out process to verify the redirection of the share of the
budget saved, there is no actual guarantee that the cuts of subsidies will be allocated to
programs of social protection, or any other social program.
Finally, although the major criticisms of fuel subsidy is that only a very small and
rich part of the population benefits from it, it is important to recognize the interests of the
population and whether or not they want the subsidies. For instance, in 2012, the
President of Nigeria, the largest exporter of oil in Africa, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, decided
to eliminate fuel subsidies in the country. This caused a generalized reaction of the
population, who promoted strikes and rioting in the major cities. According to a Nigerian
survey, Alliance for Credible Elections, 80% of the population was against the removal
of the subsidies. In addition, a collection of articles published in 2013 by Nigerian
scholars called Politics and Economics of Removing Subsdies on Petrolium Products In

The recognition the generalized poverty of those countries was brought to the attention of the
international actors after the rise of a great amount of riots (known as IMF riots) happened in the urban
areas of countries subjected to the SAPs. The anger of the protesters was directed to the withdrawal of what
was seen as political entitlement and as against austerity itself (de Waal 1997).
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Nigeria showed that the de-subsidization of fuels in Nigeria was also opposed by some
scholars. Despite international support for such initiative, the government was so
pressured by the popular discontent that it decided to bring the subsidy back. This story in
Nigeria shows that fuel subsidies do have a social protection component and that the parts
of the population who receive it and the international actors have different views and
opinions about such subsidies.

5.3. Angola, Mozambique, and the IFIs
For this case study, the main difference between Angola and Mozambique is how
they relate with the international financial institutions, because they are the most active
actors against fuel subsidies. Mozambique has had a somewhat stable relationship with
the IMF, while Angola and IMF have had difficulties in achieving agreements. In
addition, another difference between the countries is the domestic actors involved in the
decisions on fuel subsidies. For this reason, this part of the chapter explains these
relations and the domestic actors involved in each country.
Mozambique receives assistance from several international donors. As previously
explained, the country has been dependent on foreign aid since its independence in 1975,
and this dependence was reinforced after the end of the civil war in 1992. The IMF has
worked with these international donors and the donors accommodate to the requirements
of the IMF. In addition, when the IMF is against Mozambique, the donors helped
Mozambique and convinced the IMF to continue providing assistance to the country.
Since Mozambique became a member of IMF, in 1987, when it launched its structural
adjustment program, PRE, the country has received investment and loans through the
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IMF. The program was supported by a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) arrangement
until 1990, by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangement until
1995, and by a second ESAF-supported arrangement until mid-1999. In support of the
structural reforms, the World Bank approved six adjustment-lending operations in the
1990s (IMF 1999). 94 From 1987 until 1999, when the IMF changed again its lending
system, the relation between Mozambique and the IMF was based on whether
Mozambique had all of the conditions necessary for eligibility to the loans provided by
the IMF. 95
In 1999, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), part of the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), replaced the ESAF. The PRSPs were part of the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), through which the World Bank and the
IMF sought to relate debt relief with poverty alleviation (Woods 2007, 240). In theory,
the PRSPs were meant to be elaborated through a consultative process with local civil
society. However, the essential aspects of the conditionality process continued in a less
direct, but not less controlling, manner. The first PRSP in Mozambique was the Program
for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA 1), between 2001 and 2005. PARPA,
renamed PARP in 2011, had its mandate extended in 2006, and 2011. 96 It was in the
94
Due to the fact that several countries could not repay their debts, “ESAF provided a longer repayment
schedule with low interest rates, of about 0.5 per cent, but the conditions for eligibility became much
tougher.” Although the two aspects mentioned here seem paradoxical, they are both part of the strategies of
the IFIs. They started to assume that the failures of the structural adjustment programs were the recipient
countries’ fault. Therefore, they needed to strict the eligibility criteria.
95
The
IMF
approved
three
ESAF
loan
for
Mozambique.
IMF
website:
https://www.imf.org/external/country/MOZ/index.htm?pn=14
96
According to the finance minister of Mozambique, Pedro Couto, the key goals of PARPA 1 were “the
strengthening of human capital, improving infra-structure, good governance, and macro-economic financial
stability.” (“Donors offer US$722 million to Mozambique.” AIM, 2001). PARPA 1 was heavily criticized
by the local organizations and some international actors for three main reasons. First, different from what
was determined, PARPA 1 was not created through a consultative process. Rather, it was created by the
executive office, not even being approved by the parliament. Second, there was no definition of
vulnerability of the population, showing that PARPA 1 was not created based on the needs of the
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context of the PARPA 2 (2006-2010), during the period of the 2008 global economic
crisis, that Mozambique adopted its fuel subsidies.
As a response to the fuel subsidies, the IMF expressed that they were against fuel
subsidies, but it recognized that the 2008 global economic crisis would increase the price
of subsidies and negatively affect the individuals in the country. Therefore, the IMF
supported fuel subsidies in Mozambique because it was adopted as an emergency
mechanism until the price of fuels were stabilized in the global market. In order to
respond to this IMF view, the government of Mozambique announced in the 2009 “Letter
of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical
Memorandum of Understanding” that the government was going to phase out fuel
subsidies by the middle of 2010. 97 It also announced that
It will consider replacing the fuel subsidies with better targeted and more effective
alternative measures benefiting those truly in need, making use of the overall
ceiling of MT 1.7 billion for such measures in the 2010 draft budget. The fuel
subsidies will be transparently shown in the budget documents (IMF 2009).
Domestically, in order for the population to receive subsidized fuels, the
population. Finally, PARPA 1 was again a case of macro-economic development and stabilization, with the
already familiar argument that this would bring social development. As Hanlon (2007) said, the idea of
trickle down in Mozambique was used until very recently in Mozambique, when the IMF announced its
plan in 2006 of economic development in the country. Although PARPA 1 made Mozambique eligible for
the debt relief programs, even the IMF acknowledged the lack of attention to social programs in PARPA 1.
Having in mind the limitations of PARPA 1, PARPA 2 (2006-2010) was created with two significant
innovations. One was the increase of actions related to the provision of basic services to the population.
The main target was of the program was to reduce poverty from 54% in 2006 to 45% in 2009.96 The other
innovation of PARPA-2 was the new approach of the international donors to finance poverty relief, which
will be further discussed chapter six. The main difference between PARPA 1 and 2 was a new stress on
greater integration of the national economy, focusing its attention on development in the district level, and
on creating a favorable environment for growth of the productive sector, particularly small and medium
companies.” “Government launces PARPA 2.” AIM, 1006. PARPA 2 was extended in 2010, and became
PARP (2011-2014), without the “A” of absolute poverty, because the measures to evaluate poverty
changed, but the programs remain the same.
97
IMF 2009. Mozambique: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and
Technical
Memorandum
of
Understanding.
Available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2009/moz/111809.pdf
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government decided to grant subsidies for the import and distribution of oil derivatives.
Fuel imports are centralized through a consortium of fuel distributors (IMOPETRO), also
referred to as intermediaries (IMF 2016). According to the IMF Report (2016),
“membership in IMOPETRO is compulsory and no operator is authorized to import fuel
outside this system. PETROMOC, the public sector fuel distributor has de facto control
of IMOPETRO given its 51 percent stake” (IMF 2016, 25). Therefore, the government
has a great control over the import and distribution of oil in the country. The IMF
considers this centralization one of the main current challenges of the government of
Mozambique in relation to fuel subsidies.
Different from Mozambique, Angola has faced difficulties in negotiating loans
with the IMF. As explained in the previous chapters, while the war was a major issue for
both actors to come to an agreement, the end of the war did not facilitate the relation
between them. On the side of the IMF, there was no interest in negotiating with the
country because of the alleged lack of transparency. On the side of Angola, the oil
reserves attracted foreign direct from gas and oil companies, such as Chevron, Total, and
ExxonMobil, and from national oil companies from emerging markets, such as Brazil and
China. As a consequence, there was less need to accept the demands that would come
with an IMF agreement. 98Therefore, different from Mozambique, Angola did not receive
approval for its structural adjustment programs, ESAF loans, or PRSP.
Domestically, the fuels produced in the refinery are sold to the state-run oil
company, Sonangol. According to the World Bank (2005), Sonangol is responsible for
distributing the products to gas stations and other resale outlets. Most gas stations belong
“Angola Economic Briefing – High oil profile compensate for tough business environment.” Africa
News Service 30 Apr. 2013. Infotrac Newsstand. Web. 24 June 2016.
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to Sonangol. There are a few small private gas stations distributed across the country,
mainly in urban areas. Finally, Sonangol subcontracts with private transportation
companies to deliver its products in the provinces (World Bank 2005, 94). In fact,
Sonangol, plays a central role, not only in the redistribution in the country, but also in the
extraction, export, and other investments. 99 As Tallio (2015) states,

[Sonangol] owns interests in every oil concession and supervises
exploitation and production licenses, but, more importantly, it has a
prominent role in the redistribution of the oil income as it manages and
regulates the oil sector. Sonangol acquires more and more importance in
government, and gets involved in industries that have few or even no links
with oil exploitation and production; this runs counter to the privatisation
process pushed by the state in other economic sectors. It also plays a
prominent role in rescheduling the Angolan debt and negotiating new loans;
these processes involve Sonangol, the government and the Banco Nacional
de Angola (National Bank of Angola), which are also involved in the
channelling of oil revenue to the Treasury.
This highly centralized structure of Sonangol, as well as most of the political
institutions in Angola, is one of the reasons why the IMF has decided not to negotiate
loans and investments with the country. They argue that this centralization leads to lack
of transparency by the government. As a result, the IMF has not approved any PRSP
from Angola. It was only after the 2008 crisis that the IMF negotiated a Stand-By
Arrangement with Angola, meaning the provision of support for macro-economic
policies in the context of international crisis, which will be further explained below. 100
Therefore, two main differences between the relations of Angola and
Mozambique with international actors should be highlighted. First, the government of
99
“Angola: Angola mulling Norway-style oil fund -report” TendersInfo 28 Nov. 2009. Infotrack Newsstand.
Web. 24 June 2016.
100
The Stand-By Arrangements were part of the IMF decision to implement more flexible short-term,
precautionary, and emergency financial assistance for low-income countries after the 2008 global crisis
(Woods 2009, 11).
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Mozambique has had a closer relation with the IMF in comparison to Angola. Second,
the government of Mozambique relies on the import of oil derivatives whereas Angola
produces oil and the same state company is responsible for the distribution of fuels for
consumption. Because of this difference, my assumption was that Mozambique was did
not have fuel subsidies, while Angola did. We move now to the domestic aspects of both
countries to explain why they both have fuel subsidies.

5.4. Fuel subsidies for consumers in Mozambique
Mozambique has three types of subsidies: fuel, wheat flour for bread, and to cover
the operating deficits of various public enterprises (World Bank 2012). Mozambique
traditionally adjusted fuel subsidies based on a monthly market-based formula and, at the
peak of the price shocks in 2008, the government introduced an adjustment factor that
kept the fuel prices below the market prices (World Bank 2012, 62). The triggering factor
for the government of Mozambique to adopt fuel subsidies was the rioting in Maputo,
which later spread to other cities in the country, in 2008 against the hike of 50% in the
chapas, a kind of semi-collective means of transportation. The chapas are privately
owned minibuses and they are the most common means of transportation in urban areas
because public transportation is not able to accommodate the population. The gravity of
the riots, including the death of at least five people in Maputo, led the government to
restore the old fare. 101 In order to compensate the drivers of the chapas for the lost fare
increase, the government and the Mozambican Federation of Road Transport
Associations (FEMATRO) agreed to subsidize the diesel used by chapas and suspended

101

“Fuel Subsidy to Defuse Price Hike Riots” AIM Reports: No.355, 25 Feb. 2008.
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fuel-related taxes to diesel until July 2009. 102
The price hike that caused the rioting was the result of very high oil prices at that
time, of around $150 per barrel. However, the global economic crisis of 2008 had a great
impact on the price of oil and in February 2009, the price of oil dropped to $33 per barrel.
The government decided to intervene again in the subsidies of the price of oil and, in
April 2009, froze fuel prices. In August 2009, the government decided to subsidize the
importers of oil. The explanation was that these importers would lose money because of
the increase in the import of oil while the selling would continue with a fixed price. The
government decided to give importers between $34 million and 38.5 million to
compensate such losses, arguing that this would be a way to avoid them selling at retail
with higher prices and, as a consequence, to be more expensive for consumers. As
explained above, one of the main importers is the public PETROMOC.
In 2010, the government started the process of phasing out fuel subsidies, other
than diesel, with a cumulative price increase of 73%. Diesel prices raised by 38%. This
increase, however, was interrupted due to another wave of protests that happened in
Maputo. 103 Another attempt to increase the transportation fare produced mobilization and
protest in 2012.
In September 2009, the Ambassador of Finland, Kari Alanko, representing the
donor community in Mozambique, expressed great discontent with the fuel subsidies
provided by the national government. He stated that the donor countries were also facing
difficulties with the process of the global economic crisis, so the government of

“Fuel Subsidy to Defuse Price Hike Riots” AIM Reports: No.355, 25 Feb. 2008.
In 2010 and 2012, the protests were beyond the rise of transportation fare and included other major
aspects. In 2010, the strikes were against the rise in the price of bread, 17% and electricity, 13.4%, in
addition to water, gas, and other food, such as rice, tomatoes, and onions (Brito, et al. 2015, 28).
102
103
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Mozambique could find a different way to manage the problem of the price of
transportation. The IMF and World Bank have also opposed Mozambique’s fuel
subsidies. Examples of the issues that the IMF presents as being central to fuel subsidies
are: (1) the difficulty to eliminate the fuel subsidy system is because “those who stand to
lose from the reform may be in a position to exert substantial political pressure” (IMF
2016), (2) the cost of the fuel subsidy system is high, and (3) Mozambique has
inefficiencies in the import system, which makes the price of importing oil very high
(IMF 2016).
Given the reliance of the government on international actors and aid, it is
counterintuitive that the government would decide to maintain the fuel subsidies.
However, the domestic dynamics of the country in 2009 can explain why the government
kept them at least until the end of the year. The year of 2009 was general elections in
Mozambique and President Armando Guebuza was trying for reelection. The popular
protest against the hike of transportation fare was an incentive for the candidate to
propose the subsidies as part of his electoral campaign. This dynamic highlights three
main political aspects for the decisions of the government to keep the fuel subsidies for
consumers.
First is the divide between rural and urban areas, and the role of the urban
population for the politics of the country in general. While most of the attention of the
international social policy actors is on the provision of direct assistance to the poorest
individuals, who are usually in rural and distant areas of the capital of the country, those
in urban areas are the ones who pressure the government for reforms. The reason behind
this is, according to Rickey (2008), that the urban poor in African countries in general,
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are more valued by the government and because the rural voters are more willing than the
urban population to accept a role of the state in development matters (Rickey 2008, 256).
In addition, the urban poor are the most affected by high food and fuel prices, so they
have one more reason to rebel against the government in the context of fuel subsidy cuts.
Second is that most supporters of FRELIMO are historically from Maputo and
major cities in the south of the country. Therefore, there is an incentive for the
government to keep the social protection that targets this population, such as fuel
subsidies for consumers. Those in urban areas are the ones whom the government seeks
to benefit through fuel subsidies. As explained in chapter three, there is an institutional
legacy that makes the government of Mozambique prioritize the voices and interests of
the urban population.
Third, since the end of the war in 1992, the urban population in Mozambique has
been more active against programs promoted by FRELIMO and by international actors.
In 1992, for example, the urban population protested against the economic reforms of the
structural adjustment, and was particularly resented by the influx of the UN personnel in
Maputo. 104 Even the population of Maputo, who was historically supporters of Frelimo,
started to contest, protest, and organize strikes against some of the measures taken by
FRELIMO throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.
In summary, fuel subsidies for consumers do have a self-serving purpose in
Mozambique because the political elite, FRELIMO, has the control of the import of oil in
the country though Petromoc. This is one of the reasons why international actors disagree
with fuel subsidies in the country. However, these international actors disregard the
political goals of the government through the promotion of fuel subsidies.
104

“A frail peace: Mozambique” The Economist, December, 1993.
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5.5. Fuel subsidies for consumers in Angola
Angola is the second largest exporter of oil in sub-Saharan Africa. It experienced
an oil boom between the end of its internal war, in 2002, and the global economic crisis,
in 2008. In 2012, its economy relies heavily on oil soil sector, which corresponds to
around 45% of its GDP, 75% of government revenue, and over 90% of total exports. 105 In
2006, Angola became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) (S. a. Whitley 2015).
Angola has had fuel subsidies since before the end of the war in 2002. In the
2000s, the country started to phase out the subsidies in response to the IFIs. There were
three major periods of adjusting fuel prices in the 2000s. The first adjustment of fuel
prices was in 2005, when the government increased the price of gasoline by around
138.35%. 106 This sharp increase in the price of fuel can be explained as a response to the
international actors’ indication of the possibility to provide aid to the country in 2005.
The second adjustment was in 2010, with an increase of 46.4% in the price of
fuels and, in that same year, the government froze liquid fuel prices for four years until
September 2014. This adjustment was caused by two main factors. One was the global
financial crisis that led to a reduction in the price of oil on the global market. In addition,
as explained above, IMF and Angola signed the Stand-By Arrangement, through which

“Angola Economic Briefing – High oil profile compensate for tough business environment.” Africa
News Service 30 Apr. 2013. Infotrac Newsstand. Web. 24 June 2016.
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“Combustíveis em Angola sobem hoje 46,4% na primeira mexida desde 2010.” Lusa, 27 September,
2014.
Availbale
at
http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/energia/detalhe/combustiveis_em_angola_sobem_hoje_464_na_
primeira_mexida_desde_2010.html. Visited on 07/01/2016.
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the Fund provided around US$1.4 billion to the country (IMF 2009). The other was the
end of the growth in Angolan oil production. 107
During this four-year period of frozen fuel prices, the government of Angola
maintained a blurry relation between social protection and fuel subsidies. The 2012 and
2013 “Position of the Political and Social Observatory of Angola (OPSA) and the Action
for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA) on the State General Budget”
Reports explain that in the General State Budget, the government of Angola includes fuel
subsidies as a social expense. Moreover, the budget of 2013 mentions that 11.6% of the
total expense was for subsidies, but did not specify how much it was for fuel subsidies.
The third adjustment, from 2014, happened three days after a mission of the IMF
to Angola to provide technical assistance to the government to reform its fuel subsidies.
In Angola, the subsidies of oil also remained, but there was a hike in the price of gas. The
argument used by the government was that they needed to channel money from the
subsidy to pay the programs of the National Development Plan 2013-2017.
In that mission, the IMF developed a report that showed some of the
characteristics of fuel subsidies in Angola. Some of the main points in the report are in
the box below:
•
•
•
•
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Box 5.1: Assessment of fuel subsidies in Angola
Subsidies to diesel, gasoline and LPG accounted for 94% of all consumption
subsidies.
Industry absorbed about 47% of all subsidies, the government 21% and
households 32% (based on fuel consumption).
Subsidies created incentives for over-consumption and smuggling (about 10% of
consumption was being smuggled to the Republic of Congo and the Democratic
Republic of Congo).
77% of fuel price subsidies benefited the richest 40% of households, while only
10% of benefits accrued to the poorest 40%.

“Angola oil boom is over.” TendersInfo 25 May 2010. Infotrac Newsstand. Web. 5 June 2016.
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•
•
•

Although poorer households benefited less from the subsidies, they spent about
4.8% of their income on energy while richer households dedicated only 3.6%.
The fuel-intensive sectors that would experience the greatest impacts of subsidy
reform include fisheries, electricity, transport and mining.
Inflation resulting from subsidy reform would be limited as many consumer
goods in Angola are imported, so their cost of production would not be affected
by higher fuel prices.

Source: Whitley and Van der Burg 2015

The box shows that the urban population also has more access to the fuel
subsidies than the urban areas. However, different from Mozambique, the vast majority
population in Angola is located in the urban areas of the country. In the capital of Angola,
Luanda, the majority of Luanda’s urban population lives in the periphery. They are the
most affected by the government’s adjustment of fuel prices.
Three political aspects of the fuel subsidies deserve attention in Angola. First, the
government has proposed the cuts of subsidies as part of the negotiation process with
international actors. On the side of the IMF, the cuts are considered a success because
they do not believe that subsidy is a kind of social protection – they assume that the
money that was being used to subsidize the gas will now be used to social protection. On
the side of those who criticize the cuts of the fuel subsidies, they argue that, in fact, the
cuts harm the poorest population: the increase is high enough to affect the possibility of
the poorest individuals to have access to, and low enough to affect the rich individuals to
have access to them.
Second, different from Mozambique where the government defends the subsidies,
and use the subsidies as a strategy to gain votes, in Angola, the process has been the
inverse. The government has promoted abrupt adjustments in the price of fuels whenever
the price of oil in the external market falls and the country needs to negotiate with the
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IFIs for loans and investments. While the urban poor is not satisfied with such measures,
the government does not seem to take into consideration the interests of the population to
make those decisions. 108
Finally, while the IMF is against fuel subsidies because it is not pro-poor, the
same organization supported the development of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (or just
Sovereign Fund), which is a mechanism of non-redistribution. 109 Through the 2010
Stand-By Arrangement, the IMF encouraged government’s plan to establish a Sovereign
Fund, of around US$5 billion. “The authorities [in Angola] are committed to take further
steps to improve fiscal management over the medium-term, increase non-oil revenues by
reforming the tax system, and de-link the fiscal stance from short-term movements in oil
revenues” (IMF 2009). The idea of Sovereign Fund is “to generate returns on excess
capital and preserve funds for future generations.” 110 In other words, it guarantees that
countries that rely on only one commodity can have another source of wealth.
Some analysts agreed with the IMF and with the general idea of the Sovereign
Fund, arguing that such Fund “would help Angola protect itself from oil price shocks by
cutting the states’ dependence on crude revenues.” 111 Skeptical analysts criticize the
Sovereign Funds arguing that they help government to accumulate wealth, instead of
distribute it. Others argued that when the social conditions of the country are very poor,

População angolana muito descontente com aumento do preço de combustíveis.” DW 12/29/2014.
Available at: http://www.dw.com/pt/população-angolana-muito-descontente-com-aumento-do-preço-decombust%C3%ADveis/a-18159391Visited on 25 July 2016.
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For the sake of comparison, Mozambique does not have a Sovereign Fund. However, in 2013, the
government mentioned the possibility of creating one in the future, similar to the other Portuguese-speaking
countries that already have it: Brazil, Angola, and East Timor. “Moçambique poderá ter Fundo Soberano,”
Voz da Africa. 25 Sep. 2013.
110
“IMF World Bank: Sovereign Wealth Funds – The SWF route to stability.” The Banker. 1 Oct. 2013.
GeneralOneFile. Web. 24 June 2016.
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“Angola names president’s son to chair $5bln sovereign wealth fund.” Namibia Press Agency 21 June
2013. Infotrac Newsstand. Web. 24 June 2016.
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the Sovereign Fund is problematic for not realizing the money sooner, rather than later. In
the particular case of Sovereign Wealth in Angola, the control of power in Angola also
negatively affected the Sovereign Fund. In 2013, the son of the president dos Santos, Jose
Filomeno de Souza Santos, was nominated to run it.
In summary, the negotiation between domestic actors and international financial
institutions in Angola show how much the citizens do not have a substantial role in the
creation and maintenance of fuel subsidies. The main reason for the government to phase
out fuel subsidies in 2014 was prospects to get loans from the IFIs. However, given that
the country has very high levels of fuel subsidies, the political aspect of such subsidies is
because those who benefit from it are mostly people from the urban areas. In addition,
whenever the more the government cuts the subsidies, the more the fuel subsidies become
more regressive, because then only richer people are able to afford them. Finally, as
explained above, the fact that most of the distribution is concentrated in the urban area
also shows that fuel subsidies are mostly benefiting the urban population.

5.6. Conclusion
This chapter showed that in this arrangement of social protection, there is, in fact,
an international pressure from IFIs that the political elites managed to minimize.
Mozambique uses the pressure from the population to justify the adoption and
maintenance of fuel subsidies. Angola keeps one of the highest fuel subsidies in subSaharan Africa but it adjusts it depending on its interest to negotiate aid with traditional
international donors. This dynamic happens at the same time that they please their urban
supporters through keeping the price of the fuels low.
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The findings in this chapter contribute to my general argument in three ways. First,
they showed that domestic the political elites had greater influence in both countries’
decisions to maintain their fuel subsidies for consumers. In other words, despite variation
in the relations of Angola and Mozambique with the IFIs, in both cases domestic political
elites determine outcomes.
The second contribution is the fact that although international actors emphasize
the importance in phasing-out fuel subsidies, they have not suggested solutions for the
improvement of social programs in general. The phase-out process pushed by these
international actors can be seen in two perspectives. International actors see it as progress,
because they do not view subsidy as a kind of social protection – they assume that the
money that was being used to subsidize the gas will now be used to social protection. On
the other hand, the phase out strategy can also be a limitation of social protection,
because each time that fuel subsidies become more expensive, it becomes consumed only
by wealthier parts of the population. The interest of the international donors in the phaseout process with no other social program accompanying it is the evidence that the
pressure of international actors against fuel subsidies does not translate into pressures for
better and more efficient redistributive programs.
The third important finding in this chapter is that Angola and Mozambique had
different motivations to keep the fuel subsidies for consumers. While self-serving is a
behavior of those in the government – and this is what the international actors pay more
attention to, fuel subsidies also have a special role in the political dynamics in both
countries. The political aspect of the subsidies was more pronounced in Mozambique, but
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both countries have a political incentive to provide assistance to those in urban areas,
more than to those in the rural areas.
In 2008, the severity of the riots in Mozambique led the government and the
Federation of Road Transport Associations (FEMATRO) to restore the old fare, through
subsidizing the gas. In 2010, the second attempt of the government to eliminate the
subsidies was accompanied by even more intense and widespread protests. These protests
might indicate that while international pressure or political parties were not able to push
for effective social protection programs, the middle class and the urban poor of
Mozambique is the only effective pressure that can fight against the government for the
development of social protection programs. While this cannot guarantee that the social
protection mechanisms that could be eventually conquered by the urban poor would be
spread to the rural population, it would signal a government that is more responsive to the
population.
In Angola, the subsidies in oil have been more connected to the government
interest to guarantee its control over and wealth of oil. The decisions to phase them out
happened when Angola wanted to negotiate with the IFIs for aid. Therefore, it is
important to recognize a difference between Angola and Mozambique. Mozambique was
more affected by the population to create subsidies while Angola was more related to its
interests in negotiating with international organizations for loans in the context of hikes
in the price of oil.
Despite this difference in the domestic dynamics of each country to push for fuel
subsidies, the fuel subsidies programs benefit the same social groups in both countries.
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Most of those who benefit from it are the urban population in general, but mainly the
political and economic elites of the two countries.
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Chapter 6: The institutionalization of formal social protection structures
6.1.

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the arrangement for the institutionalization of formal social
protection structures in Angola and Mozambique. As formal social protection structures,
I refer to the state institutions of social assistance (for the poor population) and social
security (for workers). In this arrangement, international development actors influence
poor and post-conflict countries to develop their structures of social protection in two
different stages. The first stage, the state-building process, is when they push for the
creation of such institutions. The second stage, which I call post-state-building, is when
international actors provide technical and financial support for state institutions that
already exist.
In this chapter, I argue that, in fact, the state institutions of social assistance have
great difference in Angola and Mozambique because of the different involvement of
international development actors in the countries after the 2000s. Mozambique has a very
advanced system of social assistance while Angola does not. However, this institutional
difference is counterbalanced by similar actions of both governments that minimize the
expansion of redistributive programs as much as they can. The actions presented in this
chapter are the emphasis on social security programs and the claim of the government
that they are developing strategies to boost the macro-economy.
This arrangement started in 2000 when international development actors started to
provide technical and financial support to several social protection programs in lowincome and low-to-middle-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It has counted on the involvement
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of a great number of international actors, including the same ones from the arrangements
analyzed in the previous chapters: United Nations (UN) agencies, the international
financial institutions (IFIs) -- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
-- and the traditional bilateral donors of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as a
greater involvement of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In addition, given
that programs of social protection’s aim at targeting vulnerable groups, some specific
international agencies have had an important role in pushing for programs that focus on
the groups to which they are dedicated. For instance, the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) and HelpAge International, an organization for elderly rights, have been very
active in the promotion of social protection for children and the elderly, respectively.
Finally, the different experiences of these programs from countries in the global south
have led to the establishment of regional arrangements of knowledge transfer and peer
pressure for the adoption of social protection programs.
Since the 2008 global economic crisis, international actors started to coordinate
initiatives, such as the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I), among the UN, IMF,
ILO, and other international actors to develop social protection structures in poor
countries. 112 With these coordinated strategies, international donors and development

According to the ILO, social protection floors are “nationally designed sets of basic social security
guarantees which secure protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability, and social
exclusion.”(Cunha et al., 2013). According to Cunha et al., the SPF-I is composed of “UN bodies, the IMF,
World Bank, and development partners including bilateral donors, development banks, and international
NGOs to support countries in planning and implementing sustainable social transfer schemes and essential
social services” (Cunha et al. 2013, 3). In addition to Mozambique, Cambodia, Ecuador, Burkina Faso,
Togo, and Benin have also committed to start building their own Social Protection Floors, as part of the
SPF-I. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/features/WCMS_141818/lang-en/index.htm. Visited on 16 July 2015.
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agencies operated under the assumption that states would implement redistributive
policies if they had the right institutions and sufficient resources.
International development actors justified calls for redistributive programs by
arguing that the increase in macroeconomic development, measured by the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), that sub-Saharan Africa experienced in the 1990s and 2000s
was not enough to reduce extreme poverty (Monchuk 2014, 15). According to Monchuck,
“while between 1995 and 2008 the percentage of African people living in poverty fell
from 58% to 48%, chronic poverty remained high” (Monchuk 2014, 15). In addition,
macroeconomic advances can have negative consequences by making the societies more
unequal and eroding social structures (Monchuk 2014, 15). Therefore, international
development actors saw the development of redistributive programs, i.e., cash transfer
(CT) programs, as a way to channel macroeconomic advances to mitigate poverty. In fact,
programs and institutions of CT have become the central focus of the international
development actors in sub-Saharan Africa.
Institutionally, Angola and Mozambique have a formal social protection structure,
which is divided into social security and social assistance. 113 They have very different

113
The governments in both countries also recognize the existence of various informal social protection
mechanisms used in communities and throughout the country which, the governments argue, complement
the formal structures of social protection. In Mozambique, examples of these mechanisms are xitique, tsima,
and ganho-ganho. Common in the south of the country, xitique is a communal mechanism of saving, more
generally organized by women, in which the saved money is used in cases of an important event for that
community, such as weddings or the delivery of a child, and in case of emergencies, such as sickness and
death. In the rural areas of the center and north of the country, peasants use tsima and ganho-ganho,
respectively, which are non-paid collective labor based on mutual support and solidarity (Quive 2007, 36).
In Angola, the examples of such practices are kixiquila, which is a mechanism of saving to be used either
collectively or individually by members of a community, and kilapi, which is an informal system of credit
(CIPS Angola). International development actors have argued that informal social protection does not
protect the vulnerable population from the effects of all the shocks they suffer from, such as HIV/AIDS,
chronic poverty, and various ethnic and political conflicts (Garcia and Moore 2012, 39). In addition,
demographic shifts in the continent have weakened the traditional mutual support arrangements in the
region. For instance, the number of elderly household members caring for children has grown quickly,
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trajectories of the development of CT programs, as well as their institutionalization. They
are both countries that have experienced an increase of GDP in the 2000s, but this macrodevelopment did not improve the life conditions of the poorest population in their
countries. Therefore, international actors started to get involved in both of them, at
different levels, to push for such programs and institutions.
This chapter does the following: first, it explains the social protection structure in
sub-Saharan African countries and situates the CTs within the formal structures of social
protection in these countries. Then, it separately explains the differences of international
involvement in Angola and in Mozambique in regards to the push for programs and
institutions of CTs. After that, it moves to a separate descriptive analysis of the programs
of social assistance in each country and the politics of deciding to adopt them. In the case
of Mozambique, it will analyze the politics of the expansion of the Basic Social Subsidy
Program (PSSB), the government’s CT program. Then, it shows how the government of
Angola decided not to develop its social protection program of social assistance. Finally,
it will conclude, highlighting how this chapter contributes to my argument.

6.2. The institutionalization of cash transfer programs
In most of sub-Saharan Africa, social protection is legally framed in a similar way
to the social protection structures of most countries in the world. It is divided into two
main structures, social security (or obligatory social security), which focuses on the
working class, and social assistance (or basic social security), which focuses on those
who do not have a job and live in conditions of poverty and vulnerability.
either because children have been orphaned or because their parents have migrated in search of job
opportunities (Kakwani and Subbarao 2005, cited in Garcia and Moore 2012, 39).
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Most of the societies of the sub-Saharan African countries, however, is composed
of different social strata than the one that the formal social protection structure addresses
(those who are formally employed and those who are not). According to Bevan, these
states have an “insecurity welfare state,” with a largely stratified and fragmented society.
Based on the definition of Bevan (2004, 17), the social groups of African societies can be
divided as follows: (1) the very rich, government officials, and owners of private
companies, who rely on international liberal welfare regimes and have access to
international and private systems of social security; (2) some government workers and
private workers, who contribute to the National Institute of Social Security (INSS); (3)
the vast majority of the population in rural and urban areas, who have only informal
employment and, as a consequence, do not receive social security; and (4) a large group
embroiled in violent crisis situations and other vulnerabilities, such as natural disasters
and economic crises.
The social protection institution of the countries in Africa try to frame the African
society according to how the social protection structures address it, instead of creating
institutions that are adequate to the characteristics of the Africa society. Social security
focuses on contributory schemes and supports those who are in the formal work sector.
This branch of social protection usually has the most developed institutional and legal
framework in sub-Saharan African countries, and these structures usually come from the
colonial period. Given that in African countries only around 20% of the labor force has
formal employment and a much smaller part of this percentage contribute to social
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security, social security mainly benefits very small groups of the country, mostly workers
in urban areas. 114
In fact, this support needs to be pondered. These structures are not effective, and
social security institutions have been associated with scandals of corruption because of
the lack of transparency of their accounts. International actors, mainly the ILO, have tried
to improve the conditions of social security for the working class and strategies to reach
those who work in the informal sector. The ILO development of the “decent work”
strategy is an example of these strategies.
Social assistance includes programs for the population in the latter two groups
mentioned above: those who do not have formal work and do not have the means to
guarantee the minimum necessary for themselves and their households. In other words,
social assistance embraces policies for the poor and for those most vulnerable to poverty
and shocks. Examples of social assistance include public works, food for work, and
conditional and unconditional CTs. Among the programs of social assistance,
unconditional CTs have become the most common programs pushed by international
development actors in the 2000s. 115 A study developed by the World Bank in 2012
identified a total of 123 CT programs in sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012). 116
International actors decided to push sub-Saharan African countries to adopt programs of
CTs based on evidence of the reduction of inequality by conditional CTs in middleInformation from: African Development Bank Group. 2013. Recognizing Africa’s Informal Sector.
Available
at:
http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-acrossafrica/post/recognizing-africas-informal-sector-11645/. Visited on 15 June 2016.
115
The term “push” is used to refer to the fact that international actors do not pressure countries to adopt
these programs or institutions. Instead, international actors have attempted to incentivize domestic actors to
develop these programs and have worked with them to develop such programs.
116
In the study developed by the World Bank (Garcia and Moore 2012), a total of 123 cash transfer
programs were identified. These programs have different institutional designs, ranging from short-term
emergency transfers to unconditional, noncontributory social pensions to conditional cash transfer
programs with human capital development objectives (Garcia and Moore 2012, 14).
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income countries, such as the Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Oportunidades in Mexico, and the
Child Support Grant in South Africa. Conditional CTs mean that cash is provided upon
certain conditions, most often the enrollment of children of the household in schools
and/or the vaccination of their children. Given the difficulty of access to education and
health services in the poorest areas of sub-Saharan African countries, where most of the
targeted population of the programs live, unconditional CT programs were given the
greatest priority in sub-Saharan Africa. 117
The recognized success of CT programs led international development actors to
push, not only for these programs, but also for their institutionalization. In other words,
international actors started to transform the existing programs of CT into national social
protection programs. 118 Through this transformation, international development actors
wanted CTs to be no longer community-based, unpredictable, and short-term programs,
but instead sustainable, predictable, permanent, and national-based. This long-term aspect
of the programs was also justified by the transformative role that these programs were
meant to have, according to international actors.
While international actors recognize that CT programs have positive results, they
face several issues surrounding their adoption, institutionalization, and effectiveness. The
first challenge is to convince states to adopt such internationally designed programs of
CT. The domestic power structure may have low incentives to adopt and develop such
redistributive programs, because the CTs do not give the ruling elites a political or
economic return. Therefore, the adoption of the programs, as well as their outcomes,
depends on these politics and the leverage the international actors have to pressure
See Table 2.3 in chapter two.
Countries that either had or were initiating the process of developing a national social protection system
in 2015 were Mozambique, Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania (Ninno and Mills 2015, 3).
117
118
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domestic governments to adopt them.
When these programs are implemented, the main issue is to create a permanent
source of sufficient funding. In some countries, the programs of social protection are
fully funded by international actors. However, this issue happens in countries where the
programs are financed by domestic actors and where the programs are being
institutionalized. In general, countries in sub-Saharan Africa spend very little on social
assistance, with countries spending an average of around 0.1% of their GDP on that
sector (Garcia and Moore 2012). While domestic actors have attributed these failings to
low fiscal space, which they ascribe in turn to their weak structures of taxation,
international actors have argued that fiscal space does not necessarily come from
taxation. 119 International actors have suggested a great number of alternatives to create a
fiscal space, including the reallocation of public expenditure (such as the elimination of
fuel subsidies for consumers, explained in the previous chapter), the restructuring of
existing debt, and the implementation of expansionary economic policies.
International actors also face technical issues for the execution of the programs.
Examples of these issues are how to reach the beneficiaries, who usually live in remote
areas of the countries with restricted access, and how to identify mechanisms to increase
the efficacy of the programs and avoid leakage. These technical issues have an important
role in the adoption of these programs because they affect the expenses and perceived
value of the programs by the domestic government and, as a result, the decisions of the
government to adopt them.

According to Heller (2005), “fiscal space can be defined as room in a government´s budget that allows it
to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or
the
stability
of
the
economy.”
Available
at
IMF
official
website:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005 /06/basics.htm. Visited on 05 March 2015.
119
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From this overview of the institutionalization process of CT in sub-Saharan
Africa, three aspects deserve special attention for the following analysis: First,
international development actors have converged in the process of pushing social
protection. This could indicate a strong influence on a domestic government to adopt
such programs. Second, the social protection structures in sub-Saharan African countries
do not correspond to the social reality of the societies—given, for example, the divide
between social security and social assistance which leaves behind the individuals who

work in the informal sector and who comprise the majority of the active working
population. Third, the adoption of the programs that international actors push is
counterbalanced by domestic power structures that create specific conditions for the
development to develop the programs, especially to fund them, as they are reluctant to do
so if they do not expect to reap immediate political and economic benefits for themselves.
These aspects will affect both the decisions to adopt such programs and the decisions to
fund and expand the programs. The cases of Angola and Mozambique provide evidence
of the effects of these aspects in the development of their social protection structures. In
order to analyze the variation in the institutionalization of social protection in Angola and
Mozambique, this chapter will move now to explain the difference of levels and kinds of
international involvement in both countries.

6.3. Setting up the difference of international involvement in Angola and
Mozambique
As noted in the previous chapters, international development actors have become
involved in Angola and Mozambique at very different levels and in very different ways.
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Mozambique experienced great involvement of international actors after its independence
and continues to do so. Angola, on the other hand, has a very limited involvement of
traditional international development actors. This difference coincides with the
institutional variation of their social protection structures, as I will show later in this
chapter.
In 2000, international development actors converged their actions to respond to
the MDGs, with the goal of improving the coordination of their actions towards poverty
mitigation. In this configuration, recipients of aid started to be considered partners of the
international development donors. Development actors started to prioritize state-building,
meaning that they were committed to creating new state institutions and/or strengthening
existing ones. In this sense, international donors started to provide direct assistance to the
state budget so the local partners could develop institutions and programs for social and
economic development, such as in the sectors of health, education, agriculture, and social
protection. 120 Finally, this configuration did not impose the kinds of conditionality
associated with the structural adjustment period. As Frerks (2006) explains,
[T]hese efforts focus on increased aid effectiveness through partner countries’
ownership and leadership, alignment with and capacity development of partner
countries, harmonization, results-oriented planning, reporting and assessment
frameworks, and mutual accountability and transparency (Frerks 2006).
Despite this greater number of actors involved in this arrangement of social
protection, the IFIs continued to have an important influence in the decisions of
international development donors to provide assistance to the partner countries. Donors
120
According to Manning and Malborough (2012), budget support is expected to support many of the goals
of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Donors expect budget support to increase government
ownership of development, to bring harmonization, co-ordination and information sharing among donors,
to unite disparate donor efforts in support of a common goal (in this case poverty alleviation), and to create
mechanisms for mutual accountability between donors and the government (Manning and Malborough
2012, 3-4). But the DAC studies show that none of this happens.
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continued to rely on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Therefore, despite
this apparently more cooperative strategy of the IFIs, the PRSPs continued conditionality
in a less direct, but not less controlling, manner.
This international involvement greatly influenced the development of formal
social protection structures in Mozambique. Despite the recent decrease in foreign aid to
the country, Mozambique still relies on foreign aid to support its budget. 121 Since the end
of its war, international actors got involved in the country as providers of aid. The
country had its first PRSP approved in 2001, and it had two extensions. The second
extension of its PRSP, called Action Plan for the Reduction of Poverty (PARP), 20112014, aimed at achieving sustainable and inclusive economic growth while reducing
poverty and vulnerability. 122 In 2004, the government of Mozambique and the G19 (the
group of donor countries and organizations that provide aid to the country) signed the
new terms of aid determining periodic reviews and reciprocal obligations (Hanlon and
Renzio 2007, 15). 123 The group was created as part of the international initiative,
Programme Aid Partnership (PAP), developed by the OECD donors for better practices
of international involvement in poor and fragile countries. Through the PAP,
international donors provided direct financial support to the state budget and to specific
programs and projects developed by state institutions.

In 2011, external finance of the State budget has dropped to 44.6% against 51.4% in 2010. Available at:
http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/africa-turning-point-mozambique-case/mozambique-turning-point-aiddependence-to-development-effectiveness/#fn.
122
Mozambique’s first PRSP, the Plano Nacional de Acao para a Reducao da Pobreza Absoluta (PARPA I),
from 2001 to 2005, aimed at promoting economic growth through the liberalization of the market, fiscal
restriction, and providing a favorable environment for the private sector (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009,
22).
123
It has changed to G19, but the number of associate members has fluctuated since 2004. The group has
the following permanent members: African Development Bank (AfDB), Austria, Canada, Denmark, the
European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Switzerland, World Bank. Available at: http://pap.org.mz/membros-permanentes/.
121
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In relation to social protection programs, this involvement of international actors
has influenced Mozambique to adopt many different kinds of programs of social
assistance, including public works, food for flood victims, and conditional and
unconditional CT programs. With the support of donors, the government of Mozambique
reformed its National Institute of Social Action (INAS), which is the executing branch of
the government’s social assistance program. In 2008, the program of CT under INAS and
the PSSB (formerly named the Food Subsidy Program, PSA) started to receive direct
financial assistance from the British Department for International Development (DFID)
and the Dutch government, two of the PAP members.
In the actual push for social protection in Africa, Mozambique is considered by
the international development community as a case of success of social protection in
Africa. The discourse of the successful case of Mozambique is usually related to its
political stability and economic growth because of the increasing extraction of natural
resources (gas and coal) in the country since the 2000s. International actors have been
using the country as a laboratory to implement different kinds of mechanisms and
projects related to social protection. For instance, in 2012, Mozambique became the
pioneer of the SPF-I in sub-Saharan Africa.
In Angola, the involvement of international actors has been limited in the area of
development. Due to the difficulty the government and the IMF have had in reaching an
agreement since the end of Angola’s civil war in 2002, the IFI has never approved
Angola’s PRSP. Angola completed the draft of its first PRSP in 2004, but it was not
finalized, nor was it approved by the IMF (Boyce 2004). This has also hindered the
involvement of traditional donors in the country (Boyce 2004). In addition, the wealth
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that the government of Angola obtained through the export of oil and diamonds has made
the country less dependent on international aid and, as a result, less accepting of
international demands and pressures.
On the other hand, arguing that the country had resources to provide for its
population and suspicious of the government’s involvement with illegal and not
transparent activities, international actors have done little to promote assistance to the
population via the promotion of state institutions in the country. One of the few, if not the
only one, is UNICEF, which implemented a tiny pilot project in a small town in the south
of the country from 2007 to 2011.
Therefore, the variation of institutional structures of social protection in Angola
and Mozambique is, in fact, the result of the varying kinds and levels of international
involvement in each country. The adoption of the programs pushed by international
actors in Mozambique has made the country a case of success of social protection in
Africa in the eyes of the international development actors. Angola, on the other hand, has
not been affected by trends and agendas of the international development configuration
and, as result, does not have programs of CT. Despite this institutional variation, these
government have taken actions that reduced the expansion of their social protection
programs, keeping them as limited as they could. I move now to a descriptive analysis of
the social protection structures in both countries.

6.4. Social assistance and cash transfer programs in Mozambique
In Mozambique, international actors provided technical and financial support for
its formal structure of social protection. Compared to other states in sub-Saharan Africa,
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Mozambique has one of the most developed legal and institutional social protection
frameworks. Therefore, international actors consider Mozambique an outstanding case
for this arrangement of social protection. Despite this formal success, the government of
Mozambique remains reluctant to substantially increase the allocation of resources to
social assistance. The government of Mozambique has managed to respond to the
demands of the international actors for the development of social protection while
keeping its institutions of social protection exclusionary. My argument is that the
programs and organizations developed in Mozambique help cloud the government’s
positions in the area, thereby insulating the domestic political structure from negative
international and domestic opinions related to how these programs operate.
Mozambique has a well-established legal and institutional structure of social
protection. Legally, Mozambique has the Social Protection Law, 2007, which established
the system of social protection and defined the sources of funding for the programs. In
December 2009, following the international initiatives for social protection after the 2008
global economic crisis, the government of Mozambique approved the Regulation for
Basic Social Security (Decree 85/2009), which established the rights of the vulnerable
population and defined the kinds of intervention, as explained in Box 1. 124 In the
following year, the government approved the National Strategy for Basic Social Security
(ENSSB), which created the national strategy for social protection with the support from
the international actors. Institutionally, the Ministry of Women and Social Action
Social protection was not the only measure taken by the government of Mozambique in response to the
global crisis. “In 2008 and 2009, the government of Mozambique took a series of monetary and fiscal
measures to stimulate economic growth and job creation. To support the fiscal accounts and the balance of
payments, the government asked the World Bank to increase the size of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Credit (PRSC-6) from US$85 million to US$110 million and requested US$170 million from the IMF’s
Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF), which was approved by the IMF Board in June 2009” (World Bank
2012). For social protection, in addition to establishing the regulation for social assistance, the government
also increased the minimum pension provided by the INSS (World Bank 2012).
124
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(MMAS) is responsible for social protection programs, and the INAS is the implementing
institution. Box 1 helps show how the structure of social assistance of the government of
Mozambique is organized.
Box 6.1: Social Assistance (or Basic Social Security) in Mozambique
Ministry: Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS). Other ministries deal with
sector-based programs.
Implementing Institution: National Institute of Social Action (INAS).
Beneficiaries: The most vulnerable population—the poorest households, the elderly,
people with disabilities, the chronically ill, and households with orphans and vulnerable
children.
Funding: State budget and international aid.
Kinds of Intervention: Direct social action (social transfers, cash and in-kind [food,
school materials, uniforms]), primary health care (Ministry of Health), primary education
(Ministry of Education), and productive social action (programs of social inclusion
through work programs).
Main Programs Implemented by INAS:
- Basic Social Subsidy Program (PSSB): unconditional CT.
- Direct Social Support Program (PASD): food and school supplies.
- Social Benefit through Work Program (BST): cash and credit support for household
activities.
- Community Development Program: economic support for small infrastructures, such as
health posts and mills.
Source: Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009, and Mausse and Cunha 2011.

The PSSB, formerly named PSA until 2010, is the CT program of the government
and the largest program of INAS, in terms of both funding and scope. 125 In 2014, PSSB
received around 60% of the resources allocated to INAS, a total of MT 1,462 million
(around US$44 million) (UNICEF 2014). Most of the resources allocated to INAS come
from the domestic government and, in 2008, with the support of DFID and the
government of the Netherlands (Pellerano and Hodges 2010, 26; Waterhouse 2009, 17).
The ILO and UNICEF also approved direct technical support for the delivery and
The data presented here come from different sources and organizations. They should be read as
estimates and illustrations to have an idea of the reach and values of the social transfer programs. In
relation to the conversion of US$ and Metical (MT), Mozambique’s currency, I have opted to leave the
conversions identified by the sources.
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management of PSA (Pellerano and Hodges 2010, 26). In 2011, the contribution from
international partners was MT 165 million, around 30% of the total budget of the
PSSB. 126
In terms of targeting, as of 2013, the PSSB was reaching around 322,000
households, a coverage that is considered very high in sub-Saharan Africa by
international donors. 127 The PSSB targets the elderly (women aged 55 or more, men 60 or
more), disabled, chronically ill, and malnourished pregnant women. 128 The amount given
to the beneficiaries varied depending on household size: “monthly, the amount ranges
from MT 100 (about US$2.85) for a household with a single person to a maximum of MT
300 (about US$8.50) for a household with five or more members” (Mausse and Cunha
2011, 326). Figure 1 below shows the increase of recipients of the program between 1999
and 2013.

Important to note that, since 2011, the external investment to INAS has been decreasing. In 2011, the
total of external support was 21% of the total money allocated to the organization. In 2013, it was 8.7%,
and in 2014, 10% (UNICEF 2014).
127
For a parameter, the entire population of Mozambique in 2014 was 24,692,144 and around 6.5% of this
population
was
above
55
years
old.
Information
available
at:
http://www.indexmundi.com/mozambique/demographics_profile.html. Visited on 21 Jul 2016.
128
Disabled are people “who have recognized incapability to work” (INAS 2004). Chronic illnesses include
hypertension, diabetes, epilepsy, bronchial asthma, chronic renal insufficiency, and tuberculosis. It does not
include AIDS (Pellerano and Hodges 2010, 26).
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Graph 6.1: Number of PSSB (PSA)
beneficiaries, 1999-2013
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The composition of beneficiaries has been vastly focused on the elderly, followed
by the disabled and, lastly, the chronically ill. In 2012 and 2013, for example, the elderly
received more than 90% of the assistance provided by the PSSB (INE 2013). One of the
reasons for the low rate of benefit to the chronically ill is the bureaucratic process they
must go through to receive assistance, including the requirement of having a doctor’s
prescription that confirms the illness.
Another important point about PSSB is how it reaches the population. According
to Taimo and Waterhouse, “INAS has delegations in all the provincial capitals, which
respond to INAS at central level but are also accountable to the Provincial Directorates
for Women and Social Action, responsible to monitor implementation of the social
programmes carried out by INAS” (Taimo and Waterhouse 2007). However, INAS does
not have an office in every town, so, in order to reach the beneficiaries, it has some
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transient services that try to reach those who live in areas distant from the centers where
the permanent offices of INAS are located. Even so, the system does not reach the entire
population, who need to travel in order to receive the payment. 129
The PSSB did not begin as a pilot project, which is the usual way that the
international actors develop social protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, the
PSSB was a reform of the PSA, a program that was created in 1990 to reduce the poverty
conditions in urban areas caused by the hike of food prices during the structural
adjustment programs (SAPs). The Bureau of Support to Vulnerable People (GAPVU)
under the Ministry of Planning Finance administered the program. In fact, PSA was a
recommendation of the World Bank in recognition of the negative social impact of the
SAPs on the urban population after its demand for the hike of the price of food (Taimo
and Waterhouse 2007). In 1997, GAPVU closed because of a corruption scandal, and
INAS was created with the goal of finding ways to expand PSA. In 1997, PSA covered
only 30,000 households in urban areas (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, 12). Less than a
third of that number claimed benefits at the peak of the program in 1991-92
(Massingarela and Nhate 2006, 12).
It is argued that PSA lasted for so long because of the willingness of the
government to promote redistributive policies. However, it is important to highlight that
the World Bank recommended its creation and that, since the early 1990s, the
international actors have had a strong influence in the country. This might indicate that
the existence of the program is related to the international demands and pressures in the
country. Therefore, while the program remained and the domestic government was in
charge of its execution, there is no evidence that this permanence of the institution was
129

For a very detailed explanation of how the system works, see Selvester, Fidalgo, and Taimo (2012).
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the result of domestic political interest. This fact conflict with the general understanding
that the government of Mozambique is willing to develop programs of social protection.
In the post-2008 configuration of the program, the expansion of the program has
been accompanied by several criticisms. Most of them have been discussed in reports
based on surveys with recipients and workers on the ground (Selvester, Fidalgo, Taimo
20012; Pellerano and Hodges 2010). A summary of these criticisms is presented in Box 2
based on discussion among recipients, members of international organizations, and
donors at the National Conference on Basic Social Protection in July 2014. Most of these
criticisms coincide with those presented in the reports.
Box 6.2: Main problems of PSSB 130
At the National Conference of Basic Social Protection (Social Assistance) in
Mozambique, which occurred in Maputo, July 28-29, 2014, several problems with the
PSSB were raised by local and international organizations. The problems related to the
following aspects of the program:
The coverage of the program. People complained about the very limited number of
people who benefit from the program. They argued that the program is too small to
respond to the chronic poverty in the country. This criticism was based not only on the
limited coverage of the program during the time of the Conference, but also on the fact
that the population in Mozambique is getting older, which requires an expansion of the
program to reach the elderly. In 2014, there were 1.3 million people above 60 years old,
around 0.5% of the population, and projections confirm that this number will increase
every year. Because of this projection, people argued for the importance of having a
program that assists more elderly people.
The criteria for eligibility. People were struggling to understand the criteria of
eligibility for the program. Individuals who are literate and/or live in houses of bricks are
not eligible for this assistance. This approach is called the Proxy Means Test (PMT) and
is usually used in countries where the poverty is flat (meaning that a large portion of the
population live under the poverty line, and a great number of the people who live above it
are very close to the line and, therefore, there is a large proportion of the population who
need assistance). Given the lack of resources to cover all those in need, PMT is a
mechanism to narrow down eligibility in a context of chronic and generalized poverty.
Bricks imply access to income higher than subsistence, as does literacy, which implies
that a household is doing well enough to forgo the extra income from child labor. The
130

Information from the notes taken by the author during the Conference.
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audience in the Conference harshly criticized PMT because, in their view, those proxies
did not operate effectively for sufficient income.
The neglect of particular groups within the program. Most of the already limited
attention is given to the elderly, while people with disabilities are almost entirely left out
of the program.
The difficulty of accessing benefits. The individuals have to go to the social security
posts in their provinces to receive their benefits. In many instances, particularly in rural
areas, potential recipients live far away from the posts and it is a burden for them to pick
up their benefits; in some other instances the cost of transportation to get to the posts
exceeds the benefits. In other regions of the country where there are no posts of the
INAS, members of the government have to go to those regions, but the service ends up
being extremely costly because the population is very scattered.
The relationship between the program and other social issues. The people who gave
testimonies of the programs talked extensively about child marriage. At the same time,
whenever someone in the audience brought up the discussion over women, the organizer
of the event said that they already had a national conference on women on another
occasion, so the issue was not going to be debated again.
The lack of information and knowledge about procedures and rights. There was a
debate related to whether or not beneficiaries could wait to go to the post to pick up more
than one month of the benefits at once. There did not seem to be any consistency across
regions on whether this was permissible. A member of the government clarified that, if
the beneficiary goes two consecutive months without receiving the benefits, that
beneficiary loses the retroactive benefits. But this information was not widely known,
even by representatives from domestic NGOs attending the conference.
Source: Developed by the author.

Members of the government had two common responses to these criticisms. The
first was that social protection was still in its initial stage, so that improvement as well as
expansion of coverage would come with “time and learning the mistakes.” The second
was that social protection was not just the responsibility of the state, but also that of
family and other informal social protection structures. For instance, state officials argued
that, while the state should have a responsibility to the elderly, it is the family that has the
first responsibility towards that person. While these responses may seem reasonable,
given that structures of social protection can take a long time to become strong and well-

154

consolidated, other actions and discourses of the government show that these problems
are the result of the vested political interests that the domestic elites have for keeping the
programs the way they are. The international actors, however, dealt with these problems
as technicalities, and did not take into consideration the existence of the underlying
political motivations of the domestic political elite. This chapter moves now to an
analysis of this dynamic.

The politics of social protection in Mozambique
The problems of the program mentioned during the National Conference,
described in Box 2, such as the lack of funding and the design of the programs, are in part
the result of strategies of the government to circumvent such programs or to make the
programs as minimal as possible. High-ranking politicians and civil servants openly
criticize the programs of CT, arguing that the state should not help the poor out of
poverty (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). Despite the limits of formal employment in
Mozambique, the government has suggested that social protection should come from
work instead of the government being a provider of benefits. 131 Another official criticism
was based on the assumption that CTs should not be provided because they reduce the
workforce. 132
The advance of social protection in Mozambique, as a result of the expansion of
the CT in Mozambique, has been counterweighed by of actions, views, and priorities of
the domestic political structure. Three of these actions and views are: first, to influence
who the beneficiaries of the program should be; second, to allocate more resources of the
“Alberto Vaquina volta a dizer que distribuiçãoo de riqueza não é feita “dando dinheiro.”” Jornal Canal
de Moçambique. July, 16, 2014.
132
Criticism mentioned during the National Conference.
131
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state budget to social security than to social assistance; third, to establish competing
structures of social programs outside the scope of the state’s social protection structure,
instead of channeling all of its resources to increase the fiscal space for social protection
programs. While the first decision represented a direct strategy to limit the coverage of
CT programs, the other two decisions also had a direct impact on the programs of social
assistance.
In relation to the decisions of scope of coverage, the international actors and the
domestic government initially agreed about who the beneficiaries of the PSSB should be.
However, the government has been reluctant to provide the CT program to other sources
of vulnerability in the country. For instance, the government has rejected the proposals to
implement CT programs related to natural disasters and to address the problems of
orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009).
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Waterhouse and Lauriciano cited the rationale given by the Chair of OVCs Working
Group in Mozambique in 2007 upon the retraction of a program of CT:
On reflection, we realised a cash transfer might not be used for the intended
beneficiaries, e.g., fathers might drink the money and children might gain bad
habits through access to cash at too early an age (Waterhouse and Lauriciano
2009).
Also illustrating that the limits of social assistance are the result of decisions of
the domestic political elite is the fact that the INSS, created in 1988 and administered by
the Ministry of Labor and Finance, receives more financial assistance from the
government than does the social assistance branch of social protection. Obligatory social
security corresponds to contributory schemes that provide pensions, sickness, and
There are other programs within MMAS that address OVCs and natural disaster shocks. For an
overview of these programs, see Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009). For instance, in 2001, the National
Disaster Management Institute (INGC) distributed food for the victims of the flood.“Food for flood
guaranteed” AIM, June 15, 2001.
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invalidity benefits to wage workers in the formal sector, civil servants, and state
employees. The scope of coverage is very low because Mozambique does not have a
large number of people with formal jobs who could benefit from this kind of social
security. According to the 2011 ILO Report, “the economically active population in
Mozambique is estimated at around 11 million people, of which the vast majority (more
than 60%) are self-employed, around a quarter are unpaid family workers, and only 10%
are salaried employees (4.1% civil servants and 6.8% in the private sector)” (Cunha et al.
2013, 6). From this total, only 3% of the total labor force is covered by the INSS.
In order to add to the limited contributory system, the state has to use money from
its general budget to pay for those benefits. However, most of the beneficiaries of social
security are those who work in the government and in private companies. According to
the World Bank assessment, in 2010, Mozambique spent 3.7% of the GDP on social
protection. From this total, 2% went to social security and 1.7% to social assistance
(World Bank 2012).

Table 6.1: Distribution of the expenses in Social Protection, 2010
US$(Million)
% of Total
Meticais
(Million)
Basic
Security

Social 5,012

152

44

Direct Social Action

1,782

54

16

Primary Education

2,199

67

19

Primary Health Care

657

20

6

Productive
Action

Social 373

11

3

Obligatory

Social 6,336

192

56

157

Security
Total

11,348

344

100

Exchange rate, 2010: US$1 = MT33
Source: Salazar and Zapatero 2012.

This amount of resource allocated to the INSS does not mean that that the
pensions provided the INSS are sufficient to provide good living conditions. In fact, the
pensions and other programs that the INSS provides are very low. According to the
World Bank, “the families of those receiving the average INSS pension are likely to be
below the poverty line if the pension is their only source of income” (World Bank 2012).
Three problems are related to this allocation to INSS. First, INSS covers just the
very small percentage of the population that has formal employment. Second, the
government has used the money of the INSS to invest in public and private companies,
rather than to increase the amounts of the benefits provided by INSS. 134

Third,

corruption scandals involving the private use of public funds by high-ranking government
officials have been common since the creation of the institute. 135 In fact, it was only in
2015 that INSS started to make its financial records public.
The third option of the government that restricts social protection programs is the
allocation of money within INAS. The main issue of the international actors involved in
the development of these programs is how to find the fiscal space necessary for its
development. Therefore, these actors suggest that the government transfer expenses from
other areas to finance social protection. One of the recommendations is, as discussed in
the previous chapter, to phase out the subsidies to consumption goods, such as oil and
“Além da CR Aviation o INSS tem investimentos irregulares na Épsilon Investimentos, empresa
relacionada com a ministra Vitória Diogo.” Verdade, 01 Ago 2016.
135
“Além da CR Aviation o INSS tem investimentos irregulares na Épsilon Investimentos, empresa
relacionada com a ministra Vitória Diogo.” Verdade, 01 Ago 2016.
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wheat for bread. However, the government still funds programs through INAS that do not
involve basic social assistance. For instance, part of the budget of INAS is to cover the
operational debt of public enterprises and the subsidies on oil and wheat (UNICEF 2014).
In 2010, the five public enterprises were Radio Mozambique, Mozambique Television,
Public Transports of Maputo, Public Transports of Beira, and Chockwe Hydraulic (World
Bank 2012).
Finally, another issue related to the development of social protection is the current
competing doctrine of “social responsibility” in Mozambique’s extractive industry. The
most promising revenue alternative envisioned by international actors and civil society
would be to increase the taxation of international natural resource exploitation companies
(Silva 2012). However, instead of negotiating more transparent contracts to increase the
taxation of the foreign companies, the government has enacted “social responsibility”
agreements. The government created the Policy of Entrepreneurial Social Responsibility
in the Extractive Industry (PRSEISE). This policy allows companies to limit their social
responsibility to promoting local development incurring a tax which might, if levied on
them, finance the systems of social protection. 136
The government of Mozambique has an incentive to develop internationally
designed programs of social protection because of its dependency on international aid,
which comes with demands and pressures of international actors. At the same time, the
government has made three decisions that limit the scope of social protection programs,
with little enforcement of international actors against them. These three decisions were
those involving the selection of beneficiaries of the programs, the allocation of resources
to the INSS, and the allocation of money within INAS.
136

“IESE critica politica de responsabilidade social na industria extrativa.” Jornal O Pais. 09/07/2014.
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One explanation for this reluctance of the government to increase the scope of
social protection programs is that such provision does not promote immediate political or
economic results for the political elite. For instance, people who benefit from the
programs do not know that they are provided by the state. The survey done by Selvester,
Fidalgo and Taimo (2012) in two districts of Gaza, Chokwé and Chibuto showed that
program beneficiaries had very low expectations about the state institutions and had little
understanding that those transfers originated from the state.
As a conclusion, it is possible to see that foreign aid was coming in, and that the
government’s programs neglected to find ways to improve and increase the reach of the
programs. In this sense, there is no evidence that the outside actors were trying to
pressure the government of Mozambique to make the program more effectively
redistributive, while the government of Mozambique itself was resisting. Therefore, the
point here is that international actors were satisfied with the results of the institutions of
social protections based more on what it has accomplished, than on what it could
accomplish.

6.5. Social assistance and (no) cash transfer programs in Angola
The low level of international involvement in Angola has resulted in a lack of
internationally designed institutions of social protection, i.e., cash transfer programs. To
be sure, the country does have a legal structure of social protection. Article 90 of the
2010 Constitution states that it is the responsibility of the state to promote social
development. Article 21 states that the main task of the government is to promote welfare,
social solidarity, and improvement of the quality of life. Institutionally, however, unlike
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Mozambique, Angola does not have a developed body of organizations responsible for
implementing and executing social protection programs. Despite its legal framework, the
government does not have an institutional framework to execute programs of social
protection on the ground.
Box 6.3: Social Assistance (or Basic Social Security) in Angola
Ministry: Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS), National
Directory of Social Assistance and Promotion (DNAPS), Provincial Delegations, and
Municipal Services.
Implementing Institution: None
Beneficiaries: People with limited or no sources for their subsistence.
Funding: State budget.
Kinds of Intervention: Programs of in-kind transfers.

Source: Centro de Informacoes de Proteccao Social (CIPS) and the book developed by MAPESS and INSS,
A Seguranca Social em Angola: Realisdades e Perspectivas, 2008.

Angola does not have programs of CT. Instead, the Ministry of Social Assistance
and Reintegration (MINARS) has adopted other programs of in-kind transfer, especially
food. According to data provided by MINARS, in 2011 around 600,000 people received
food aid through this program (OPM 2013). However, according to the 2013 Oxford
Policy Management (OPM) Report, these programs have faced several problems. First,
because of the lack of an implementing institution, the government contracts with private
companies to provide the assistance throughout the country. Second, there is not an
established budget for these programs, but rather, one that changes depending on the
decisions of the state. Third, because of the institutional and financial coordination
required to reach most of the municipalities, most of the programs are concentrated in a
few municipalities in the country, particularly in the capital, Luanda (OPM 2013).
In relation to CT, the only experience the country had was a small pilot program
financed by UNICEF in a southern province of the country, Cunene, between January
2010 and August 2011. The project was called “Mitigating the Impact of HIV/AIDS” and
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was implemented by the Angolan NGO Action for Rural Development and the
Environment. The program had limited funding, so it provided support to just 265
families (UNICEF and ADRA 2011). After the conclusion of the program, UNICEF
presented the results to the government as part of a proposal launched by UNICEF to
implement a national program of social assistance, with CT as one of its programs. The
government of Angola rejected the proposal.

The politics of social protection in Angola
The government of Angola announced its interest in promoting programs of
wealth redistribution during the electoral campaigns of 2008 and 2012 and in its Program
of National Development 2013-2017. These programs were designed in a different way
from those pushed by international actors. The choices of these programs can be analyzed
through the government’s institutional preferences, budget allocation to social protection
programs, and different kinds of development. With these choices, it is possible to see
that the government has connected social protection to a discourse and strategy of
macroeconomic development. This model of development does not include social
protection programs, such as CTs.
In the 2008 elections, the electoral campaign of dos Santos focused on the
provision of services and basic needs, such as water and housing. In the 2012 election,
the discourse of dos Santos focused on wealth distribution (equality) and social protection.
Several target-based programs were presented, including the abono familiar, a kind of
bolsa familia from Brazil, which was introduced during a visit of the former President of
Brazil, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva. Unlike the other programs that come from several
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ministries of the government, the abono familiar was proposed to have a direct oversight
from the presidential cabinet, instead of from one ministry. However, up to May 2015,
there was no available information or evidence that this program was going to be
established.
Redistributive programs were also announced in the National Plan of
Development (PND) 2013-2017 based on the long-run development strategy plan
“Angola 2025.” The main goals of these programs include the following: to preserve
unity and national cohesion, to guarantee the basic assumptions necessary for
development, to improve people’s quality of life, to include youth in the labor force, to
promote development of the private sector, and to stimulate the competitive participation
of Angola in the international context. These goals help show that the plan of
development is connected to the idea of modernizing the economy of the state through
macroeconomic development instead of inclusive growth. As Paulo (2010) mentioned
about this Angolan option of development,
[S]ome international commentators have suggested that the Angolan
development model, while producing impressive statistics for GDP and
investment may be relying excessively on “trickle-down development”—a polite
way of saying that so far it appears to be benefitting mainly the better-off. But
national leaders argue that their country needs to be completely rebuilt, starting
with the highways, ports and railroads. This will facilitate investment and
modernization in agriculture, which currently employs roughly six out of seven
Angolans, thus boosting rural incomes while helping feed the population.
This point raised by Paulo refers to a common debate in the development agenda.
Some argue that macroeconomic development should be done first in order to bring more
wealth to the country, and that then the society will benefit from the subsequent
economic growth. Alternatively, others believe that it would be better to redistribute the
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money through social programs in order to improve the condition of the poor, who do
after all constitute human and social capital, and make them part of the development
process. This is an old argument. However, it is important to remember that the trickledown strategy was first pushed by international actors during the structural adjustment
programs of the 1980s. It is because of the failed results of those programs–there was no
actual trickle-down–that some development actors go against such an idea.
The point of this dissertation is not to question the merits of each side and which
one is more appropriate for Angola. Rather, the point is that, regardless of the approach
Angola takes, the government needs to execute the proposed plans. In other words, it is
not the kind of development programs that matter, but that the programs are, in fact,
being implemented. For instance, in order to fulfill the promises of housing in the 2008
elections, dos Santos signed a contract with China to deliver a million houses in four
years. In this Sino-Angolan contract, the Angolan was to build entire new towns around
Angola, using Chinese construction companies to build the houses. The houses were
indeed built, but today these towns are called “ghost towns” because nobody lives there.
One reason for this, according to Benazeraf and Alves (2014), is related to the very high
cost of the houses, the prices of which were set by a private company. This indicates the
problems associated with linking social projects to private interests. Therefore, while the
programs increased the investment of China in Angola and increased the transfer of
money from China to Angola, the actual distribution of housing to the population did not
happen.
The second aspect of Angola’s social protection is the relation between social
security, created in 1990, and social assistance. Most of the Angolan institutional
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framework has focused on the provision of welfare to those who have formal
employment. There is also the law n.7/04 of 2004, Basis for Social Protection, whose
goals are to guarantee three benefits to workers: maternity leave, unemployment support,
and workers’ security. 137 This happens even though the economy is centered on the oil
sector, which is a capital-intensive sector that employs less than 1% of the total of the
work force.
However, the majority of workers, 66%, are still self-employed or have informal
jobs. Of the population with no formal position, 87% live in rural areas (UNDP 2011).
Given that most beneficiaries are people from urban areas, especially Luanda, the
distribution of assistance is concentrated in these areas.

138

For this reason, the

concentration of social protection for those who have formal work does not correspond to
the main needs of the population and an expansion of social assistance programs could
help those who do not have a formal position and represent the poorest people of the
country. According to the INSS website, Angola had 111,512 taxpayers in 2015. Similar
to the case in Mozambique, the INSS had several scandals of corruption and
embezzlement. For instance, in 2004, INSS confirmed that US$2 million were embezzled
from the institution’s funds. 139
Another important feature of the social protection mechanism in Angola is the
great part of the state budget that is allocated to social protection, under the “social
function” sector of the budget. However, as explained in the previous chapter, most of
this budget goes to fuel subsidies.
The law also makes provision for self-employed and dependent workers (Taylor 2008).
Most of the unemployed people are located in the urban areas in the country due to the extensive exodus
to those regions during the long period of civil war.
139
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In summary, the government of Angola has included distribution of wealth in its
official discourses during electoral years and in its development strategy. However, the
government has done little on the front of social assistance. The reference to wealth
distribution programs in the electoral period shows that the government sees the political
importance of these programs chiefly in terms of the votes that they can yield. However,
the weak political opposition in the country, as explained before, the oppression against
civil society organizations, and the lack of involvement by international actors give little
incentive for the government to adopt programs that benefit the entire population.

6.6. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to explain how different levels and kinds of international
involvement affect the social protection arrangement for the institutionalization of formal
social protection structures in Angola and Mozambique. The empirical evidence of this
chapter contributes to my argument in three ways. First, in Angola and Mozambique, as
most of the sub-Saharan African countries, a very small percentage of the population
have formal work and a great amount of the population falls under the poverty line. In
spite of this social structure, the governments of both countries provide more financial
support to social security than to social assistance. The decision to provide more to social
security supports my argument about the effects of exclusionary political institutions on
the social protection programs. Those who receive assistance from the government and
have formal work are individuals who have connections to the government, support it,
and, live in urban areas.
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This is not to say that the social security programs work effectively. In fact, social
security structures in these countries are very weak. Those who benefit from social
security are just the wealthiest of workers. Therefore, this reinforces again my argument
about the very restricted social protection structures of these countries.
Second, both countries have prioritized a market-oriented restructuring to favor
macro-development instead of redistributive programs. As discussed in the chapter, they
are two different kinds of development. However, it is not evident that the governments
have done what they have stated they would in terms of social development.
Third, because of the different levels and kinds of international involvement in
each country, they have variation in their institutional levels of CT programs. The fact
that Mozambique depends on international aid has made the country more susceptible to
international demands and pressures. One of the pressures from the international actors
was the adoption and increase in scope of CT programs. Given that Mozambique already
had had CT program since the early 1990s (also pushed by international actors as an
attempt to alleviate the negative consequences of the structural adjustment programs in
the 1980s), starting in 2004, international actors became committed to providing financial
and technical support to the institution to give it greater reach and scope.
Finally, there are two other important final considerations to be made in relation
to the case of Mozambique. First, the argument of the international donors and
international and domestic NGOs is that, globally, social protection has presented several
advances for the social and economic development of a society. Evidence, based on those
who receive the transfers, has proved that social protection gives long-term solutions for
problems derived from the contingencies that affect one’s economy, such as poverty and
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vulnerability. However, in Mozambique, coverage is still very limited, and the way that
social assistance has been provided still needs improvement.
Second, despite the advance of identifying categories of vulnerability and levels
of need, the social protection structure that is being developed in Mozambique does not
seem to be fully connected to its own reality. The very structure, borrowed from
developed countries, makes the implementation of social protection harder because it
requires the state to have a strong commitment to redistributive programs, which the state
of Mozambique, as presented in this chapter, does not seem to have yet. In addition,
while coverage has been very limited, the same discourse of prejudice and stigma
towards those who receive social protection in wealthy countries (e.g., laziness, and the
deserving vs. undeserving poor) has been replicated by some leaders of the government
in Mozambique. This negative discourse might indicate that the government could
interrupt or control the expansion of the social protection coverage even if the fiscal
space were enlarged.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1. Research question and argument
Since 2000, and even more after the 2008 economic global crisis, social
protection has become a central topic on the international development agenda. At the
same time as this international push for social protection, international development
actors have also started to include in their agenda the state-building process. As statebuilding, I mean the creation and reform of state political institutions. In other words,
international actors decided to provide assistance to the state so it could develop its
domestic programs, including those of social protection. This assistance took different
forms, such as direct financial and technical support for programs as well as direct
assistance to the state general budget.
The relationship between state building and social protection has raised academic
interest in the subject. The literature on the topic, mostly in the field of social policy, has
currently debated the actual feasibility of implementing social protection institutions and
programs. For this reason, they have analyzed some programs that have already been
created and implemented in poor and post-conflict countries. Some authors consider these
internationally implemented programs successful and argue that social protection can be
the solution to the problems of poverty and social inequality of those societies. Other
authors believe that the idea of social protection in these countries is far-fetched because
these states do not have the necessary resources or the necessary institutional capacity to
develop these programs and, as a consequence, social protection is just another donors’
fad. In other words, they do not believe that the programs of social protection can become
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national long-term sustainable institutions and they are just successful when they are
implemented as local and short-term programs.
In this dissertation, I analyzed arrangements of social protection and examined the
extent to which the involvement of international development actors in poor and postconflict countries overrides the influence of domestic political elites on the outcomes of
social protection. I argue that while the international development actors may influence
countries to adopt internationally designed social protection programs and institutions,
they alter neither the attitudes of the domestic government in relation to implemented
programs of social protection nor the outcomes of such programs.
I found empirical evidence for my argument by comparing three arrangements of
social protection in Angola and Mozambique: military reintegration programs, fuel
subsidies for consumers, and the institutionalization of formal social protection structures.
These two countries have different levels of international involvement, which I measure
based on the levels of international involvement in the state building process in the postconflict context, and the country’s reliance on foreign aid. Mozambique had greater
international involvement in its state-building process and relies heavily on international
aid, while Angola did not have international involvement in its state-building process and
does not rely on international aid. Despite the different mechanisms of influence that
international actors have in both countries, I found empirical evidence, detailed below,
that Angola and Mozambique have similar outcomes.
I am not suggesting that the domestic governments have specific features that
make them unwilling to promote social protection programs, such as neopatrimonialism
or clientelism, which are usually used in the literature to explain the actions of states in
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Africa. Rather, through understanding the particular political, economic, and social
factors in the history of Angola and Mozambique, I suggest that one of the main reasons
that allows the domestic political elite to contain and accumulate its wealth without
redistributive programs to the population is their link with the global market. In Angola,
this connection exists through the contracts between the domestic elite and international
actors for the exploitation and export of oil. In Mozambique, this relation happened
through the privatization of companies, as part of the structural adjustment programs that
the country went through in the mid-1980s. Recently, the exploitation of coal in the
country has also increased the link between the political elite and the global market.
Therefore, I challenge works that suggest that international actors can alter the
redistributive role of the state through the implementation of programs and institutions of
social protection. In other words, the domestic political elites, supported by international
market forces, have much greater influence on the extent and beneficiaries of the social
protection programs and institutions in Angola and Mozambique than international
development actors. I move now to the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation.

7.2. Empirical findings
The first arrangement analyzed in this dissertation is the reintegration of excombatants. This arrangement shows that the different involvement of international
actors at the end of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique did not alter the political
criteria to benefit some groups over others. The United Nations Peace Operations in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) developed and executed the reintegration programs in
Mozambique. One of these programs was the Reintegration and Support Scheme (RSS), a
cash-transfer program to support the reintegration of all the demilitarized combatants in
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the country. RSS was considered one of the most successful programs ever implemented
in a post-war context for former-combatants reintegration. It provided financial assistance
to all ex-combatants for two years, regardless of whether they fought on the side of the
incumbency or the insurgency. In Angola, the reintegration process was homegrown and
the support of the international actors was limited to the World Bank’s financial support.
The program provided cash for ex-combatants for a period of six months. At the end of
the international financial support to the programs, former-combatants reintegration
became the responsibility of state institutions, and the newly created ministries.
Once the states were in charge of such programs, the governments in Angola and
Mozambique prioritized former-combatants who fought on the side of the incumbency,
while they did not support the reintegration process to former-combatants from the
insurgency. In Mozambique, the government also decided to prioritize FRELIMO
combatants from the liberation war instead of the combatants from the civil war.
Therefore, despite the variation of international involvement in Angola and Mozambique,
they did not alter the domestic structure of the countries, which continued benefiting only
former-combatants of the incumbent party.
What I found in the process of the state involvement was that although both
countries had different levels of international involvement – Mozambique had one of the
greatest international involvement and Angola did not -- two factors allowed the variation
in international involvement to lead to similar outcomes. The first was the liberal
underpinning of the international involvement, which ensured that the international
involvement had little effect on the structures of social protection. In both cases, the
programs were short-lived and prioritized the goal of guaranteeing that the insurgents
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were not going to restart the war. The second aspect was that after international actors left
Mozambique and after they stopped funding the program of military reintegration in
Angola, the international actors did not pressure the domestic governments to continue
developing their program of reintegration. Therefore, domestic actors had no incentive to
promote an inclusive social protection structure for all ex-combatants.
The second arrangement is the fuel subsidies for consumers, which has a central
role in the political dynamics between the government and its constituents in both
countries. This social protection arrangement is a case that it is implemented by domestic
actors while international development actors, especially the international financial
institutions, are against it. International actors argue that these subsidies are regressive
and they do not benefit the poorest population in the country. Despite the variation in
international involvement in both countries, both countries spend a great amount of the
state budget on social protection to subsidize fuel for consumers, mainly kerosene and
gas.
Mozambique maintains its policy of fuel subsidies even though it goes against the
interests of international actors. The government of Mozambique keeps the subsidies
because, among other reasons, of the active demonstrations from the population against
the hike in the price of transportation fares. In addition, the government of Mozambique
is aware that these subsidies will not cause international actors to stop providing
assistance to the country. In Angola, the government provides the greatest amount of
money for fuel subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa, around 5% of its GDP. One of the
reasons the government has kept the subsidies has been to benefit the state-owned oil
company, Sonangol, and, as a result, the political elite that has access to the resources of
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the company. The only three times that the government decided to decrease the fuel
subsidies -- 2005, 2010, and 2014 -- were when the government was negotiating aid with
the IMF.
Therefore, given that the use of fuel is restricted among the population, being
used mainly by the wealthier population and the urban population, it shows the interest of
the government in having a social protection structure that benefits a very limited group
of the population.
The international financial institutions, as well as the international development
actors in general, claim that poor states should stop subsidizing fuel and transfer the
saved money to other social protection programs that target the poorest population. While
fuel subsidies have a self-serving role for those in power, they have an important political
role in these countries. For instance, fuel subsidies have an important role for the urban
population because it keeps the means of transportation affordable and this is how the
government receives support, i.e. electoral support, from this group of the population.
The third arrangement is the recent institutionalization of formal social protection.
In this arrangement, I show that the domestic attitudes and understandings of social
protection in Angola and Mozambique are very similar in two main points. First, they
both prioritize a market-oriented restructuring to favor macro-economic stability, instead
of redistributive programs. This is evident in Angola with its programs of development
that are related to macro-economic and infra-structure development. In Mozambique, the
recent growing extractive sector (coal and natural gas) and increasing contracts with
international industries have little favored the development of redistributive reforms.
Second, both countries have focused more on programs of social security for workers
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than programs of social assistance for the poorest population. While both programs are
important, the focus on social security indicates that both countries value a liberal and
work-oriented kind of social protection.
These two points show that, despite different levels of international involvement
in the countries, Angola and Mozambique have put forward programs of development
that are market-driven and with a liberal social protection, meaning that social programs
are provided to formal workers. Given that formal work is limited to a very restricted
number of elite and of the urban population in these countries, the implemented programs
reinforce the social, economic, and geographic (urban verses rural) inequalities within
these countries.
Despite these general similarities, these two countries have, in fact, a variation in
the implementation of cash transfer programs (CTs), which is the result of the variation in
international involvement in both countries. While Angola does not have such programs
or institutions, Mozambique has one of the largest and oldest social protection institutions
in sub-Saharan Africa.
CTs are programs that give money directly to a targeted group of individuals to
help them against vulnerabilities, such as natural disasters, and to help them against
conditions of extreme poverty. These programs have recently received central attention
from the development actors who are implementing them in several sub-Saharan African
nations. In some countries, international actors push for local projects, and in others, they
push for the institutionalization of these programs. When international actors push for the
institutionalization of CTs, this program becomes part of the social assistance of the
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country, which is divided into two branches of social protection: social assistance –
programs for the poor population – and social security – programs for workers.
Finally, in relation to the institution of CT in Mozambique, I argue that the
existence of the program is related to the indirect imposition and pressures from
international actors for the existence of social programs. Since the 2000s, when social
protection became central to the international development agenda, the government has
received financial and technical support to increase its CT programs. In fact, the program
is recently increasing its scope because of this assistance and the increase of the financial
provision from the state, as well. However, this increase in the program is contrasted by
discourses and attitudes from the domestic government against redistributive programs.
In addition, the focus of the international actors on technical and financial assistance to
these institutions raises the question of how much these institutions will alter the
exclusionary political structure of the country and, in fact, transform the nature of the
state towards redistribution.
This empirical evidence has shown, therefore, that international development
actors have not greatly affected the nature of the state and the domestic governments’
attitudes on redistribution and the outcomes of the institutions implemented. In the three
cases, domestic actors found ways to adapt and circumvent the international pressures on
redistribution in order to guarantee that the exclusionary domestic politics remain and to
continue benefiting its political constituencies; in other words, they are able to keep the
programs restricted.
Finally, another point evidenced in this dissertation is that while the domestic
political actors determine limitations of such programs, the international development
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actors are also part of the problem because their priorities are just as blind to the
problems of social as the priorities of the government. While international actors pushed
for social protection, they were not active in promoting policies to evaluate their results
and in monitoring the responsiveness of the state. Even in the third arrangement, where
the focus of the international actors is on the institutions of social protection, the fact that
several international actors treated the problems of these institutions as technicalities, as
shown in chapter six, raises the question of how much they really cared about the effects
of redistributive policies.

7.3. Angola and Mozambique post- 2014
The timeframe of the analysis of this dissertation ends in September 2014. After
that, the process of social protection in both remained the same. In Mozambique,
international and domestic actors continued developing and experimenting with different
structures of social protection. In 2014, with the support of the international actors, the
government started an evaluation process of the 2010-2014 National Strategy for Basic
Social Security (ENSSB). The evaluation was supposed to facilitate development for the
2015–2019 Strategy. A Support Group for Social Protection Programs was created to
develop this evaluation process. It was chaired by the National Institute of Social Action
(INAS) and includes the World Bank, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, the
International Labour Organization, the Dutch government, and the British Department for
International Development (DFID) (World Bank 2014). In addition, the government is in
the process of developing a comprehensive management information system for social
safety net programs (World Bank 2014).
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In Angola, on the other hand, there is no evidence of the development of
programs of social assistance in the country. According to the 2014 World Bank Report,
the only information provided about Angola is that the “government is making progress
in developing a general framework for social protection” (World Bank 2014). The Report
did not mention any new program or institute created by the country.
In relation to fuel subsidies, both countries continue subsidizing gas. In April
2015, the Minister of Natural Resources and Energy of Mozambique, Pedro Couto,
explained that there were domestic and international reasons to keep the subsidies,
including the necessity to keep the price of transport low, at the same time that the
international exchange rates and taxes related to the import of oil increased and made the
cost of importing oil rise. 140 In Angola, the subsidies of fuel also remained, but, at the end
of 2014, there was a decrease of the subsidy, causing a hike in the price for the
consumption of gas, as mentioned in chapter five. 141 The argument used by the
government to reduce the fuel subsidies was that it needed to channel money from the
subsidy to the programs of the National Development Plan 2013-2017. However, this
decision to phase out fuel subsidies also coincided with an economic crisis in Angola
caused by the drop in the price of oil on the global market. As a result, the government
was looking for an agreement with the IMF for loans.

7.4. Future research questions
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This dissertation has raised three empirical and two theoretical questions for
future research. The first empirical question is, what are the strategies that governments
with similar kinds and levels of international involvement use to circumvent international
demands to implement social protection programs? This question would differ from the
empirical question of this dissertation that analyzed two countries with different levels of
international involvement. In this sense, in a direction similar to that of the works by
Whitfield (2008) and Devereoux and White (2009), a comparative study between
Mozambique and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa that depend on international
assistance, such as Kenya and Tanzania, would help show that. A comparative study
between Angola and other countries that do not rely on international aid would also be
helpful to understand whether the position of Angola differs from that of other countries
that have similar leverage from international assistance.
The second empirical undertaking in this work is an analysis of the progress of
social protection programs in other developing countries. As explained in this dissertation,
the international development community used the cases of success of social protection in
countries like Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and South Africa to push for similar programs
in poorer and post-conflict countries. This study would explore the question of whether
international development actors take into consideration the current state and progress of
those programs, to prescribe and suggest better alternatives to the programs of social
protection implemented in the poor and post-conflict countries.
The third empirical question would be about the cash transfer (CTs) programs in
Mozambique. This dissertation took a broad perspective on the social protection structure
of Mozambique and tried to show how the governments of Mozambique and Angola are
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similar in terms of their attitudes towards social protection programs. However, the CT
program is still in progress and it has annually increased its number of beneficiaries.
However, it still requires time to evaluate its effect on the redistributive nature of the state.
Therefore, an empirical analysis of the program in the coming years will help show
whether this program will have a transformative role in the country.
In relation to theoretical questions, the first one investigates the very idea of social
protection. Given that each society faces different political and economic problems,
social protection as a policy should not be one single package to be implemented
everywhere. Therefore, the theoretical question that this perspective raises is, how to
address the fact that international development actors identify the targets of such policies
based on moral grounds (the poorest and most vulnerable), while the domestic actors
identify the targets based on political grounds (like the desire to increase the number of
appreciative voters).
Finally, the second theoretical question was somewhat addressed in this
dissertation. It would be what are the bases on which international actors interpret and
understand the societies for which they push for policies of social protection? Through
that question, it would be possible to theorize over how ideas and perceptions about the
recipient country could influence the decisions of countries to provide assistance to some
countries and not others.

7.5. Final considerations
This dissertation has shown that the development of social protection structures in
Angola and Mozambique is the consequence of the combination between international
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involvement and domestic political elites. The different arrangements of social protection
help bring into focus the question of the ongoing implementation of social protection
structures in countries with governments that have no commitment to redistributive
policies. The domestic elites end up using the structure to benefit themselves specific
groups of the population along political criteria.
The greatest push for social protection of international development actors
happened after the 2008 global economic crisis. In the context that followed this push of
social protection, three aspects related to the actions and perceptions of some
international development actors and domestic political elite of poor and post conflict
countries deserve attention. These points can also serve as the final considerations of this
dissertation.
First, after the 2008 global crisis, international development actors sought to
develop a sustainable and long-term strategy to guarantee that individuals in poor
countries would have a mechanism of protection against external shocks and
vulnerabilities. These institutions, therefore, started to be pushed in poor countries by
international actors who did not take into consideration the extent to which the domestic
political elites, in fact, determine the outcomes of such programs, They also did not pay
attention to the fact that, at that same time, the government of some industrialized highincome countries were making political decisions that directly affected their social
protection programs. In order to alleviate the effects of the global crisis, they promoted
fiscal austerity measures. The effect of such measures decreased their welfare states.
The second point is related to the attitudes of the domestic political governments
in some poor and post-conflict countries. Once they adopted the institutions and
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programs of social protection from international actors because of international demands
and pressures, some domestic governments use similar criticisms to those made about the
programs in the rich industrialized countries. For instance, the idea that individuals
should find a way out of poverty through work is a common criticism of the welfare state
in rich countries. However, this criticism, which is already problematic in rich countries,
cannot be sustained in the context of poor and post-conflict countries, where very few
formal jobs are provided, most individuals work in the informal sector, and a great part of
the population live in extreme poverty with no access to basic services.
Finally, the last point that deserves attention is related to the views of the
international development actors of their partner countries. Although the standard point
of view among the international development actors is that Angola rejects programs of
social protection and that Mozambique embraces them, through the analysis of the three
social protection arrangements, this view could be challenged. Driven by domestic
politics, the programs adopted by Mozambique often benefit only part of the so-called
target population intended by the international actors. As a result, the large number of
people living under poverty in Mozambique end up not being protected by the
internationally designed programs, which are meant to provide social assistance to the
poorest and to boost the economic development of the country through the well-being of
the population.
In conclusion, in theory, social protection is an effective mechanism to guarantee
that people have sources of income in moments of social and economic vulnerability, and
to help the poor to find ways out of poverty. The inclusion of social protection in the
international development agenda represents an important step forward in the promotion
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of social development, with a consideration of promoting social inclusion and halting
economic inequality. In practice, at the core of any social protection arrangement, the
main issue that should be addressed is who is actually being protected by the programs of
social protection adopted, and why.
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